310.393/8–1450
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)
| Participants: | Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. Rusk, FE | |
| Mr. Clubb, CA |
Mr. Burrows called by appointment. Mr. Rusk introduced the conversation by asking Mr. Burrows the significance of the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Mr. Bevin’s message of August 11 to Sir Oliver Franks. Mr. Burrows gave the interpretation that the matter of Chinese representation in the UN should preferably be considered in the Security Council rather than the General Assembly because, in the opinion of the British Government, it would thus be less likely that there would be created an overt East-West division. Mr. Rusk then computed the “East” group as comprising in the hypothetical circumstances India, Burma and Thailand.
Mr. Rusk said that there are various points where the American and English viewpoints were at variance. We could not agree, for instance, without question, to the assumption that China is essentially an Asian problem. Great Britain and the U.S. have had in the past many more relations with China than has had India. It is easier and quicker to proceed from Seattle to Shanghai, for instance, than from Calcutta to Shanghai. Color, moreover, is not necessarily a factor in determining relative interests. Mr. Burrows admitted that this was possibly true in practical respects, but said that the matter was in good part one of sentiment.
Mr. Rusk again admitted that it was true that the Nationalists could not be considered to be the Government of all China but he was moreover not sure that Peking on its part was quite warranted in claiming the support of all China. For instance, it was dubious whether Peking could claim full authority over Manchuria, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia: [Page 263] maybe Moscow had more to say in those areas than had the Chinese Communists. It was also questionable whether the Chinese Communists exercised full authority over certain parts of China proper, not to mention Tibet and Formosa.
Mr. Burrows pictured the attitude of the British Government as being that China should be represented in the UN and that the Peking regime was that best titled to constitute the representation. With respect to their behavior they should not be prejudged as guilty. Mr. Clubb asked at this point whether it would be proper to ask Peking to define its position with respect to international obligations generally, having in mind the relevant provisions of the Common Program* and with particular reference to the UN and its charter and to the UN decisions respecting Korea. Mr. Burrows replied that a new Government in the UN would naturally be called upon to give adherence to the statutes of the UN. Mr. Rusk commented that the present was not a case of new admission but one of change of personnel and Mr. Burrows on second thought agreed with him.
Mr. Burrows said that the British Government, of course, was not asking for action but was setting forth its position. Mr. Rusk observed that this position was equivalent to asserting that the UK would support the admission of the Chinese Communists into the UN regardless of whether they were guilty of crime at the time of their application. Mr. Burrows said that this was essentially correct, it being felt that the best chance for causing the Chinese Communists to shift away from the USSR was to give it certain opportunities. Mr. Rusk replied that it was doubtful whether the Chinese Communists should be paid all prices asked when they are still to be found on the side of the USSR. In the present circumstances, particularly, American public opinion would tend to be very critical of any British move along those lines. Mr. Burrows said that this was appreciated. Mr. Rusk went on to say that we of course appreciated that the British had their own problems of public opinion and realized that if the U.S. were to ask Britain to prefer Delhi to Washington, Britain might in turn ask whether we preferred Taipei to London. It was hoped, however, that there was not going to be caused a split down the Atlantic as well as one through the Pacific, but it was believed that British action along those lines would make it rougher going for a North Atlantic military program.
Mr. Clubb asked whether there might not be introduced a change into the situation if the Chinese Communists attacked Tibet, having particular reference to the present attitude of India. Mr. Rusk added direct Chinese Communist intervention in Korea as being a factor [Page 264] possibly also making for change. Mr. Burrows asked whether such intervention was thought likely. Mr. Clubb replied that it seemed at any rate a possibility which merited due consideration. Mr. Burrows commented that we were after all dealing with realities, whereas the suggestions were only hypothetical. Perhaps in such case, however, India might change its attitude. Mr. Rusk carried the discussion on to Formosa and pointed out that perhaps the US was not so isolated in this regard as might seem on the surface. The present situation there seemed somewhat stabilized, and General MacArthur1 does not expect an attack. It would be too bad if there were to develop a split between British and American policy at a time when the situation had thus become relatively stable. The situation in Indochina was commented upon with reference to the possible effects there of events in Korea. Mr. Clubb cited the Suslov report that the USSR would not let the North Koreans fail in Korea. Mr. Rusk noted that the report in question was unclear.
Mr. Rusk said that he would take the matter of Chinese representation in the United Nations up with the Secretary, who was returning the following night but probably would not see the message until the morning after. Mr. Burrows said that the British Ambassador was presently out of town but would return for discussions with the Secretary if it seemed desirable.