357.AB/7–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
232. 1. I learned yesterday through high and reliable Indian governmental sources following:
- a.
- During recent conversation between Liaquat and Nehru with Dixon participating, Dixon did his best to find formula for demilitarization looking forward to general Kashmir plebiscite.
- b.
- Liaquat displayed willingness make generous concessions in matter demilitarization provided his concessions would assure general plebiscite. Nehru was unyielding, laying down conditions which Liaquat obviously could not accept.
- c.
- During last of series of conversation after it had become clear that it was impossible find formula which would assure general plebiscite, Dixon advanced for consideration idea of partial partition plus plebiscite in Vale; that is, roughly each country to retain what it now controls of Kashmir subject to certain possible minor frontier adjustments with exception plebiscite would be held in Vale of Kashmir.
- d.
- Liaquat violently opposed such suggestion and Nehru felt compelled at this stage to act as though he was not enamoured with it.
2. My informant who had been sent to me by one of most powerful political figures in India added that:
- a.
- Indian Cabinet was extremely anxious for settlement of Kashmir in near future on basis which will leave as little bitterness as possible.
- b.
- It was absolutely out of question, however, for India to permit Jammu with its heavy Hindu population and its geographical position to go to Pakistan.
- c.
- Cabinet believed only solution was that of partition-plebiscite as advanced by Dixon and believed that if Pakistan accepts this solution, GOI should be extremely liberal in making concessions re demilitarization and UN control in Vale during course plebiscite even though it was confident that plebiscite under such conditions would yield Vale to Pakistan. In other words, Cabinet prepared now abandon idea of Vale going to India provided Jammu and Ladakh would be retained and decision re Vale would be based on plebiscite.
- d.
- Nehru although somewhat reluctant was willing go along with Cabinet in this regard but believed that he must continue treat Dixon’s suggestion with reserve in order that Liaquat would not gain impression that adoption this suggestion would represent great concession on part of Pakistan to India.
- e.
- Sheikh Abdullah and his associates were likely to protest loudly in case India and Pakistan should agree to partition with plebiscite for Vale. They might even attempt to resort to force with Communist support. They might cause some difficulties for UN civilian and military officials supervising plebiscite but these difficulties were not likely to become so grave as to prevent plebiscite from being held.
3. Source expressed hope of several prominent Indian leaders that anything US could discreetly do to condition Pakistan for accepting partition-plebiscite solution would be in interest of stability south Asia.
4. I gained impression that Nehru would like, if given opportunity, to endeavor obtain concessions from Pakistan in other spheres in return for agreeing to solution of Kashmir which would probably result in Yale going to Pakistan.
Sent Department 232, Karachi 14 eyes only for Warren.