293.1122/12–850
Memorandum by Mr. Robert C. Strong of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)
Subject: American citizens on the China mainland
Mr. Perkins1 asked me several days ago to dig into the question of American business men being held hostage in Shanghai and to bone up on it for a possible conference with Mr. Merchant.
Since our telegram 2961 June 19 to London2 requesting the Embassy there to have the Foreign Office instruct its Chargé in Peking to make representations to the Communist authorities regarding these men, little has been achieved, and the problem apparently remains, basically the same.
Discussions held at various times (the latest one November 1) between representatives of the interested companies in the US and of the Department included the possibility of cutting off “duress” remittance by legal action, widespread publicity, some kind of action through the United Nations, use of the Indian Ambassador in Peking to press the issue, employment of the issue as an argument against recognition of the Chinese communist regime.
The approach through the British Chargé has had no apparent result (we might ask for a follow up to his first démarche although the time does not seem propitious), the company representatives as well as the Department considered blocking of remittances a cumbersome and undesirable move, publicity which named names was deemed unwise, our UN delegation pointed out that the Charter left little margin for taking up individual cases, no use has been made of the Indian Ambassador in Peking (and probably cannot be at this time), and the question of nonrecognition now entails much larger issues than the fate of a few men.
It seems to me that we need to consider the problem from a broader view point now that we are in direct combat with the Chinese communists and the chances of extricating ourselves therefrom may be slim. Continuance of hostilities in one form or another will probably lead to consideration of strong economic sanctions and possibly implementation thereof as well as other measures which would have a direct effect on all Americans under communist control on the mainland.
I should like to raise the question, the prospects being what they are (not to mention the possibility of another world war), whether the Department should at this time urge all American educational, [Page 598] philanthropic and business institutions having American representation on the mainland, to order such personnel to attempt to leave for a safehaven, and to make whatever financial sacrifices are necessary to facilitate their departure. To delay, in the hope of a reasonable attitude on Korea on the part of the Chinese communists, would probably waste valuable time in an all too lengthy process. The Chinese communists are quite capable of stimulating our hopes for an extended period without any intention of fulfilling them. If such a measure in large measure fails, we might then consider use of the Indian Ambassador in Peking, provided circumstances are then at all propitious.
With regard to the businessmen specifically, it would appear that the concerned companies are going to have to pay heavily to bail ther men out. At this stage, publicity and UN measures can have little or no effect, and imposition of economic sanctions would at a future date probably preclude necessary remittances.3
- Troy L. Perkins, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.↩
- Not printed.↩
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A manuscript mote by Mr. Clubb on Mr. Strong’s memorandum reads as follows: “Believe answer to project of general withdrawal should be negative: missionaries and businessmen have been ‘warned’ repeatedly, only ‘hard core’ remain, and they were recently presumably warned by British.”
An additional note by Mr. Merchant reads: “I think we have done all we could to warn these people in the past. Further advice by us now would appear to risk arousing hopes of our being able to help them get out—and on that we are in fact helpless.”
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