794A. 5/12–850
It is particularly interesting to note that the Group concludes (page 33)
that the Chinese military establishment “although the product of
expediency … is nonetheless also the product of and consistent with
Chinese tradition and, accordingly, should be accepted as that most
likely to satisfy the diverse tangible and intangible elements that
comprise and motivate resistance to Communist aggression.”
This statement, and the Group’s failure to indicate that any changes in
the Chinese command structure might be in order, are somewhat surprising
in view of the generally adverse findings contained in the detailed
discussion of the operating efficiency of the individual services. For
example, the Survey Group failed to make the requested recommendations
for additional aid to be furnished the Army and Air Force if the Seventh
Fleet is removed, indicating that “limitations of personnel, training,
etc.” would tender it impossible for these services to absorb the
additional aid which would be required. The Air Force is said to be in a
“very low” state of combat readiness, unprepared (in its present state)
to provide adequate air defense even in conjunction with the Seventh
Fleet, This deficiency is reportedly due in part to a lack of uniform
training policies and tactical doctrine. The Navy, it is noted, has no
plans for coordination of command, with individual ships apparently
wandering about more or less independently. Navy training methods are
said to be “generally deficient.” Although these deficiencies are noted,
the Group’s report seems to conclude that the Chinese military
organization should be “accepted” … as is.
It appears from my fairly hasty reading that the Survey Group’s report
does not ignore any of the factors mentioned as relevant to military aid
planning for China in our letter to Defense dated September 15:
[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. Richard E. Johnson of the Office
of Chinese Affairs
top secret
[Washington,] December 7,
1950.
Highlights of Report of Far East Command Survey
Group to Formosa Dated September 11, 1950
i. mission
The Survey Group had a two-fold mission. Its instructions were to
make recommendations regarding the need of military assistance to
enable the Chinese Nationalist Forces to prevent the capture of
Formosa by the Communists, both (1) with and (2) without the Seventh
[Page 592]
Fleet. However, the
Group largely ignored the second phase of its assignment. In the
case of the Chinese Army and Air Force, it is stated that the
requirements developed on the assumption of Seventh Fleet assistance
were “the maximum within the limitations of personnel, training,
etc”. In other words, the Survey Group appears to believe that the
Chinese Army and Air Force are incapable of absorbing sufficient
military assistance to defend the Island without the Seventh Fleet,
and requirements listed for Army and Air Force are based on the
single assumption of continued Seventh Fleet protection. Chinese
Navy requirements are shown under both assumptions, with the
recommendation that 54 escort vessels and patrol craft be furnished
if the Seventh Fleet is removed. Here too, however, the Survey Group
appears to have doubts regarding “ability to absorb” sufficient
units to defend the Island alone.
ii. scope, character and conduct of survey
Since its instructions were to survey requirements for the defense of
Formosa and the Pescadores, the Survey Group “studiously avoided”
any consideration of the Nationalists’ off-shore islands. However,
in stressing the importance of these islands as points of contact
with the mainland, the report emphasized that “the Nationalists’
will to fight is directly proportional to their hope of return to
the Asiatic mainland,” and that the defense of Formosa is merely a
“means to an end”.
The Survey Group reports that the Nationalists “laid bare” their
military establishment, willing to open any installations and answer
any questions with no forewarning. Their eagerness to cooperate is
termed “astounding”.
iii. discussion of factors bearing on the
problem
Surveying enemy capabilities, the report states that it is considered
doubtful that the Communists will attempt to launch an amphibious
assault against Formosa and/or the Pescadores “in the near future”
unless substantial Soviet air and naval forces are made available.
The continued occupation of Kinmen and Little Kinmen Islands by the
Nationalists hampers Communist egress for a Formosa assault and
poses a threat to the mainland. Nationalist garrisons at Ma-tsu and
Ta-Chen Islands are of less tactical value, but serve as outposts
for contact with guerrillas and for the collection of intelligence.
It is estimated that the Communists will attempt to eliminate the
Nationalist outposts, especially Kinmen and Little Kinmen, before
launching an amphibious assault against Formosa and/or the
Pescadores. After examining various geographical factors, the Survey
Group concludes that the most likely points for Communist landings
on Formosa are between Hsinchu and Tansui in the north and between
[Page 593]
Tainan and Fangliao in
the south. It is estimated that 19 divisions would be employed in
the initial landings.
