Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

700.5 MAP/7–2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] July 21, 1950.

The President received the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Harriman and me for the purpose of our presenting to him the attached memorandum dated July 21, 1950. The President read the memorandum.

At the request of the others, I then stated to the President that the purpose of bringing this matter before him was to give Mr. Spofford instructions and guidance for his negotiations. His purpose would be to try and get the European members of NAT to make a very greatly increased military effort. In order to do this, it was necessary for him to have some measurement of the size of the effort we hoped that they would make; (2) some measurement of the amount of help which we would give them in attaining this goal, and (3) an idea of what we could do to make available to them designs of weapons.

The President said that he thoroughly understood the purpose of it and asked whether there were any further comments.

Mr. Johnson then underlined the fact that of the sum of money mentioned in the second paragraph, $4 billion should be devoted strictly to military matériel and should not be used for general economic support. However, he developed the idea that it was quite possible that some of the $4 billion could be advanced to European countries as funds to finance the manufacture of military equipment. He was not prepared to say how much could be handled in this way.

Mr. Harriman stated that he had not understood this and that if substantial amounts were advanced in this way, it changed the economic problem of these countries. However, the point was that regardless of the amounts involved, the Europeans would require (1) physical matériel manufactures in the United States; (2) dollars to enable them to make the necessary defense effort since they would be losing essential dollars on which to live and produce on which to make the effort. The President said he thoroughly understood this and was prepared to and did approve the memorandum.

Mr. Harriman then mentioned to the President the fact that if this program was to be undertaken by the Europeans, reaching as it did into years beyond 1952, this Government would have to be prepared to reconsider its decision so far that ECA would end in 1952. The President said he throughly understood this also.

Mr. Johnson remarked that all his advisers told him that it would be totally impossible to get funds for Europe at this time for any purposes other than strictest military equipment. The President replied that he had been successful in more difficult tasks than this and was not at all discouraged at the prospect.

The President said that in approving this memorandum, we all understood that he was approving this as a position for us to take in our negotiation. He had every confidence that whatever came out of this negotiation we would be able to put through. He understood that the figures might be changed both in the course of the discussion and in the course of obtaining legislation and that we must have this in mind. We all told him that we thoroughly understood this.

Dean Acheson

[Enclosure]

July 21, 1950.

Points on Which It Is Necessary To Have a Decision Prior to Mr. Spofford’s Departure for London

1. That the latest staff study by the Department of Defense on force requirement estimates for the Mid-Term Defense Plan will be made available to Mr. Spofford by the Secretary of Defense for his guidance in his discussions on an expanded MDAP program. It should be understood that these force estimates have not been formally approved by the Secretary of Defense but were drawn up as guidance to General Bradley as the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group.

2. That Mr. Spofford is authorized to indicate to the NAT Representatives that the Administration is prepared to recommend to Congress an increased MDAP program of the order of magnitude of 4 to 6 billion dollars additional provided the other NAT countries are prepared to go forward promptly with the necessary measures to implement a program of development of defensive forces of the order of magnitude indicated in the staff study mentioned in paragraph one above. While it must be realized that the additional defense provided by this program is primarily for the security of the United States as well as for NAT defense, it is realized that there must exist some flexibility in the coordination of spending money for purely military purposes and for economic recovery. However, it must also be realized that the principal purpose of this additional sum is to provide additional defense and that to the extent of 4 billion dollars thereof, such 4 billion is related solely to defense.

3. That the United States is prepared to make available to the NAT countries such modern defensive weapons (under adequate security arrangements) as may be determined by the Department of Defense.

As approved by President at Meeting 4:15 p. m. July 21, 1950.