784.00/4–650
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs
Subject: Stability in the Palestine Area
| Participants: | NEA—Mr. Hare |
| Mr. Burrows, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Greenhill, British Embassy | |
| ANE—Mr. Rockwell |
Messrs. Burrows and Greenhill called under instructions to discuss the question of the stability of the Palestine area.
Mr. Burrows said that the Foreign Office had decided that there was little hope of being able to establish at the present time a regional security system in the Near East. The present state of Arab-Israeli [Page 845] relations prevented any kind of cooperation between Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Hare commented that the Department had understood that the British Government hoped eventually to draw Israel in with the Arab states for a kind of partnership with the UK for the military defense of the Near East. Mr. Burrows said that this might be so but that he foresaw that any such complete arrangement would be a long way off.
Mr. Burrows continued by stating that the Foreign Office would be prepared to make a declaration to the effect that the British Government would take strong steps in an attempt to prevent aggressive moves either by the Arabs or Israelis in the Near East. The Foreign Office was tentatively thinking that such a statement might be made on the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, even if this takes place, as seems likely, before any Arab-Israeli agreement is reached. The Foreign Office was also thinking that at the same time proclamation might be made of the extension of the provisions of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to Arab Palestine. The Foreign Office wondered whether the US Government would be willing to make the same sort of declaration at that time, a declaration which would welcome the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan and support the UK statement against aggression in the Near East.
Mr. Hare said that his first reaction was that the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine with Jordan would not be such a favorable time for the US and UK to make a declaration as the occasion of an agreement between Israel and one of the Arab states. With regard to a statement approving the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, Mr. Hare recalled that the Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the US is a member, had only last December challenged the claim of Israel to sovereignty over all the territory now controlled by Israel.
Mr. Rockwell said that the Department had recently been giving considerable thought to the question of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. He wished to mention the following factors for the consideration of Messrs. Burrows and Greenhill:
- a.
- The union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, with US and UK approval, would certainly shut the door on any possible territorial readjustment in Palestine, since the reaction of Israel would undoubtedly be to proclaim sovereignty over all territory under its control.
- b.
- There was the question of whether the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to Arab Palestine would inject a third party into the Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement, with adverse effects on the agreement.
- c.
- Since the question of Jerusalem was sub judice in the United Nations, it would be impossible for the US to approve the incorporation of Arab Jerusalem in Jordan.
Mr. Rockwell said that in his personal opinion it would be much better to continue the present process of gradual extension of Jordan sovereignty to Arab Palestine rather than to make a sudden pronouncement of a constitutional union. Mr. Burrows replied that in the opinion of the British Government there were at present dangerous disintegrating tendencies in Arab Palestine and that the psychological stimulus of formal incorporation was necessary. It was particularly desirable to strengthen the Jordan Government against the activities of the Mufti and his followers. Mr. Burrows maintained that the influence of the British Government upon King Abdullah was not unlimited and that the King seemed definitely determined to go ahead with a formal proclamation of union as soon as the elections were over.
Mr. Rockwell inquired what the reaction of the other Arab states would be to the incorporation of Arab Palestine and Jordan. Mr. Burrows said that the reaction would undoubtedly be hostile but that the British Government was prepared to disregard it.
Mr. Hare said that one difficulty for the US was that we were members of the PCC, which had a mandate to promote negotiations between the parties to the Palestine dispute. A unilateral move by one of these parties would certainly make the Commission’s already difficult task all the more so. As the British Government knew, the US approved of the incorporation of Jordan in Arab Palestine and the extension of the terms of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to the new territory, at an appropriate later date.1 Mr. Burrows then inquired whether it would be better from the US point of view if the proclamation of union should take place after some sort of agreement had been reached between Jordan and Israel. Mr. Hare said that this would definitely be better. Mr. Burrows then asked whether if there were such an agreement between Jordan and Israel the US would be able to make some kind of reassuring declaration concerning stability in the Near East shortly thereafter. Mr. Hare replied that this was a question which was being actively considered in the Department at the present time but he was not prepared to indicate what the decision would be.
Mr. Greenhill inquired whether it would be easier for the US if the Arab League should approve the incorporation of Arab Palestine. Mr. Hare said that this would help but that it would be still better if there were also a previous Israel-Jordan agreement.
Mr. Rockwell then said that King Abdullah seemed to be most interested in the Palestine Conciliation Commission’s new proposal [Page 847] combining mediation and direct negotiations. The King appeared to think that this gave him an out in connection with the recent pronouncement of the Arab League against separate negotiations with Israel. Mr. Burrows and Mr. Greenhill had not heard of this interest on the part of King Abdullah.
Mr. Hare stated that there were three imponderables in the situation. One was the result of the Jordan elections, the second was the action the Arab League might take before concluding its Cairo meeting, and the third was the reaction of the Arab states and Israel to the new PCC proposals. The Department would wish to consider all of these factors.
Mr. Burrows then took up the question of arms for the Near East. The Foreign Office hoped to be able to supply arms to both the Arab states and Israel but the conditions for this did not yet obtain. Supplying arms to Israel would be very harmful to the UK’s relations with the Arab states. Therefore, no Israeli application for armaments would at present be entertained. When such applications were considered, the size and equipment of the Israeli armed forces would be an important factor in any decision. The UK would wish to be as well informed concerning the Israeli military establishment as it is concerning the Arab armies.
Mr. Hare inquired whether the UK was obtaining guarantees from the Arab states that arms supplied to them by the UK would not be used against Israel. Mr. Burrows said that such guarantees were not being obtained for each shipment but that in the past over-all assurances had been obtained from all the Arab states.
Mr. Burrows then remarked that the Foreign Office was worried that the present US–UK attitude toward arms for the Near East lead the US–UK into what both countries agreed was a most undesirable situation—that the UK would supply arms to the Arabs only and that the US would supply arms to the Israelis. Mr. Hare agreed that this was something which must be carefully avoided.
- The latter portion of this sentence, italicized here by the editors, was ordered deleted by Mr. Rockwell in a revision of his memorandum of conversation, drafted by him on April 20.↩