694.001/3–1551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State

secret

2785. For Dulles from Cowen.

[Here follows part of the first paragraph of this telegram (printed on page 179).]

In passing I would add that Philippines’ neurotic anxiety re security is rooted so deeply that assurances and pacts can mitigate but not eliminate it, and that Philippines wants not security in place reparations but security and reparations.

Portion plan A1 which should please Philippines is treaty admission Japanese liability for reparations. Feeling as it does that Philippines should have priority in receiving reparations, this country of course would oppose US receiving reparations if Philippines does not. However, forebearance vis-à-vis Japan represented by US renunciation [Page 927] of Japanese reparations would not per se be pleasing to Philippines because of desire for revenge on one’s enemies which runs so deep in Filipino character.

Plan B should have merit as compared plan A of containing actual promise reparations—in addition Japanese assets in Philippines and removals of machinery to Philippines under advance transfer program both of which, because the assets involved have already been received, now are regarded as beside the point. Prospect of a Japan left impoverished and embittered by heavy reparations is not displeasing to Philippines and argument that it would be dangerous to greatly weaken Japan carries little weight here because of counter-argument that a strong Japan proved dangerous in past and may again. Official and non-official Filipinos visting Japan see bustling and apparently prospering country and on return are quoted in press asserting Japan can pay: Bernabe Africa ex-chief Philippine mission Tokyo had been quoted in local press as saying Japan can pay $8 billions and March 14 press carries story that his successor Jose P. Melencio has sent Philippine FonOff a report of same effect.

Passing from realm of publicly-expressed opinion and general sentiment, I wish to comment that we have long suspected Philippine Government, while it certainly would like to receive additional Japanese reparations, does not actually expect receive them and is keeping issue alive in hopes of using it as bargaining instrument for obtaining additional aid from US. This appears to be borne out by report obtained by OSI from House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Macapagal thru channel which that US agency considers usually reliable. Macapagal is quoted as telling informant that Acting Secretary Foreign Affairs Neri has within past week or so sent President Quirino memo suggesting following policy re Japan:

(1)
Philippines not to oppose limited US rearmament Japan. Such rearmament to be designed ensure internal security and defense against outside atack but not to be carried to point which would permit Japan again to menace other countries Far East. In line this thinking Philippines would not object establishment adequate army and limited air force but would oppose letting Japan have a navy.
(2)
Philippines not to oppose such development of Japanese economy as is necessary to economic viability.
(3)
Philippines should refuse to modify present Philippine stand in opposition to extension Japanese fishing grounds.
(4)
Philippine Government should use its demand for reparations as bargaining lever to pry additional aid from US.

I should think main point is write a treaty likely to ensure that Japan, the chief center of military potential facing the Communist-controlled mainland in the Far East, will be on our side in time of [Page 928] need—or at least will not be used against us. We should not lose sight of that main point in attempting (Deptel 2048 March 8) write a treaty which would please Philippines—a task which I think probably is impossible. Nevertheless, we should try to write a treaty which will be recognized as considerate of Philippine sensibilities and as making right kind of gesture. I suggest that treaty should contain acknowledgment of fact that Japanese attack and occupation inflicted grave injury to people and economy of Philippines which could never be fully remedied, but that Japan ought make such recompense as may be possible. Senator Tanada, who is one of most reasonable Philippine politicians we know, has told us he has no idea where 8 billion figure originated, that Philippines actually can hope to receive little, but that some Japanese gesture in direction gaining Philippine’s good will seems in order. He recalled Boxer indemnity which US used to gain good will and to help educate a generation of Chinese students in our country, and wondered whether Japan could not afford finance something similar (I assume he meant for study in US—as few Filipinos would wish study in Japan). Knowing inordinate passion Filipinos have for schooling we think the idea deserves being explored; if project could not be financed by Japan either pursuant peace treaty or under separate agreement without opening way to reparations claims by our other allies, perhaps US could somehow finance it.

Cowen.
  1. See the Department’s telegram 2048 to Manila, March 8, p. 904.