Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 154: USDel Min 1 & 2

United States Delegation Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France¹

secret

Brussels, December 19, 1950—5 p. m.

Mr. Bevin, who served as Chairman of the meeting with the consent of all present, said the first thing to be decided was the method of approach to the Germans on the issue of German participation in the European force. He said we must consider both the tactics and policy involved.

Mr. Schuman said it would be interesting to hear the High Commissioners’ views on these issues.

Mr. François Poncet spoke first for the High Commission. He said that he thought one thing was clear. Dr. Adenauer does not want to be forced by a formula which would require a yes or no vote in the Bundestag. He said that if such a vote took place now, the answer would be negative. Chancellor Adenauer wanted to be presented with a draft resulting from the Brussels Conference which the High Commission and Dr. Adenauer could discuss freely and fully. If the conclusions arrived at in these meetings were approved by the Foreign Ministers and the North Atlantic Treaty Council, they could then be made public. In conversations which had been held with Dr. Adenauer, it appeared clear that the formula of the European army² was the one which had most appeal to the German Government, parliament, and public opinion. He said the reason for this was that the working out of the plan for a European army, to be undertaken at a conference in January, would give the Germans an opportunity to take their place on a basis of equality with the others. Chancellor Adenauer would probably be convinced that the formula agreed to in Brussels was satisfactory.

Mr. François Poncet continued by saying that he would like to draw the attention of the three Ministers to a very delicate point. Even if agreement resulted from the Commissioners’ meetings with Adenauer, the Chancellor might not be able to get his Parliament to agree. This could happen even though no text was handed to Dr. Adenauer. For example, a vote could be taken on an interpolation. This had already occurred in the case of the undertaking which had been requested regarding German debts. While Dr. Adenauer had agreed, the Bundestag Committee had refused to support him. The High Commission had for some time noted an attitude of opposition to the High Commission and the Allies on the part of the Bundestag. It would be necessary for the Foreign Ministers to decide whether to avoid the debt issue or whether to do something about it. He pointed out that the arrangements agreed by the Ministers at New York were dependent for their entry into force on two conditions. Those things which were to be done unconditionally had been conceded to the Germans immediately, but the matters which were subject to conditions had not advanced a step. The High Commission is agreed that, before anything further is done, the Ministers should insist that the New York decisions be carried out.³

Mr. François Poncet said that it was important for the Ministers to bear in mind the state of German public opinion. The recent speeches by Schumacher and Niemoeller, the Grotewohl letter,⁴ and the possibility of a four-power meeting have all made a significant impression in Germany. The idea of neutralization has gained ground very rapidly. Finally, the Chancellor has asked on three or four occasions that the Occupation Statute be replaced by a contractual arrangement. He did not ask that this be done immediately. Two weeks ago, he said that he wished to see some indication of Allied willingness to move in this direction.⁵ The High Commission felt that it would be necessary to make some response to these requests.

Mr. McCloy said that he could confirm the accuracy of Mr. François Poncet’s report. He had recently seen the Chancellor,⁶ who had underlined the need for a free exchange of views after the Brussels meeting and the need for placing Germany on a status of equality at an early date. Mr. McCloy agreed that a decision needed to be taken on the status of the New York decisions before going into the rearmament question. The time had come to make clear to the Germans that the New York decisions must be implemented before any progress could be made. He thought that the Allies should consider any proposals made by the Germans as to the drafting of the debt acknowledgment.

Mr. McCloy agreed that Dr. Adenauer laid great store on contractual arrangements. He thought that Dr. Adenauer hoped by obtaining such arrangements to regain some of the ground which had been lost in the recent elections. Dr. Adenauer had indicated to him that he would be satisfied if the Foreign Ministers could make clear, without necessarily accepting the concept, that they did not reject it. Mr. McCloy said that this was a period of considerable unrest in Germany, owing to the recent elections and the Far Eastern situation. All of this had been accompanied by increased Communist activity and pressure. The situation is delicate, but if it is tactfully handled he did not despair of success. With regard to negotiating with the Germans on political questions, Mr. McCloy said that he thought that so far as we could we should proceed on the basis of the Germans making offers to us rather than our making offers to them. He said that if Dr. Adenauer had in mind the establishment of the contractual relations, he should come to us rather than have us go to him.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said he had nothing to add to the statements made by his colleagues.

