357.AB/8–1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

342. 1. Dixon told me following yesterday re Kashmir situation:

(a)
Although Nehru’s suggestions made during Dixon’s previous visit to New Delhi re conditions for partition plus plebiscite were by no means satisfactory, Dixon believed from conversations with various high Indian officials that they might well be altered during discussions to such extent as to afford fair basis for settlement. He therefore decided try persuade Liaquat enter into discussions with Nehru of solution this character.
(b)
Nehru had refused allow Dixon make offer to Liaquat on his behalf. He had however, agreed that Dixon could outline to Liaquat what Nehru had said.
(c)
Liaquat and his associates flatly refused attend conference for purpose discussing partition plus plebiscite. Such conference they insisted would be failure because they were sure from past experience GOI’s price would continue rise as discussion progressed. GOP would then face criticism of public for having without benefit to Pakistan abandoned Pak’s present advantageous position of insisting on general plebiscite. Liaquat and his advisors insisted India would not agree to fair conditions of plebiscite in Vale and that if it should unexpectedly agree it would not keep its word. They claimed India had thus far not lived up to any of its agreements with Pakistan.
(d)
Dixon told Pakistan officials that so far as he could see only hope for settlement was one of partition plus plebiscite and that if they refuse consider this kind settlement they would probably be abandoning any chances which they might have of obtaining Vale. Liaquat’s answer was that Pakistan would never give up Vale even if it had to wait many years in order obtain it.
(e)
Just before departure Dixon told Liaquat it seemed his efforts had failed and asked if latter had any suggestions. Liaquat suggested partition without plebiscite with Vale going to Pakistan. Dixon replied this solution out of question and asked if Liaquat would be willing consider detailed plan for partition plus plebiscite. Since Liaquat did not give categorically negative reply Dixon thought there might still be slender hope.
(f)
Upon his return Delhi, Dixon talked with Nehru and Bajpai. He told them of Liaquat’s attitude and proposed that he invite Liaquat and Nehru to conference and at this conference propose plan of his own to both for partition plus plebiscite. Either side could be free flatly to reject plan or to use it for basis tentative discussion. If Dixon should make suggestion neither side would be committed in any way merely by hearing it. Dixon told Nehru he would, of course, inform Liaquat privately when inviting him to conference that he might suggest plan of his own involving partition plus plebiscite. Liaquat in accepting invitation, however, would merely be going to conference and would have no official knowledge of what Dixon might suggest.
(g)
Nehru was not enthusiastic. He was afraid such conference would break down and if it did it might be more difficult for agreement to be reached later. He wondered if it might not be better for Dixon to return Lake Success and make report which would not make it appear that solution was entirely hopeless. When Dixon pointed out that failure his mission might render even more difficult any solution in future Kashmir problem, Nehru promised discuss matter with Cabinet and give answer to Dixon last night. If answer of Cabinet should offer hope of conference Dixon planned depart this morning for Karachi in order propose conference Liaquat. If answer was entirely negative Dixon would probably leave here Saturday or Sunday, stop for short time in Karachi, and return US empty-handed.

2. I did not see Dixon after he had received answer last evening from Nehru. We have been informed, however, by acting High Commissioner Australia Nehru has agreed attend and Dixon left early this morning for Karachi.

Sent Department 342; priority Karachi 16.

Henderson