357.AB/9–1251
Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
Subject: Kashmir Dispute: Future Action
| Participants: | Mr. R. H. Scott, UK Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs |
| Mr. Ronald Belcher, First Secretary, UK Embassy | |
| Mr. Robert Fowler, UK Delegation to the United Nations | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA | |
| Mr. Joseph Palmer, First Secretary, US Embassy, London | |
| Mr. T. E. Weil,1 SOA | |
| Mr. W. Witman, SOA | |
| Mr. R. D. Gatewood, SOA | |
| Mr. D. W. Wainhouse, UNP | |
| Mr. H. Meyers, UNP |
Mr. Scott wondered whether Dr. Graham would be apt to put in a report showing complete failure for his mission, or rather would leave a door open for further progress.
Mr. Hickerson believed that Dr. Graham would do the latter; that he, of all men, could pull off a miracle in this dispute.
Mr. Scott then inquired whether this description of Graham’s nature did not indicate that, if Graham could not successfully conclude his mission, there was not much sense in making further approaches of a similar nature.
Mr. Hickerson said that we were somewhat inclined to agree, although we had not come to a definite conclusion and wished to stress the necessity for examining carefully Dr. Graham’s report to see whether that report might offer possibilities of advancing the dispute [Page 1842] in the Security Council. However, we had given thought to referring the dispute to the General Assembly, in an effort to bring about pressure upon the Government of India. He personally was inclined to doubt that such pressure would be successful without being coupled to other approaches. He invited Mr. Scott’s comments.
Mr. Scott referred to Secretary Acheson’s comments regarding the possibility of further efforts by the Indonesians and Burmese. He thought that the best forum for such efforts was the General Assembly, where these Asian countries might take an active part in the discussion.
Mr. Hickerson then read to Mr. Scott the draft SOA–UNP paper, Subject “Kashmir Dispute: Future Action”, dated 27 August 1951. He cautioned that the United States proposals with regard to the Development Authority in the Vale and the Indo-Pakistan Water Authority were only tentative and involved difficult problems of financing and staffing. Mr. Hickerson further cautioned that our whole paper was tentative and that we earnestly desired the United Kingdom’s comments.
Mr. Scott said that this was such a baffling problem that any constructive approach was valuable. Recapitulating the situation for a moment, Pakistan was pressing for a state-wide plebiscite but was willing to accept arbitration on the unresolved differences with India in regard to this plebiscite. Moreover, there was serious danger of internal difficulties in Pakistan if there were no progress on the Kashmir dispute. Consequently, the United Kingdom was afraid that anything less than an emphasis upon arbitration would seriously weaken the position of the Liaquat Government. Regarding the new approach outlined under point 4 of the United States paper, the United States proposals depended upon mutual acceptance by both parties. Could we believe that the Government of India would agree to such proposals as partition of Kashmir, the Development Authority or the Water-Right Authority? In other words, what would India obtain which would be better than what it has now?
Mr. Fowler pointed out that both the Development Authority and the Water-Right Authority would really require some surrender of GOI control in the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir. The only benefit the GOI would derive would be financial assistance and economic development, and it was a most moot question whether enough money would be available for these projects to induce India to go along with these proposals. However, this might be a possibility if the inducement could be made good enough, although in his personal opinion this was not a very good possibility.
Mr. Scott pointed out that other factors, such as a world crisis, might cause India to go along with these proposals. This, on the other hand, would involve a most dangerous situation in India and elsewhere.
[Page 1843]Mr. Fowler stated that it appeared from the joint UK–US discussions the previous day, that all favored examining this new approach to see if this might be a valuable course of action to have in reserve. He thought that if cautious soundings showed that India might accept this line, then the proposals might be put to Pakistan. To do otherwise would alarm Pakistan, since the GOP might believe that the United Kingdom and the United States were abandoning them by a departure from the present insistance upon the agreed UNCIP resolutions.
Mr. Wainhouse urged that we should not think of going to the General Assembly until we had exhausted the possibilities of action in the Security Council which might appear when we examined the Graham report. He pointed out that we really could not make any definite decision until we saw this report.
Mr. Witman referred to the Indian elections in January 1952, and inquired whether it might not be wise to drag out negotiations in the Security Council past this time, in order to see if the negotiating atmosphere within the GOI would be better. As he understood it, the General Assembly would still be in session at this time, should it prove advisable or necessary to refer the dispute to the Assembly.
Mr. Fowler said that the United Kingdom was afraid of reaction in Pakistan following the Graham report, and thus the United Kingdom thought that immediate United Nations consideration and action was needed.
Mr. Witman said that he believed we all agreed we must wait and see Dr. Graham’s report, which it appeared would probably be phrased in such a way as to enable further United Nations consideration and discussion of possibilities. He thought that Pakistan would be satisfied by immediate Security Council consideration of the problem.
Mr. Fowler said that if the dispute were referred to the General Assembly he would hope that a General Assembly resolution would favor arbitration. If India refused such a recommendation, then the General Assembly might appoint a negotiating committee and use Dr. Graham’s services in conjunction with this committee. This would provide continuing pressure on India, pressure which would be maintained even after the Indian elections in January. This might cause a change of heart on the part of Nehru, particularly if the January elections strengthened his domestic political position.
Mr. Gatewood inquired what the Security Council could do before referring the dispute to the General Assembly.
Mr. Wainhouse replied that this depended upon Dr. Graham’s proposals. The Security Council might well consider proposals, whether through Dr. Graham or through other machinery, including the Council [Page 1844] itself. He favored using Dr. Graham’s services to advance the possibilities which might be contained in Graham’s own report.
- T. Eliot Weil, Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.↩