There follows a discussion of the structure of the Ministry of
National Defense, the Supreme General Staff, and the four
departments of the MND: (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Combined Service
Forces), reaching the conclusion that the command structure of MND
“appears to be sound”, although it has not been battle-tested.
Army
The Chinese ground forces are characterized as an “important
deterrent” to the Communist invasion of Formosa. The armored brigade
is stated to be the most effective organization of the ground forces
“in view of its counterattack potential”. Although training is sound
and morale appears to be good, infantry divisions are hampered by a
lack of automatic weapons and by the wide variety of arms on hand
which complicates re-supply of ammunition and spare parts. Effective
anti-tank defense appears to be lacking and radio communications are
generally inadequate. The Army organization that has been
established “is the product of an attempt to reconcile available
means with the situation posed not only by the potential enemy but
by many interior political and psychological factors”. The Survey
Group concludes that “units as now disposed will be capable of
containing and expelling Communist landings on Formosa if provided
with the material aid and personnel assistance recommended elsewhere
in this report” (NB: report contains no detailed listing of
“personnel” assistance required). This conclusion is presumably
reached on the assumption of continued Seventh Fleet protection.
Navy
The Survey Group’s comments regarding the Nationalist Navy are far
from complimentary. The report states that the Chinese Navy has done
little toward the preparation of war or operational plans, with
ships generally operating independently and with no specific plans
for coordination of command. Of the 41,000 officers and enlisted men
in the Chinese Navy, only 15,000 are eligible for sea service.
Manpower suitable for naval training is said to be limited and
training methods are generally deficient. The report estimates that
the Navy would require “many times its present number of ships” to
carry out its mission of destroying an enemy armada without Seventh
Fleet assistance, but indicates that the Navy is unable to expand
sufficiently to absorb these additional fleet units. With the
Seventh Fleet present, the Chinese Navy could be used for inshore
patrol, dealing with any ships which might get by US units. In this
case, it is estimated that the maintenance of operability of
presently available Chinese ships is the only requirement. This
would involve the furnishing of ammunition,
[Page 594]
fuel, and certain critical ordnance,
electronic, and diesel spare parts, but no new vessels.
Air Force
The Survey Group also describes the Chinese Air Force in unflattering
terms. Although Air Force training concepts appear to be sound, the
general state of combat readiness is rated “very low”. This is due
to (1) limited training, owing to the lack of aircraft spares and
other supplies, and (2) lack of uniform directives to cover training
and tactical doctrine. While morale appears to be good, virtually
all pilots lack proficiency in most technical phases of flying, such
as instruments, gunnery and bombing. In its present status, the Air
Force is not considered to be prepared, either alone or in
conjunction with the Seventh Fleet, to provide adequate air defense
for Formosa and the Pescadores. However, the Air Force does have the
organizational structure and the necessary personnel to absorb and
utilize the additional equipment (including 220 fighter-type
aircraft) necessary to make it an effective force for the defense of
Formosa, “within a reasonable period of time”.
Combined Service Forces
It is interesting to note that in its treatment of CSF procurement
procedures, the report makes no mention whatsoever of the role of
Commerce International (China).
iv. requirements
Requirements (listed in detail in Annex E) are said to represent
“minimum essential needs, considering limitations of trained
personnel for operation and maintenance, terrain, facilities, etc.,”
adjusted to reflect assets available through stocks on hand as well
as local production. It is conceded that “in many cases”
requirements recommended by the Survey Group exceed those estimated
by the Chinese Government itself.