Mr. Bevin thanked the High Commissioners for their views and then asked for discussion by the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Schuman said that, with regard to the approach to the Germans on their military participation, he believed the NATO communiqué⁷ showed the way and conformed to the High Commissioners’ feelings in the matter. The communiqué stated there had been no decision on the matter of German participation but that a unanimity of view had been reached by the NATO countries which had suggested that the High Commissioners work the problem out with the Germans. The Allies must not give the impression that they had reached a decision but rather that there would be negotiations with the Federal Republic on the basis of the Brussels meeting.

Mr. Schuman said the next question was how to get the New York decisions implemented. He agreed with what the High Commissioners had said on this point. We must have complete and rapid decision by the Germans on the New York decisions before proceeding further. The acknowledgment of the debts was more theoretical than practical, but since we had decided we wanted it, we must get the Germans to go along.

Mr. Acheson said he agreed we should not make a proposal to the Germans which they could turn down now and then use as a basis for a counter proposal. He thought the High Commissioners should inform Dr. Adenauer of the Brussels proposals and discuss them with him. He said our general attitude should not be that of urging the Germans to come along. While it was very important to obtain a German contribution to defense, he thought we would get farther by not pushing the matter with the appearance of too much haste.

Regarding the question of acknowledging debts, Mr. Acheson said he agreed with Mr. McCloy and that this was an action which the Germans should take. It was as much in their interest as in ours. He said we should not insist on particular language. He agreed with Mr. Schuman that there was an air of unreality to the matter, since all of the debts would have to be scaled down. The Ministers should not necessarily decide this question for all time, but they should take the line now that the acknowledgment should be given. They should not take a mere statement by Adenauer as being sufficient. He did not think we should refuse to discuss anything else with the Germans until the acknowledgment had been given but that we should refuse to put anything into effect until it had been given.

With regard to the other question, he thought we ought to indicate willingness to make a change in the occupation regime. We should tell the Germans that the Schuman Plan would help in bringing about a change and that the success of the forthcoming Paris talks would have a great bearing on the matter. We should be willing to discuss any ideas which the Germans had. The High Commission should carry on the discussions with the Germans. It is desirable that our ideas be lined up for these discussions. The work should be divided between the High Commission and the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany. The ISG should deal with technical problems requiring study and the High Commission should deal with those on which progress could be made most rapidly by discussion.

Mr. Bevin said that he thought the minds of the Foreign Ministers were moving along in the same direction. He was concerned about being too hasty with the Germans on the defense matter, particularly since several things seemed to be running together. He mentioned the possibility of four power talks in this connection. He said that he thought the High Commissioners should take the report on Brussels to Dr. Adenauer and ask him to study it. It was agreed that no written text would be presented.

Regarding implementation of the New York decisions and the question of whether this was conditional on anything else being done for the Germans, Mr. Bevin said he had a phrase to suggest which he had found useful in discussions with the British Cabinet. The phrase was “the Allies would take into account at each step progress on the New York decisions”. He said this would mean that German action on the New York agreements was not a condition but would clearly have weight in considering what else we did for the Germans. For example, the British would probably have no objections to the contractual arrangement but, in considering the question, German progress in implementing the New York agreements would have bearing.

Mr. Schuman said that he wanted it clear that he did not mean to say that until the New York agreements were implemented there would be no discussion with the Germans. He said that in fact, he would have no objection to such discussion but thought that no new concession should be made to the Germans prior to German satisfaction of the terms of the New York decisions.

All agreed that the approach discussed above was the one to follow with the Germans.

Mr. Schuman said there was a second question which he considered important. It was raised by Chancellor Adenauer in a memorandum of August 29.⁸ The question involved contractual arrangements and German equality. The French had accepted complete equality, of right and in fact, in the Schuman plan negotiations. He said we were also accepting it in the defense discussions. He was willing to negotiate on a basis of equality on the Occupation Statute.

He said that if equality means automatic and complete removal of restrictions and servitudes on the Germans, then we must be careful. He said that this state of affairs is a long term objective and did not involve an immediate decision to be made now or during the next year. He saw no drawback in telling Chancellor Adenauer that the day would come when the Germans would be freed from all controls but he did not think we should make a commitment now. Mr. Schuman said such action was prohibited by international commitments that cannot be ignored.

