Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

The Department of State to the British Embassy ¹

secret

Aide-Mémoire

The United States Government appreciates receiving the detailed observations of the Government of the United Kingdom on the various aspects of the Japanese Peace Treaty as set forth in the aide-mémoire handed to Mr. John Foster Dulles by the British Chargé d’Affaires on March 12, 1951.² The United States Government has also studied with interest the views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff handed to Mr. Dulles at the same time.³ The large measure of agreement between the views of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom is a source of gratification. The preliminary comments of the United States Government on the British aide-mémoire are given below. It is the intention of the United States Government to make available to the Government of the United Kingdom in the near future a suggested draft of a Peace Treaty with Japan which will give a more precise indication of the views of the United States Government.

The United States agrees with the statement in the United Kingdom aide-mémoire concerning the major object of a peace treaty with Japan. However, the United States considers that an additional object must be to ensure, in so far as possible in a treaty, that Japan continues in friendly association with the free world and that the industrial potential and manpower of Japan should be denied to exploitation by those of aggressive and despotic tendencies. The United States agrees with the statement of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that:

“The continued alignment of Japan with the West can only be achieved on a voluntary basis, which would mean the establishment of an identity of interest politically, economically and militarily.”

The understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom that the United States desires, in so far as possible, to negotiate the Japanese peace treaty as a multilateral instrument through the diplomatic channel is correct. The United States Government has not yet come to any final conclusions with regard to the procedure by which a treaty with Japan should be completed and does not wish at this time to advance any specific line of action. Any suggestions which the United Kingdom might wish to make on this point will be welcomed.

The United States Government notes that the Government of the United Kingdom wishes to reserve its right to raise at a later stage the question of the disposal of German assets in Japan and certain points of detail connected with the economic, financial and property clauses of the Treaty.

Territory

The United States Government agrees in general with the territorial clauses of the United Kingdom aide-mémoire and in particular agrees that the following should be recorded in the Treaty:

(i) “Japan should recognise the independence of Korea.

(ii) “The Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under a United States trusteeship.

(iii) “Japan should renounce all special rights and interests in China.

(iv) “Japan should specifically renounce all her rights and claims in respect of her pre-war mandated territories.”

With respect to the carrying out of the Yalta Agreement the United States agrees that Japan should be prepared to cede South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, provided it becomes a party to the peace treaty, but believes that the precise definition of the extent of the Kurile Islands should be a matter for bilateral agreement between the Japanese and Soviet Governments or for judicial determination by the International Court of Justice. While the United States agrees that Japan should renounce all its present claims to the Antarctic Continent it appears invidious and not in keeping with the overall philosophy of the Treaty to require Japan to forswear any future claims to a vast territory much of which has not yet been explored.

The United States notes that His Majesty’s Government will shortly communicate its views with regard to a clause on Formosa.

Political Provisions

With respect to the Political Provisions of the Treaty the United States Government is of the opinion that sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of Paragraph 7 of the United Kingdom aide-mémoire are inconsistent with the agreed objectives of the Treaty as stated above and in particular with the statement that Japan’s continued alignment with the West “can only be achieved on a voluntary basis.” In addition the United States does not perceive how “undesirable political societies” could be defined with sufficient precision to enable such an undertaking to be practicably enforceable. Indeed, the attempt to arrive at a definition would doubtless disclose considerable difference of opinion among the Allied Powers. The Government and people of the United States have learned by experience the futility and in fact the danger of bringing into being vague and unenforceable treaty provisions.

With respect to a “war guilt” clause the United States doubts that it would accomplish any positive good, and if the Versailles analogy has relevance, it might do harm. The United States is particularly reluctant now to press for such a clause more than five years after the surrender, and in view of the splendid cooperation given by all the people of Japan in lending assistance to the United Nations action in Korea as called for by the Resolution of January 30, 1951, adopted at the 438th meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

With reference to the position enunciated by the United Kingdom regarding the serving of war crimes sentences, the United States believes that the Japanese Government should not be able to reduce or alter the sentences of war criminals unless by agreement with the nation or nations imposing the sentence.

In general the United States agrees with the provisions of subparagraphs (iv) to (ix) of Paragraph 7 of the United Kingdom aide-mémoire although in some cases it is not convinced of the necessity of spelling them out in detail.

The United States does not understand the necessity for requiring Japan to recognize in the Treaty the full force and effect of the treaties made or to be made with Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, Finland, Thailand, Germany and Austria, as these treaties are effective in their own right. So little of practical significance to the Allies depends on Japan’s recognition of these treaties that it does not appear worthwhile to include this requirement.

Security

The United States agrees with the Government of the United Kingdom that the Peace Treaty with Japan should contain no provisions prohibiting Japanese rearmament or limiting the size or nature of any armed forces which she may eventually raise. The United States is of the opinion that any safeguards which may be considered desirable can best be secured by voluntary agreement with Japan in the overall context of a security arrangement for Japan or all or parts of the Pacific area. The Treaty of Peace would recognize Japan’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisioned in the United Nations Charter and that Japan could voluntarily enter into a security arrangement or arrangements with one or more of the Allied Powers. As an interim measure the United States contemplates concluding a provisional bilateral security agreement with Japan providing for the retention after a peace treaty of United States armed forces in and about Japan until such time as there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area. We believe that this provisional agreement or other eventual agreements will most effectively assure that any Japanese rearmament would be a matter of agreement and purely defensive in character.

