McGhee Files: Lot 53D468
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)
Subject: Kashmir: India–Pakistan Relations: Your Talk with Mr. Scott.1
Discussion:
On Monday, September 10, the Secretary discussed Kashmir with Mr. Morrison—presumably along the lines of WFM B–2/3b2 (Tab [Page 1840] A). On the same day officers of the Department discussed with Mr. Fowler of the UK delegation to the UN and Mr. Belcher, First Secretary of the British Embassy future action with regard to Kashmir. The paper “Kashmir Dispute: Future Action”3 was used as a basis for discussion (Tab B). At this working level conference there seemed to be general agreement that on balance there was greater advantage in getting the Kashmir case before the General Assembly than in restricting UN treatments of the case to the Security Council. The British representatives agreed with points 1 and 2 of this paper, said that it was a firm UK decision not to take the initiative in stimulating Asian approaches (point 3). Regarding points 4 through 8 in general, the British representatives believed that danger would lie in indicating to the Government of India at too early a stage our willingness to go ahead on a basis other than the agreed UNCIP resolutions. They thought we should not now commit ourselves to action so far in advance and that the whole situation should be re-examined if the approaches suggested in points 1 through 3 failed. They intend to send the gist of the paper to London for HMG’s comment.
In the record of the afternoon meeting of the Secretary and Mr. Morrison on September 10, it is stated that the Secretary told Mr. Morrison that “the Pakistanis would be willing to do anything to which India would agree to solve the problem”. We doubt that this statement accurately reflects the Secretary’s comments, because it differs with our appreciation of the attitude of the Government of Pakistan. As you are aware, the Pakistan and Indian positions have been unchanged for more than two years.
In connection with the possibility of approaches to the two Governments by certain Asian countries mentioned under numbered paragraph 4 of Tab A, and mentioned also in the record of the talk between the Secretary and Mr. Morrison, it should be noted that SOA has not contemplated that Ceylon’s intervention would be useful. The question of stimulating or encouraging Asian Governments to offer assistance is so delicate that we are convinced action along this line, if attempted, must be most adroitly executed lest India and Pakistan learn that such Asian approaches are the result of United States stimulation.
With reference to the discussion of a joint Indo-Pakistan Water Authority in Tab A, SOA believes it is not possible to remove Kashmir from the political sphere by concentrating on technical aspects of Indo-Pakistan problems.
SOA had hoped that Mr. Morrison’s remarks might have been somewhat more responsive to the position outlined in Tab A. It is hoped [Page 1841] in your talks with Mr. Scott that you elicit rather more precise views than were forthcoming from the Foreign Secretary.
Recommendation:
1. That you discuss Kashmir and India–Pakistan relations along the lines suggested in Tab A.
2. That you ask Mr. Scott whether he has any comment on the ideas contained in Tab B (working paper).