Regarding the other request of Adenauer on the subject of contractual arrangements, Mr. Schuman said that if this means that everything done in the future on Germany would be subject to negotiation, then he believed he could agree to this. He mentioned as examples the things covered in the memorandum of August 29, such as occupation charges, and saw no objection to handling these through negotiation on an equal to equal basis. He said it would add to the prestige of the Bonn Government. He saw no difficulty in the creation of mixed commissions and said that the experience in the coal and steel negotiations had been good. There never had been any trouble in these discussions with the German Government. Occupation costs, cost of barracks, etc., could be dealt with on the basis of bilateral negotiations.

On the other hand, Mr. Schuman did not believe it possible to put total relations with Germany, particularly matters relating to troops, on a contractual basis and supplant the occupation regime because the basis of relations with Germany is covered by four power agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam. To put all our relations with Germany on a contractual basis would be provocative to the USSR. Mr. Schuman mentioned the difficulty in conducting four-power negotiations on Germany in the future if we had already destroyed the basis for such negotiations and given the Germans their freedom. It would be particularly premature if Germany had military units. The USSR could say we were giving Germans military units to use in regaining their lost territories.

Mr. Schuman said that for other reasons as well we should not be too revolutionary. We had other agreements—NATO and with Benelux countries, for example—which should not be overlooked. We should view things broadly where the Bonn Government was concerned and give the Germans equality in procedures but he did not think we should go further at this time. He believed we should tell Adenauer that going too far at this time was not good for us or for Germany.

Mr. Acheson said that Mr. Schuman had raised fundamental questions. We had no intention of taking off all controls now but merely that the High Commissioner should explore all problems. What concerned him about Mr. Schuman’s attitude was not the problem of Germany but a problem which went to the next item on the agenda—the question of the four power meeting. To concede that we were so bound by our four power agreement on Germany that we could not make any move even though that move was in our interest, would be a fatal concession to the USSR. He pointed out that Russia had sought to destroy the quadripartite agreements and all that went with them. He said he was disturbed by the possibility that Mr. Schuman thinks the Western powers have a contractual relationship with the USSR which they cannot do away with except by negotiations with the Russians. We must not hesitate to take the steps we must take nor should we ever say that the Russians have a legal basis for claiming we cannot do those things which we must do for our own security. He pointed out that there was a difference between whether an action was wise and whether it was legal but he emphasized that we are not tied by a legal relationship to the Russians as regards Germany.

Mr. Bevin remarked that Potsdam and other agreements had never been denounced. He did not understand what Mr. Schuman had said that concerned Mr. Acheson so greatly. Was Mr. Acheson worrying that legal ties would now be brought up to keep us from doing anything in Germany?

Mr. Acheson said he understood Mr. Schuman to say that the French would negotiate with Germany on the basis of equality, but that there were some things which we could not do because we could not proceed without the consent of the USSR.

Mr. Schuman said that all he meant to convey was that the basis of our position in Germany is quadripartite and rests on agreements with the Russians at Potsdam and Yalta and on the unconditional surrender of the Germans. He added that the substitution of this four power basis would provoke a violent Soviet reaction and cited our position in Berlin as an example. We would be destroying unilaterally the Potsdam decisions which were the agreements of common victors If we gave all our powers to the Bonn Government, our presence in Germany would rest upon an agreement with the Germans.

Mr. Acheson asked that the Berlin issue be laid aside for a moment. He said it is always possible that if we do something it may provoke the Soviets. If the three Ministers did not choose to do something it must be because it was not in their interest to do so, not because of any agreement with the Russians. When we set up the Bonn Government some time ago, we heard the same arguments that were being made now. We had gone on and set up the Government. We must go on now with the rest of our program and not be halted by Yalta or Potsdam, which the Russians had repeatedly violated. He said our position in Berlin must be carefully considered but that this issue was much too complicated to be handled in the meeting that afternoon.

Mr. Bevin said all this indicated the desirability of going slow. What may seem right to do with the Bonn Government must be carefully examined by the High Commissioners in relation to other agreements. In so far as equality was concerned, instead of announcing that future negotiations would be on that basis, he suggested saying that from now on, whenever possible, negotiations would be on the basis of equality. He pointed out that there may be exceptions which would harm us if we had promised the Germans that in every case, equality would be the rule. As questions arise, each would have to be considered on its merits but we would aim for equality of treatment. Mr. Bevin remarked that what was being done now (the three Ministers sitting down and discussing these issues) was in itself probably contrary to Potsdam.