Reparations

The United States agrees that there should be no further reparations exacted from Japan from its industrial assets. However, the United States cannot agree that the stocks of Japanese monetary gold should be made available as reparations. The Allied Powers have never been able to agree on a division of reparations shares with respect to industrial assets and the United States sees no reason to believe it would be possible to reach agreement on the division of the monetary gold in Japan. Furthermore the United States Government has consistently maintained that should it be possible for Japan to pay anything on reparations account, the United States has a priority claim as a result of the approximately $2 billion advanced for occupation costs. The United Kingdom has agreed with France and the United States that comparable advances to Germany have a prior status over other claims. In view of the fact that Japan has been deprived of all her overseas territories, has suffered for almost five years the virtual elimination of her merchant marine and has seen her textile industry plant reduced to approximately one-third of its pre-war status, to say nothing of other losses and post-war debts, the United States Government finds no occasion for worry over Japan’s advantageous economic position. Even if Japan retains the $200 million of gold as a currency reserve there is cause for concern whether Japan will be able to maintain a viable economy. The United States Government therefore does not agree to making the stocks of monetary gold available for reparations.

The United States agrees that, with certain minor exceptions, Japan’s assets in the territories of the Allied Powers should be at the disposal of the Governments of those countries.

With respect to Japanese assets in ex-enemy countries the United States wishes to reserve its position on the question for the time being. As regards Japanese assets in neutral countries, the United States is inclined to make no effort to recover them for the Allies in the Treaty. The total amount is relatively small, approximately $20 million, and the United States Government questions whether the net amount which might be made available to the Allies would be appreciable or worth the effort which experience with German assets has shown would be necessary to reduce them to possession. Again the problem of shares arises as well as the priority of United States claims for occupation costs.

General Economic Clauses

The United States Government agrees that pending the conclusion of treaties regulating trade and commerce with the Allies, Japan should grant foreign nationals and companies in Japan national and most-favored-nation treatment. The United States believes this should be on a reciprocal basis and subject to the normal exceptions. With respect to the desire of the United Kingdom Government that such a provision in the Treaty should be so drafted that each territory (such as colony or protected state) would be treated as a separate country, the United States Government would appreciate receiving definite suggestions from the United Kingdom Government as to how this might be accomplished.

Shipping and Civil Aviation

The United States Government cannot agree that Japan’s so-called “surplus” shipbuilding capacity should be sheared away and that this is justifiable on economic grounds, or that if it can be so justified, it is sufficient reason to take the suggested step. As a practical matter, a required physical dismantling would inflame the very qualities in Japan that are dangerous. From a security or strategic point of view, both the United States and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have held that there is no reason to deny a merchant fleet to Japan. As a result of the destruction of Japan’s merchant fleet during the war Japan has today less than 1 million tons of ocean-going shipping as compared with between 3 and 4 million tons pre-war. At a time when there is a world-wide shortage of shipping and when the prospects are that this shortage may be increased the United States would think it unwise to impose treaty limits on either Japanese shipping or shipbuilding capacity. As a practical matter the fact that Japan must import much of the raw materials for her shipbuilding industry from Western countries and that such materials are, and for some time will continue to be, in short supply operates as a limiting factor on the expansion of Japan’s shipbuilding capacity. It may be that for some time to come there will be excess shipbuilding capacity in Japan for the above reason and an investigation might show that much of this excess capacity could be put to more profitable uses. Should this prove to be so the United States Government believes the Japanese Government might voluntarily agree to the transfer of such excess shipbuilding capacity to other fields.

The United States Government agrees with the stand taken by the United Kingdom Government in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of its aide-mémoire on most-favored-nation or national treatment for shipping and civil aviation, and with respect to the latter, that pending the conclusion of civil air transport agreements Japan should grant to the international air lines of signatory states the same or not less favorable air traffic rights and privileges as they enjoyed immediately before the Peace Treaty came into effect.

Bilateral Treaties; Far Eastern Fisheries Convention; Human Rights; International Treaties and Conventions

The United States Government agrees in general with the position of the United Kingdom Government on the revival of pre-war bilateral non-political treaties, the conclusion of a Far Eastern Fisheries Convention, a Human Rights Clause, and the resumption by Japan of her obligations in certain pre-war treaties and conventions, as set forth respectively in Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the United Kingdom aide-mémoire.

Claims and Debts; Industrial, Literary and Artistic Property; Contracts, Prescription and Negotiable Instruments

The United States Government is considering what would be the most appropriate action to take on the matters treated in Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, and 24 and will communicate further with the United Kingdom Government on these points. In the meantime the views set forth by the United Kingdom Government will be given the most careful consideration.

Disputes

This subject will also be a matter for subsequent consideration although in general the United States Government concurs in the position taken by the United Kingdom Government that disputes, other than claims disputes, arising out of the Treaty should be referred either to diplomatic settlement or to the International Court of Justice.

War Graves

The United States will give consideration to the desirability, as suggested by the United Kingdom, of including a clause in respect of war graves in Japan.

The United States Government will communicate further with the United Kingdom Government concerning the views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on Post-Treaty security and the rearming of Japan. However, it can be said now that the United States Government has found the views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff most helpful and is pleased to note how closely they coincide with the views of the United States.

Washington, [March 13, 1951.]

1. Apparently handed to a British representative on March 13. This paper was drafted by Mr. Allison and cleared by, among others, Messrs. Dulles and Rusk.
2. Ante, p. 909.
3. Supra.