Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

310.2/11–551

Briefing Memorandum for Talks by the Secretary of State With the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden), Paris, November 4, 1951¹

Paris, November 4, 1951

Chinese Representation Issue in the Sixth GA

I. In your talk with Mr. Eden on the question of Chinese Representation in the Sixth GA, it is suggested that you seek his support for one of the following alternative procedures (in order of preference) which in our opinion fall within the scope of the moratorium agreement:

A. Motion to effect that the Sixth GA decide to take no action on any proposals to exclude Chinese National Representatives or to seat Chinese Communist Representatives.

B. Motion to postpone consideration of any such proposals for the duration of the Sixth Session.

In connection with alternative B, it would be understood—and you would state in your supporting speech—that the effect of its adoption would be that the Chinese Nationalist Representatives would be seated for this session.

II. If the UK will not support alternative A or B, it is suggested that you should not force the issue to the extent of proposing that we go our separate ways. In these circumstances you might suggest that we await the initiative of the USSR and move adjournment of debate on the issue under Rules 75 and 78.

In presenting alternatives A and B, you may wish to make use of the following arguments:

1. We believe it to be a matter of the highest importance that the Chinese Communists not be seated. Surely the UK, with its forces now actively resisting Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, would not wish to have the Chinese Communists seated.

2. We believe it to be of the highest importance likewise that the US and UK work together on this issue.

3. The question should be disposed of promptly and effectively so that the GA can get on to the important issues before it. Postponement sine die would permit the Soviet bloc to raise the issue of Chinese representation at any time. The question would become an issue also in connection with the Credentials Committee and with its report to the GA.

4. Postponement sine die would be too temporary a device to satisfy American public opinion which, as Mr. Eden must be aware, is deeply concerned with the question of Chinese representation.

5. As the proposed procedures avoid any questions impinging on the substance of the problem, the UK should be able to accept these procedures without any serious difficulty.

6. If Mr. Eden objects that adoption of the US proposal might result in sealing the issue for an entire year, you might say that no one, of course, can guarantee when the session will terminate. It is our purpose—and we have so informed all friendly governments—that the session should be completed within the minimum possible time. We have been talking in terms of 8 to 10 weeks and we shall bend every effort toward this end. We would be prepared to accept language which makes it clear that the question is postponed only “for the duration of the Sixth GA in Paris.”

7. In any case, the UK could certainly not contemplate seating the Chinese Communists within the near future. Even if an armistice should be arrived at, it is inconceivable that the UK would wish to take up the question of seating the Chinese Communists immediately thereafter.

1. Although the date of November 5 is handwritten at the top left-hand corner of the document, inductive evidence indicates that the paper was prepared for use by Acheson at the November 4 bipartite meeting with Eden.