v. conclusions
“Although the product of expediency, the current organization of the
Chinese Armed Forces is nonetheless also the product of and
consistent with Chinese tradition, and accordingly, should be
accepted as that most likely to satisfy the diverse tangible and
intangible elements that comprise and motivate resistance to
Communist aggression and should be used as a basis for computing aid
requirements. There exist today, within the Chinese Military
Establishment, certain major shortages, primarily in automatic
weapons, artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft, combatant vessels,
motor transportation, signal communications and ammunition, that
seriously endanger the defense of Formosa. Various stocks must be
built up to an operating level if the
[Page 595]
Chinese Nationalist forces are to be expected
to repel a determined invader. As equipment and matériel are
provided to the Chinese, United States technical assistance will be
needed. Many additional combatant ships would be required for
satisfactory defense of Formosa by Chinese Nationalist forces alone. However, the Chinese Navy, through
shortage of trained personnel, is severely limited in its ability to
absorb additional units. Should the Chinese Communist Forces launch
an all-out amphibious operation against Formosa and the Pescadores,
using 19 divisions in the initial lift, the intervention of the
Seventh Fleet would seriously cripple the invading fleet but it
probably could not prevent a considerable number of Communist troops
from getting ashore. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Seventh
Fleet in this operation would be reduced proportionately should it
have other commitments at the critical period. On the other hand,
the current Chinese Navy, operating alone, would be practically
impotent against such an offensive. In either case, a maximum effort
on the part of the Chinese Air and Ground Forces would be required
to expel the invaders. There can be no significant increase or
decrease envisaged in the military manpower available to the Chinese
Nationalists on Formosa nor can any significant redistribution among
the four services be anticipated. Given material and moral aid, the
probability of a successful defense of Formosa by the Chinese
Nationalists will be greatly enhanced.”
vi. recommendations
“It is recommended that the attached list of major items (Annex E)
and all supporting accessory equipment, maintenance tools and spare
parts for ninety days maintenance be furnished to the Republic of
China with the least practicable delay. It is further recommended
that appropriate United States technical assistance be provided as
required by the Chinese Nationalists. [”]
vii. annexes
A, B & C:—Detailed review of organization, personnel, training,
equipment, etc. of Army, Navy and Air Force.
D. G–2 Estimate of Situation:
This section includes an analysis of Communist troop deployment and
capabilities (most of which has become obsolete in the three months
since the report was published) and an estimate of the probable
nature of a Chinese Communist operation against Formosa and/or the
Pescadores (summarized under Part II above).
E. Items required by the Chinese Nationalist
Forces
This annex is divided into two sections. Part I, indicates Army,
Navy, and Air Force requirements for the defense of Taiwan with Seventh Fleet support, and includes a
wide variety of ammunition,
[Page 596]
weapons, vehicles, tanks, aircraft, radio equipment, and
quartermaster, engineer and medical supplies, as well as petroleum
requirements for thirty days combat operations. Part II indicates
requirements (Navy only) for the defense of Taiwan without Seventh Fleet support, including 4 destroyer
escorts, 20 patrol craft, 20 small personnel landing craft and 10
26-ft. motor launches, together with necessary ammunition, weapons,
parts, accessories and petroleum.
Note—The Survey Group did not price these
estimated requirements, but they have since been priced in the
Pentagon as follows (in millions):
|
Part I
|
Army
|
Navy
|
Air Force
|
Total
|
| Maintenance and Replacement |
$ 3.0 |
$10.0 |
$26.4 |
$39.4 |
| New Equipment |
55.0 |
_____ |
41.8 |
96.8 |
| Packing, Handling and Transportation |
8.0 |
2.0 |
12.0 |
22.0 |
|
$66.0 |
$12.0 |
$80.2 |
$158.2 |
Part II (additional ships to be furnished if
Seventh Fleet is withdrawn): $100 million
F. General Plan of Combined Operations by (Chinese) Army, Navy and Air
Force for the Defense of Taiwan (furnished by the Chinese
MND and reproduced without change):
“Purpose—In order to annihilate the invading
enemy, to hold Taiwan, and to prepare for a counter-offensive on the
mainland, the air force will seek to attack the enemy air and naval
forces and its ship installations; and the navy will carry out
repeated attacks on the ships along the coast line of the mainland,
so that the enemy’s preparation for a landing operation may be
destroyed. In case that the enemy commences his voyage for an
invasion of Taiwan, the ground force will concentrate rapidly its
superior mobile troops, supported by air and naval forces, to launch
severe and determined attacks simultaneously on many fronts so as to
destroy the enemy during its initial landing. After the landing
enemy is destroyed, some of the points along the coast line of the
mainland will be selected as limited objectives for a pursuit
landing and the remnants of ships and ship installations will be
wiped out so as to dismantle its ability of resuming any
offensive.”
Note: This statement appears to contradict
unevaluated information previously received indicating that MND did
not plan to defend the beaches, but would launch its counterattack
well inland.
G. Indicated Production Capabilities of
Formosa.
[Mr. Johnson’s memorandum ended here. There were no comments listed
under heading “G”.]
