Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

McGhee Files: Lot 53D468

Paper Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs and the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] August 27, 1951.

Kashmir Dispute: Future Action

problem

The problem is to determine, to the extent possible prior to Dr. Graham’s report, what future steps should be taken with respect to the Kashmir dispute. It is assumed that the current crisis arising out of the July concentrations of practically all Indian and Pakistan combat troops along common borders and the September “elections” of the Kashmir constituent assembly will not result in immediate hostilities; also that Dr. Graham will be unable to effect demilitarization of Kashmir.

discussion

1. Immediately following Dr. Graham’s report to the Security Council, the Council should discuss the report. If the report contains recommendations which appear to offer reasonable hope of advancing the dispute toward a mutually acceptable settlement, the United Kingdom, United States and other members might introduce a resolution embodying those recommendations deemed feasible.

2. If Dr. Graham’s report does not provide basis for making substantial progress toward a settlement of the dispute, immediately following its presentation to the Security Council, the Council should discuss the report and adopt a resolution requesting the General Assembly to consider the Kashmir dispute, making recommendations in regard to the approaches previously taken by the Security Council and any possible solutions. Other provisions of the resolution would be determined by any recommendations made by Dr. Graham as well as by the outcome of the consultations and the discussions in the Council. If the Security Council is prevented by a veto from adopting such a resolution, the question should be placed on the General Assembly agenda for the Assembly’s consideration and expression of opinion, which is technically feasible but not as preferable as its recommendations would be. The Security Council would remain seized of the problem during the Assembly consideration. The action in the Assembly should be directed towards:

a) increasing the pressure upon the parties to accept peaceful solutions by focusing world opinion on the dispute, and,

b) exploring any new possible approaches which may be suggested either in Dr. Graham’s report or which may come from other quarters. A thought might be given to retaining the services of Dr. Graham in his present or some other capacity.

3. At the time of the Assembly consideration, Asian countries should be discreetly stimulated to make independent and apparently spontaneous approaches to the parties. It would be best for them not to base their respective approaches on any previous action or proposal but rather to endeavor to take a fresh look at what might bring about agreement between the parties.

4. The United States and the United Kingdom should agree as soon as possible on an entirely new approach to be put forward jointly or independently, as decided upon later. At some stage, to be determined subsequently, presumably United Nations action would be required. The elements of such an approach might be:

a) Immediate partition of Jammu and Kashmir except for the Vale on a basis mutually acceptable to both parties, insofar as possible utilizing the principles employed in the partition of British India.

b) A United Nations administration for the Vale for a specified period (five to ten years). Indian and Pakistan forces to be completely withdrawn from the Vale. In this connection, a proposal might be made that United Nations forces (non-United States) replace the Indian and Pakistan troops.

c) An agreement between India and Pakistan which would specify that:

(1) A plebiscite in the Vale would be held at the end of a specified period (five to ten years) under United Nations auspices,

(2) The parties would refrain from all propaganda activities directed against each other during this period.

(3) The two countries would guarantee to maintain law and order in the portions of Jammu and Kashmir given them and would not threaten in any way the Vale.

(4) The two countries would agree to accomplish a substantial reduction of any of their forces remaining in that part of Jammu and Kashmir transferred to their sovereignty, and would consult with the United Nations representative in implementing this undertaking.

d) A United Nations Development Authority for the Vale which would provide for its economic development and improve living conditions for the people, and which might in consultation with the parties be extended to other parts of Jammu and Kashmir.

e) An Indo-Pakistan Water Authority which would undertake the joint development of the water resources shared by the two countries. Funds for this program could come from either the Mutual Security program or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

5. If there is no indication that the parties may be receptive to the plan envisaged in the new approach, the new approach should not be put forward until it appears that the lines of the action contained in paragraphs 1–3 are not likely to lead to any constructive results. If there is an indication that the parties may be receptive to this plan, it may be raised in connection with the proceedings of the General Assembly or in any negotiations which may arise as a result of the Asian initiative contemplated in paragraph 3 above. Some of the elements mentioned in paragraph 4 may be included in Dr. Graham’s recommendations and in a subsequent resolution of the General Assembly.

6. If the new approach also is not acceptable, a group of countries including the Commonwealth nations and the United Kingdom, the United States, Near Eastern and Asian countries might jointly make representations in the hope that the parties would choose the line they were willing to accept, or put forward a mutually agreed line of their own.

7. Further action may be required in the Security Council. The Council might well consider providing some form of continuing mediatory machinery to take advantage of any changes in the situation, and to be available for use by the parties in case either or both wishes to approach the other through United Nations means. This machinery could take the form of an SC representative, with an indefinite term of office, who would report progress or lack of progress to the Security Council at specific periods.

8. At some time in the course of our efforts, we might consider asking the Security Council to request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion regarding the legality of the act of the Maharaja of Kashmir in signing an instrument of accession to India. If the ICJ finds the accession was invalid, this would knock out one of the principal Indian arguments supporting their occupation of Kashmir. On the other hand, this submission of this question to the Court would be hazardous, since considerable time would elapse before a decision would be made, other action might be blocked pending a decision, and despite the tentative opinions of the United Kingdom Foreign Office and our legal Adviser a decision supporting India’s claims could conceivably be rendered. This eventuality would weaken Pakistan’s position.

recommendations

That the above plan be discussed with the United Kingdom as soon as possible in Washington.

1. Drafted by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Kennedy) and Messrs. Howard Meyers and Eric Stein of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.