CFM Files: Lot M–88: WFM British and French Talks
Payer Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs1
Alignment of US–UK Policies in the Middle East
kashmir
The Problem
The absence of recent progress with respect to Kashmir and the concentration by both India and Pakistan of practically all their combat troops along common borders presents a situation of gravest concern. Dr. Graham may achieve some success but this is not anticipated.
US Objectives
Our long-run objective is a lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which would eliminate this problem as a cause of tension. We desire that armed conflict be avoided and some progress towards solution be made.
Probable Position of the UK
The UK is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and is urgently looking for ways to ameliorate it, but has not yet given any clear indication of new measures which it believes would be helpful. [Page 1826] The UK is willing, but perhaps reluctantly, to retain the lead, but desires, as we do, continued close consultations with us and coordinated action. We may find it necessary to detail our views on particular issues between India and Pakistan and on certain aspects of the Kashmir dispute, such as the question of troop withdrawals or the nature of UN supervision during a plebiscite. The British may not be disposed to do this because of their wish not to risk offending India and thereby increasing Indian sentiment for withdrawing from the Commonwealth. It is probable that the British Foreign Minister will concur in our view that inaction or weak action now could result in the necessity of our taking strong action later under even worse conditions.
It is likely, however, that the British will be inclined toward some procedure which would result in their not risking the responsibility for steps which might not have the desired effect. The British Government seems willing to stimulate additional steps such as offers of help by third countries or further UN action, but may be expected to be very cautious as regards open intervention by itself, on a unilateral basis. It is fully aware that any reasonable proposal designed to bring about progress in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute along the lines laid down by the United Nations will be resisted and resented by India.
Position To Be Presented
1. It is hoped that close US–UK coordination will continue, with the UK in the lead. We believe that the present situation is so dangerous that we cannot acquiesce in inaction or weak action if hostilities are to be averted and if British and/or US prestige is to be preserved in India and Pakistan. We believe that the alternative to forceful action by the British and ourselves would have consequences so grave that by comparison Indian displeasure would be the lesser evil.
2. We know the UK has considered a personal plea by Attlee and would appreciate knowing its status, including its timing and character. We also have in mind an appeal by the President to be made if hostilities appear imminent.
3. We would like to know the Foreign Minister’s appraisal of the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities and when it might occur. We believe that the election of the constituent assembly in Kashmir is the danger point but that barring incidents Pakistan will be unlikely to resort to force if some hope of progress toward a settlement exists. We should like to know the opinion of the Foreign Minister as to what would be acceptable to Pakistan as constituting hope of progress. Specifically, would a US–UK promise of further action in the Security Council or General Assembly be enough?
[Page 1827]4. We are studying certain broad alternatives with respect to future steps:
- a.
- Continued action through the UN;
- b.
- US–UK separate or joint action outside the UN;
- c.
- Intervention by Asian countries (i.e., Burma, Indonesia; possibly Turkey and Iran) in spontaneous pleas and offers of assistance;
- d.
- Postponement of the disposition of Kashmir for an extended period (such as 10 years) and provision for third party direction of the affairs of the state (such as UN trusteeship) combined with UN or US assistance in providing for economic development during this period; and
- e.
- Combinations of these alternatives.
The Foreign Minister’s thoughts as to the best general line of action would be appreciated. Specifically, would it be better to depend on UN action, to try some line outside the UN, or a combination of both?
Discussion
Mr. Black, president of the IBRD, is thinking seriously of addressing letters to both Prime Ministers offering “good offices” in connection with furthering consideration of the Lilienthal proposal for a joint Indo-Pakistan water authority. Mr. Black is considering suggesting that, if the two Governments desire to approach the development of the Indus water resources along the proposed lines, he would be happy to recommend that the Bank give appropriate assistance, including making available qualified members of his staff and considering any related financial proposals. Officers of the Department have informally indicated their interest in Mr. Black’s suggestion, but have said that they believed it would be wise for the US to remain dissociated therewith, in order that it would be apparent that this development had occurred spontaneously with Mr. Black.
- Prepared as a briefing paper for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to be held in Washington, September 10 through 14. In the records of the meetings the paper was designated as document WFM B–2/3b. The Kashmir dispute was considered at the meeting of September 10; see the extract from the minutes of that date, p. 1837.↩