Mr. Acheson said the issue did not arise in connection with the question the Ministers were dealing with. It was not proposed to give up supreme authority. This issue seemed more important in relation to discussions with the Russians. He had thought it was sufficiently important to clarify the point.

Mr. Acheson then referred to a draft directive to the High Commission and to the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany which had been distributed by the US Delegation. He said he understood the British and French wished changes in it. (See Annex A).

Mr. Schuman suggested the changes which were made in the first and second paragraphs of the US draft. These were adopted without discussion.

There was considerable discussion of subparagraph (a) of the third paragraph, regarding which both Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin proposed changes. The changes made were essentially those proposed by Mr. Schuman.

Mr. Schuman also proposed suppression of the words “with a unified Germany” in subparagraph (c). He said, in this connection, that he wanted to make clear he had in mind excluding from contractual arrangements not only the question of frontiers, but also the presence of the Allies in Germany. He added that the conditions and atmosphere of the occupation would be on a contractual basis but not the presence in Germany of the occupying powers who were there by right.

With regard to subparagraph (d), Mr. Schuman said that the relaxation of controls should be conditional on German adherence to international statutes and organizations.

With the changes indicated, the directive was agreed upon.

The Foreign Ministers then approved the communiqué to be issued on Germany. (Annex B)

Mr. McCloy argued for the inclusion of some reference in the communiqué to “contractual arrangement” on the ground that this would be helpful to Dr. Adenauer but it was decided to omit mention of this phrase.

Mr. Bevin said there was one additional point which should be discussed. He said there was a difficulty about the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement. The Ministers had agreed at their last meeting that it should be discussed. Now the French were opposed to discussing it. He asked whether this was still the situation, remarking that there was pressure to complete the agreement.

Mr. Schuman said that the point was taken care of in the directive.

The Ministers then began discussion of the possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Bevin said that no general discussion of the substance of issues should be carried on with the Russians at the “official” level. He said if we say we designated officials rather than Ministers for such discussions, the reaction in Great Britain would be that we were not making a serious effort to talk to the Russians. While Great Britain was ready to do all possible in regard to defense and further taxation, it was essential to make a real effort to discuss these matters with the Russians. He believed that Soviet positions would be revealed when an agenda for a meeting was drafted. He pointed out that the British Government was accused of sending in 1939 a Foreign Office official to Russia for discussions there. He said that no Minister had been sent and that this was now regarded as a serious error. He spoke of the feeling in the UK that a CFM meeting was necessary even if there was great doubt that it would succeed in reaching agreements.

Mr. Schuman said that French public opinion on a meeting was similar to British opinion. He said he agreed that public opinion was in favor of the Ministers themselves going, rather than sending officials.

Mr. Acheson then said that it was extremely important that the discussion of a proposed CFM be held in the utmost secrecy. He said that any leak of these discussions would have the most far-reaching consequences and would give away the entire tripartite position.

Mr. Bevin then asked if Mr. Acheson would like to have a closed meeting for consideration of this subject. Mr. Acheson said he would and Mr. Schuman agreed.

In the private meeting which followed, Mr. Bevin outlined again the view of the British Cabinet that discussions of the nature proposed had to be handled at the Ministerial rather than at the official level.

Mr. Acheson said that, before getting into a discussion of the actual text of the reply, he wanted to make it clear that the US did not regard the present note as an acceptance of a CFM. Both Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman expressed their full concurrence.

The three Ministers then agreed on a text for the disputed paragraph 6 (see text of note in Annex C⁹) and on the following timetable with regard to this reply:

1) The text was to be communicated at noon Wednesday December 20 to Chancellor Adenauer in Frankfort by the three High Commissioners or their representatives and to the Austrian Government by the three High Commissioners in Vienna. At the same time the Benelux representatives would be informed as agreed by the British and French in their meeting.

2) Delivery of the note would be made at 5 p. m., Friday, December 22, or as near thereafter as possible, to the Soviet Foreign Office by the three Embassies in Moscow.

