320/12–1051: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
Delga 601. Re Kashmir. Graham called at his request on Gross with Hyde present to discuss substance of his report and tactics in presenting it. He has got the issue narrowed down to the question of the number of troops to remain at the end of the demilitarization period and the date of appointment of plebiscite administrator, but he finds little tendency on the part of Indians to agree to any reasonable proposition. He has asked Rau if India wld accept 600 or 800 UN observers and alternatively whether India wld accept UN forces in Kashmir. (He has not suggested they might be used in Azad-Kashmir area.) If neither of these suggestions is agreeable he has asked Rau to make a counter-suggestion. The current Indian figures on troops as he gets them from Rau are 28,000 men, including state forces, and 6,000 militia.
In addition to this Devers has had exploratory conversations on the military level with Indian generals and has suggested a series of stages, the first of which is more favorable to India than the basic resolutions wld provide. However, the Indians have not been encouraging on this. Graham and Devers are waiting for concrete answers to [Page 1912] their suggestions and figures on the number of troops which they expect to have this week.
Rau’s general approach is that the Indian elections make a final settlement difficult at this time. Ayub1 feels that Pakistan needs a simple formula or some encouragement in the report from Graham to avoid a blow up. Pakistan feels that this is a bad time for a showdown with India, especially since the UK wld not get tough on the eve of Indian elections and, therefore, Graham feels that Pakistan wld agree to some simple formula that wld keep the door open until after elections.
In the light of the above analysis and the expectation of Graham that he will get nothing helpful from the Indians on the question of the number of troops they insist on keeping in the state, and considering that the Pakistanis need something for domestic political purposes on or about the due date of his report, Graham is thinking of tactics along the fol lines:
He wld draft a report that contains a long analysis of the background of the case that will not recite the suggestions that have been made and refused by India. Then, on the theory that the report shld contain something positive, he wld state simply (1) that in his opinion the forces remaining after demilitarization shld be as small as possible and (2) the plebiscite administrator shld be appointed not later than at the end of the demilitarization period. He wld add that on this point his opinion is contrary to the Indian view.
His theory is that this report wld let the operation suspend for a month during the Indian elections, wld give the Pakistanis something to hold public opinion and while it wld not satisfy them they wld swallow it. Graham feels that he shld not make concrete recommendations now and Gross agreed that the case shld not be permitted to crystallize at this stage. The effect of the report wld be to give the SC time to get by the Indian elections and late in Jan mediation operations again commence. Graham wants to hold the case in a negotiating situation, but he feels he must meet the deadline of Dec 22 and the Pakistanis wld object to any appreciable delay in his report. Also, he is sensitive to causing such delay on a second occasion. Graham added that this was the result of much earnest consideration by him. Ayub has told him that any delay in his report wld give great comfort to extremists in Pakistan and at the same time wld be just what the Indians want.
If these tactics were followed Gross suggested that Graham after the elections wld probably want to go again to the subcontinent although Graham stated that the Indians had not suggested this. It was agreed that there is no point in his doing so until after the elections. While a report along the lines projected might weaken Graham’s position to some extent, it wld be a natural consequence of it for him to return to the subcontinent.
[Page 1913]Graham then suggested possibility of including in his report or in some covering statement an appeal to the parties to move this case along as a concrete way of showing by deeds that they believe in disarmament. He also suggested pointing to the relationship of any Korean settlement to the Kashmir case as showing that two pending security issues can be settled by UN processes.
Gross felt that these broad questions shld be kept for later on and not used in a report which Graham intends as a holding operation.
Gross commented that it seemed clear that Pakistan wld not request or agree to any substantial delay in his report and that therefore it shld be filed as planned.
- Mohammad Ayub, Ambassador of Pakistan in France.↩