USUN Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Subject: Arab League Attitude toward Negotiations with Israel.
| Participants: | S—The Secretary |
| The Ambassador of Israel | |
| ANE—Mr. Rockwell |
I received Ambassador Elath at his request. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to take up with me on the most urgent basis the attitude recently displayed by the Arab League concerning negotiations by the Arab states with Israel.
The Ambassador said that the Israeli Government was seriously disturbed by the resolution adopted by the Arab League providing that any Arab state which negotiated a peace with Israel without the consent of the League would be considered as automatically out of the League and would be subject to economic boycott by the other Arab states. The Israeli Government was particularly disappointed because of the harmful effect this resolution would have on the Israeli conversations with the Jordanians. The Israelis believed that chances for negotiating an Israeli-Arab peace with all the Arab states together were very poor, and that individual negotiations between Israel and the separate Arab states were likely to be much more productive. After the League resolution, the Israeli Government thought that it would be more difficult to come to peace terms with Abdullah. The Israeli Government also thought that the presence of the Mufti as a delegate in the League meeting had made an unfortunate impression in the Arab world. The Mufti was the personification of Arab violence, and his presence in the League meeting might strengthen the hands of those Arabs who desired the resumption of hostilities.
[Page 843]The Israeli Government thought it particularly unfortunate that the Arab League had come out with nothing positive. The representatives had made no progress toward solving their own numerous internal economic and political problems, but had merely banded together to seek outlet from their own troubles by pointing to Israel as the cause of all their difficulties.
The League resolution, when combined with the US–UK attitude in seeming approval of Arab rearmament, would have a psychological effect which the Israeli Government thought harmful. The Ambassador said that this rearmament itself might perhaps not be on a very great scale, but that the encouragement given by it to Arab revenge motives was considerable. The Arabs believed, said the Ambassador, that the US and UK were supporting them. Mr. Bevin’s recent “unfortunate” remarks in the House of Commons contributed to this impression.
The Ambassador then declared that his Government knew that rearmament by Israel was not the solution. Israel did not wish to spend money on unproductive military material, but in the circumstances would like to acquire some additional arms so that the Arabs might realize that any venture on their part would be very costly for them. The Israeli Government still maintained that the UK should cease its shipments to the Arab states.
The best way to peace, continued the Ambassador, lay in direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states one at a time. Dr. Bunche had been successful in using this method. Mr. Porter had not been successful with combined negotiations. King Abdullah should be further encouraged in his desire to reach a peace with Israel. There was one thing that was entirely certain, and that was that Israel had no intention whatsoever of attacking any of the Arab states.
Under these circumstances, the Israeli Government hoped that the US would use its best influence to see that the recent resolution of the Arab League should not hinder the possibilities of peace in the Near East. Encouragement of King Abdullah was not enough. It had to be brought home to all the Arab states that nothing is to be gained by the continuation of their present hostile attitude.
Ambassador Elath then said that Israel was encouraged by the Trusteeship Council’s decision to refer the revised Jerusalem statute to Jordan and Israel for their opinions. This course of action did not mean that Israel would cease its efforts to reach an agreement with the Christian world, and particularly with the Vatican. The Ambassador thought that the Vatican was very realistic and would abandon its present uncompromising attitude when it realized that the revised statute did not have much chance of being put into effect.
[Page 844]I explained to the Ambassador the action which we had taken in the Arab capitals when we had first heard the rumors that the Arab League was planning to expel Jordan for its negotiations with Israel. Our representatives in the Arab countries had been instructed to urge moderation and prudence upon local Government officials. We thought that our action might have had something to do with the League’s decision to back away from the expulsion resolution. This did not mean we were pleased by the resolution as adopted, but at least it was not as bad as originally it seemed it might be.
I added that we had the impression that in the recent League meeting the Arab leaders had adopted a purely public attitude, and that in private most of them felt that they would eventually have to reach peace arrangements with Israel. I said that we would continue our efforts to urge upon the Arab leaders a prudent and conciliatory attitude, but that, of course, the Arab states were sovereign nations and our influence was necessarily not unlimited. I stated that generally speaking, however, past history had shown that the Arab League has taken extreme positions which it has not carried out.
I assured the Ambassador that our views as regards the necessity of peace and stability in the Near East were the same as his. We were encouraged to think that progress was being made toward peace, and we would continue our efforts to facilitate this progress.
The Ambassador expressed his gratitude for the above information, which he said was the most encouraging he had heard for quite a while. He would immediately inform his Government, which he knew would be grateful for what the US had done.
- Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.↩