3) The note would be released to the press about 12 hours after delivery in the three capitals, or at around 10 p.m. Washington time, Friday, December 22.

The meeting adjourned at 9:20 p. m.

Annex A

[Brussels, December 19, 1950.]

Paper Prepared by the United States Delegation

Terms of Reference for Allied High Commission and the Inter-Governmental Study [Group] on Germany¹⁰

The Foreign Ministers have decided to institute promptly preparations for a general outline of arrangements to be made with the Federal Republic of Germany, which would reflect [the basic change in occupation status required by] the agreed¹¹ changes in the present occupation regime by reason of Germany’s participation in Western European Defense. After preliminary discussions with the Federal Chancellor and other leaders of West Germany, the High Commissioners should [formulate] elaborate this outline in broad terms for consideration by their Governments.

The High Commissioners should examine the problems involved in the development of a new relationship between the Occupying Powers and Germany, and should recommend, as a matter of priority, to their Governments those aspects which they feel should be dealt with by the Inter-Governmental Study Group. The Inter-Governmental Study Group shall reconvene in London [not later than January 15,] during January, 1951, to consider those problems referred to it as a result of these recommendations, and to complete the work assigned to it by the Foreign Ministers in September 1950.

The High Commissioners and the Inter-Governmental Study Group should be guided in their work by the following general principles:

(a) The entry of Germany into Western Defense arrangements would logically entitle it to substantial freedom [and equality]. The goal should [, therefore,] be to [place] establish the relations between the Occupying Powers and Germany [on a basis to achieve this end, taking into account proposals made for the substitution of contractual agreements for the present occupation status] on as broad a contractual basis as possible, taking into account the resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council and, to this end, to associate the German Federal Government in the working out of future arrangements concerning this Government.

(b) In working out the relationship contemplated in (a) above, every effort should be made to explore with the Germans the problems involved, so that the final plan will be mutually satisfactory.

(c) The arrangements in (a) above should cover all aspects of these relations, except such problems as can be resolved only in a peace settlement [with a unified Germany].

(d) Commitments made by Germany through its adherence to international statutes or organizations would [facilitate] render possible the relinquishment of occupation controls.

Certain of the subjects covered by contractual arrangements with Germany will involve countries other than the Occupying Powers. The Study Group should identify these subjects and should submit recommendations as to the procedure to be followed in dealing with them.

Annex B

[Brussels, December 19, 1950.]

Agreed Tripartite Communiqué on Germany

Following is text of agreed tripartite communiqué:

“The North Atlantic Council having agreed upon the establishment of an integrated force for the defense of Western Europe and upon the appointment of the supreme commander, the Foreign Ministers of the USA, UK and France considered the problem of associating Germany in the common defense effort of the free nations of the West.

The three Ministers have authorized their respective High Commissioners, in discussions with the Government of the Federal Republic, further to explore this problem on the basis of the Council’s proposals, as well as any changes in the present occupation arrangements which might logically attend a German defense contribution.”

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed, which contained a table of contents and indicated that the meeting was held in the Palais Provincial at 5 p. m. A set of draft summary minutes of the meeting is in the CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 154: BFM Memo #1.
2. For documentation on the compromise formula for the European army arrived at during the sixth session of the NATO Council, December 18–19, see vol. iii, pp. 585–595.
3. For the text of the New York Foreign Ministers decisions on Germany, see Document 37 Final, September 19, vol. iii, p. 1286.
4. Regarding Grotewohl’s letter to Adenauer, November 30, calling for the establishment of an all-German Constituent Council to pave the way for all-German elections, see telegram 811, December 7, from Berlin, p. 668.
5. Regarding the meeting of the Allied High Commission with Adenauer on December 1, see telegram 348, December 1, p. 789.
6. For a memorandum of McCloy’s conversation with Adenauer on December 16, see p. 674.
7. For the text of the NATO communiqué see Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1951, p. 7.
8. For the text of Adenauer’s memorandum of August 29, see Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945–1953 (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966), pp. 280–281.
9. Not printed; for the text of the agreed tripartite note, see telegram 605, December 21, p. 920.
10. A bracketed note in the source text indicates that all material in the text in brackets was eliminated from the U.S. draft while the underlined portions (here printed in italics) were inserted.
11. A corrigendum to the United States delegation minutes indicates that the word “agreed” should be deleted from the terms of reference.