Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762.0221/12–2250: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Bonn, December 22, 1950—4 a. m.

414. AGSec from Slater. For Acheson and Byroade. Verbatim text.

Following is summary report of HICOM Council Meeting with Chancellor Adenauer (which lasted nearly five hours) held Bonn-Petersberg 21 December with Poncet (French) chairman, Kirkpatrick (UK) and McCloy (US) present:

1. Implementation of Brussels’ decisions:

A. Review by chairman

On basis of discussion HICOM executive session prior to meeting with Adenauer, Poncet gave report Brussels’ decision in which he stressed:

(1) That Federal Republic would be at full liberty to consider, comment upon, accept, reject or make counterproposals re plan for Federal Republic contribution to western defense. High Commissioners have been instructed to find agreement on basis of agreement which is to be freely negotiated and entered into by all parties concerned.

(2) That Federal Republic would be invited to participate, without prejudice to future decision, in January Paris conference which would deal with political, financial and military problems connected with implementation of Brussels’ decision.

(3) That present basis of planning, subject to Federal Republic concurrence, envisaged establishment of German units which would have at their disposal heavy fire power, tanks, tactical air units, engineers, et cetera. These units would be trained with allied troops in Germany in joint military academies. Method of recruiting, equipping and organizing such units would be settled by common agreement between Federal Republic and HICOM. Armaments of such units would be supplied from both allied and German sources under a program still be formulated.

(4) That deploying and future use of these units would be determined by Supreme Allied Commander. In interim period, such units would be attached to allied forces in Germany. Poncet continued that German contribution to west defense required re-examination of present HICOM-Federal Republic relationship in order that it should be adapted to the new political situation resulting therefrom. Subject to retention of basic principle which serves as basis for presence of occupation forces in Germany, a principle which for the moment could not be altered, HICOM was prepared to consider substitution of contracts and treaties on basis of Federal Republic proposals for certain present HICOM powers and practices. Poncet advised Adenauer, however, that new program could commence only after full implementation of New York decisions now being held up pending receipt of Federal Republic assurances of such undertakings (see paragraph 2 below).

B. Adenauer reply

Adenauer expressed his great satisfaction that:

(1) High Commissioners had been designated to conduct negotiations with Federal Republic.

(2) Eisenhower had been appointed Commander-in-Chief.

(3) Federal Republic would have opportunity to accept, reject or make counterproposals regarding draft plans.

(4) Organization envisaged included not only combined European army but also controls over production which could outlast present east-west crisis and serve as basis for further European integration. (In this connection, he expressed hope that British would adopt proper attitude toward such plans which were essential to integration of Western Europe.).

Adenauer stated that German public had two prerequisites which would have to be met before they would be willing to make contribution to western defense. First prerequisite is that western allies must maintain sufficient military force in Germany to insure defense of Federal Republic area against Soviet invasion and not merely retention of force adequate to cover allied retreat. In his opinion, this prerequisite had been met inasmuch as UK and France realized that if Federal Republic area would fall under Soviet control, they would lack security and that Eisenhower would not have been appointed (or have accepted appointment) Commander-in-Chief of a force which merely intended to retreat. He believed German public could also be convinced that Eisenhower appointment was manifestation that US took European defense problem most seriously. Second prerequisite is that German contingents would have complete equality and would not have to fight under circumstances less favorable than other contingents.

In order to satisfy second prerequisite he suggested that HICOM-Federal Republic military experts meet to discuss military problems involved. He nominated Herr Blank and Generals Heussinger and Speidel to serve as a Federal Republic delegation, with Blank acting as chairman. (High Commissioners made no definite nominations; however, Kirkpatrick mentioned possibility of Jack Ward, new UK Deputy High Commissioner, as member of UK delegation. I have in mind appointment of General Hays as member of US delegation.).

C. Ultimate allied authority for presence in Germany, Adenauer’s request for clarification of Poncet’s reference to “interim and final stages” of occupation and retention of basic principle which served as basis for presence of allies in Germany touched off long and somewhat heated discussion. Adenauer stated that principle set forth by Poncet was based on “unconditional surrender” and concept therefor, contracts and increments of sovereignty granted under such contracts could be repealed or withdrawn by three western powers. He expressed hope that period during which HICOM would insist on retention of such a principle would be as brief as possible. He stressed that no reference to this principle should be made public when [and] if the phrase “retained for the moment” as expressed by Poncet, were employed. I stressed that although Foreign Ministers had given High Command [Commission] authority to discuss any proposals, political or military, put forward by Federal Republic, it was necessary that the most careful consideration be given before existing basis for our presence in west Germany and Berlin be altered as such consideration involved not only Germany and our position in Central Europe but also peace of the world. A considerable part of the meeting was devoted to correcting in Adenauer’s mind a misunderstanding concerning contractual arrangements to be effected between Federal Republic and HICOM. Adenauer, during entire period of this misunderstanding, was very much disturbed at thought that occupying powers might retain until east-west settlement this principle of ultimate right to remain in Germany on basis of unconditional surrender concept as opposed to his concept of right based on treaty arrangement and also by the thought that allies could repeal any contractual arrangement made on basis of this ultimate right. This latter thought was also based on a misunderstanding of our explanations of the reasons we wanted to retain ultimate right for time being. At one point Adenauer temporarily reneged on his agreement to commence study of German contribution to western defense. We finally convinced Adenauer that the present relationship with Federal Republic would be put wherever and as quickly as possible on a contractual basis. The question of our ultimate right in Germany, however, would have to be the matter of future consideration and most careful study.

D. During course of conversation I made following points, inter alia:

(1) Brussels’ decisions represent significant departure from past procedure of “fixed formula” approach to Federal Republic as opposed to present concept of a free exchange of views designed to reach mutually satisfactory arrangements. German press had not given proper attention to this significant development;

(2) Although HICOM does not have power of decision re Federal Republic counterproposals, it can refer such counterproposals to Foreign Ministers together with its recommendations, and if latter body cannot act promptly, then matter can be decided by deputies who are always in session;

(3) Many of the considerations with respect to such matters as type of weapons to be employed, manner of training, size of force, et cetera may well be modified by the Commander-in-Chief who will be responsible for establishment of a practical force in the field. The main concept which must be understood is that the force should be constituted as a European force rather than a series of national armies with general staffs.

E. Understandings.

After clarification of above points with Adenauer, he agreed that military and political talks of exploratory nature could commence. This clarification took form of two recorded statements agreed upon by HICOM in reply to Adenauer’s questions. Agreed verbatim texts of which follow as separate cable.¹

F. Communiqué.

High Commissioners and Adenauer issued following communiqué as result of above discussion:

“The Chancellor was assured that the Federal Government would not, in the matter of a German contribution to the defense of Europe, be confronted with faits accomplis It was agreed that conversations would shortly take place between Germany and allied experts, in which the scale and manner of a German contribution would be examined. The result of this examination would then be the subject of discussion between the Allied High Commission and the Federal Government. The Federal Chancellor noted with satisfaction that the Allied Governments were prepared to place their relationship with the German Federal Republic to an increasing degree on a contractual basis. Conversations to this end will begin shortly.” End text.²

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 2–4 in which the Grotewohl letter, the German debt undertaking, and the Federal Civil Service Law were discussed.].

Department pass Moscow. Sent Dept 414 Repeated information Frankfort for limited distribution 467, Berlin for Taylor 160, Paris for Bruce 107, London for Gifford³ 106, Moscow 13.

McCloy

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. For another account of the discussion of the Brussels decisions, see Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945–1953 (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966), pp. 310–315.
3. Walter S. Gifford, Ambassador to the United Kingdom.