690D.91/8–450: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State
123. Eyes only Secretary. Sir Owen Dixon, in a long conversation with me this p. m., said Nehru in his eager and voluble opposition to the various conditions Dixon proposed for an overall Kashmir plebiscite made himself vulnerable time and again to Liaquat, but Liaquat appeared so inept at negotiation that he failed to take advantage of any of the opportunities presented. Dixon was unimpressed by both Prime Ministers as negotiators, and concluded when the conversations fell through that it would not be possible to obtain agreement on the mechanics of a free plebiscite.
In their last meeting at Delhi, Dixon asked Nehru in Liaquat’s presence if there were any objections to him, Dixon, talking with other members of the Indian Government, specifically Rajagopalachari.1 He said Nehru obviously disliked the suggestion but in the circumstances had to agree to it. Thereupon Dixon explored with Rajagopalachari the possibilities of a partition and partial plebiscite, and his conclusion at the end of the conversation was that he was dealing with an intelligent but disingenuous personality who would probably get him nowhere. Whereupon he suggested to Rajagopalachari that he would like to talk with Patel with the intimation that Nehru should be informed. In his conversations with Patel he found a more constructive and independent attitude which he hopes reflects not only the possibility of support of partition in the Indian cabinet, but may also show some desire on the part of the Congress Party to put an end to the expensive Kashmir adventure. I gathered that both of these last conversations reflected the thinking in Delhi’s top secret 232 of July 29.
[Page 1419]Since Dixon’s arrival at Karachi he has talked not only with Liaquat but with Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali and expects later this p. m. to talk with Gurmani,2 who has been summoned by air from Rawalpindi for conference. He said that Zafrullah apparently hopes that Dixon will conclude it inadvisable to attempt further conference between the two governments because of the impasse on conditions for obtaining an overall plebiscite and will return to Lake Success and in his report given there will condemn Nehru for obstructing the negotiations. Should this action be taken, Zafrullah would be provided with the material for a denunciation of the GOI’s attitude before the SC, at time when he believes the US, the UK, and other powers might support a vote so adverse to India that Nehru would abandon his present position. Dixon feels that Zafrullah has communicated this thinking to Liaquat and this a. m. in a three hour conversation with Mohammed Ali taxed him for a confirmation or denial of this impression. Mohammed Ali said that Liaquat’s thinking is independent of Zafrullah’s but Dixon wondered in his own mind this p. m. if Mohammed Ali was adequately informed. Dixon’s own thinking is that Zafrullah, and to the extent that Liaquat subscribes to Zafrullah’s thinking, must be given to understand the utter improbability of success in their contemplated approach to the SC because in the first place Dixon cannot present a report that would promote further complications and difficulties in the Kashmir issue by censuring Nehru and, in the second place, members of the SC would be most unlikely to castigate Nehru in view of the current relationship between GOI and the USSR in SC debates.
Dixon would welcome any help he might get either from the US or UK in putting the Pakistan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister back on the track in their thinking and expectations. Meanwhile, in his conversations with the Prime Minister and Mohammed Ali, he has sounded out the possibility of partition in Jammu plus a partial plebiscite in the Vale. I gathered he had presented to them the suggestions in Delhi’s top secret 232, July 29, which I inferred came from Patel. He said the Pakistani are suspicious of good faith in any suggestions proposed in behalf of India although it is obvious to Dixon that the Pakistani too are desperately anxious to arrive at a solution in Kashmir. He feels that if there could be some positive offer of record [accord?] from India he would have a basis for allaying the Pakistani’s suspicions. In the event that this could be brought about he would then suggest a further meeting of the two governments not limited to the Prime Ministers but, in the case of India, to include Bajpai, Patel and Rajagopalachari, and in the case of Pakistan, [Page 1420] Ghulam Mohammed,3 Zafrallah and Gurmani. Ghulam Mohammed this past week has been confined to a nursing home in London but is expected to arrive Karachi within the next few days. In a conversation Dixon had with him at the end of June before the Prime Minister’s return from the US, Ghulam said that he was certainly in favor of bringing the Kashmir issue to an end by working out the best possible compromise on partition. His presence at a meeting between the two governments would therefore be most helpful.
I have not seen the Prime Minister since Dixon returned on Wednesday, and do not expect to see Zafrullah until Tuesday when I am lunching with him.
Sent Department 123, repeated info Delhi 10 eyes only Henderson.