762A.6/6–351: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
top secret
priority
priority
Frankfurt, August
3, 1951—9 p. m.
1094. Ref: Dept to Frankfort 549, rptd Berlin 35, Bonn 35, London 498, Heidelberg 16, Paris 499, Moscow 51.2
- 1. Reference cable raises two major issues re basis for increasing strategic stocks in Berlin. First is availability of aircraft. Latest info from 12th Air Force indicates it cld airlift 12–24,000 tons per month after 15 days; that Brit Air Force cld lift 5,000 tons per month after 30 days. Wld thus require 30 days before airlift on basis present aircraft availability cld be fully effective.
- 2. EuCom has advised that daily requirements for combined mil garrison forces and civilian occupation personnel in three West sectors of Berlin wld be 189 tons for first month, for second and third months 198 tons, fourth and fifth months 289 tons, sixth, seventh, and eighth months 435 tons and for ninth month and each month thereafter 656 tons. These figures are based on assumption that present Allied stockpiles wld be utilized until exhausted and then only minimum items necessary for operations wld be airlifted.
- 3. This data reveals that by end of six months, on basis monthly lift capacity of 29,000 tons, only about half of available in-bound capacity cld be used for Berlin population’s needs.
- 4. Foregoing inextricably bound to second issue of balanced or staggered type stockpile. Before tripartite decision (HICOM/M(51)143) was reached to recommend Balanced six months program, question was debated in great detail. We supported balanced concept principally (a) because of our conviction long range planning imperative and necessity divorce stockpile program from periodic fluctuations aircraft availability, (b) since six months balanced stocks wld allow sufficient time full consideration of then existing problem before necessity reinstitute airlift. While it is US policy mount airlift in event new blockade, must emphasize many factors which cld result in lesser availability of aircraft at time it is actually required. You appreciate aircraft on hand has primary direct mission of purely mil character and therefore some reluctance wld probably exist on part of EuCom and UK to make it available in toto for airlift. As in case of Korea, for example, it was necessary for this theatre to transfer aircraft to other areas in face of emergency.
- 5. Although US element has assumed primary responsibility for stockpiling effort, UK in particular has at times expressed strong views. We pointed out to UK in negots inconsistency of adopting balanced program re food and coal while planning stock raw materials on assumption aircraft wld be available transport Berlin’s finished products to West. We acquiesced to UK wish knowing we cld, at time raw materials actually purchased, insist purchases be consistent with the then prevailing estimate of aircraft availability. These comments illustrate nature of our negotiating problem. Although HICOM/P(51)444 submitted May 11, six months program worked out by Berlin Kommandatura not yet approved by commandants due to necessity agree wide range technical aspects problem. Expect approval momentarily.
- 6. Even more formidable obstacle represented by indifferent attitude of FedRep toward stockpiling effort. We resolved we must continue [Page 1932] constant pressure on FedRep if delays in shipments to Berlin are to be minimized.
- 7. We consider it matter of urgency transmit six months program to FedRep and request your agreement. We will reserve US position on proposal to amend foreign mins decision to stock food and fuel for 12 months in Berlin. If you insist on program in excess of six months for coal and certain foodstuffs after receipt our further comments, necessary modifications can be made at later date after discussions with UK and Fr. Detailed comments on reftel will fol in few days.
McCloy