Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

357.AB/12–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Kennedy)

secret

[Washington,] December 12, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants:	Mr. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
	Mr. C. T. Moodie, Counselor, Australian Embassy
	Mr. Shullaw—BNA1
	Mr. Kennedy—SOA

Mr. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, Australia, came to my office to discuss Kashmir in accordance with an appointment made by the Australian Embassy. In the course of a general discussion the following points emerged.

1. Mr. Casey said that Prime Minister Nehru had told him that the January elections in India would prevent him from making any concessions on Kashmir at the present time. Anything he did to “appease” Pakistan would undoubtedly lose him dozens of seats in Parliament. Mr. Casey had asked Prime Minister Nazimuddin of Pakistan what the Pakistan reaction would be if there were further delay because of the Indian elections and the latter replied that the world would have to be prepared for a lot of “shouting” about this, but in the end that Pakistan would take the delay.

2. In response to my query, Mr. Casey said he thought the UK would be prepared to take a strong line on future steps to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It had been his observation that Mountbatten was the only one left in London who favored India.

3. Mr. Casey said that he had asked Churchill² if the latter had any new ideas as to settlement of the Kashmir dispute and that the latter had replied that he did not. Mr. Casey had then suggested that there be a high-level approach to the parties, meaning by this that there should be personal appeals by Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman. Churchill replied that this was worth considering and that he would talk to the President about it when he came to America. Mr. Casey said that on the occasion of his appointment with the President during his current stay in Washington, he had mentioned this and the President had replied that he would be glad to discuss Kashmir with Churchill.

4. Mr. Casey expressed no disagreement with Graham’s continuing his efforts to reach agreement re demilitarization but expressed some surprise that Graham seemingly was not going to go to the subcontinent before making his report on December 22. Although he did not specifically say so, it was evident that Mr. Casey did not have much optimism as to the prospects for success arising out of Graham’s efforts.

5. Mountbatten³ had said in a private conversation with Mr. Casey that the latter’s suggestion that Churchill and the President intervene was the worst possible one to make. Nehru personally disliked the President and had no love for Churchill.

6. Mr. Casey did not express any particular interest in providing UN troops to replace those presently in Kashmir. This seemed to be merely one way of attempting a solution. I indicated our concern that such a proposal might interfere in some respect with the broadest possible UN support in Korea.

7. In a long conversation with Nazimuddin the latter told Mr. Casey that Pakistan had a lot of troops that would be available for assistance in the defense of the area once the Kashmir dispute was settled; until that time not a corporal would be provided.

1. J. Harold Shullaw of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
2. Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of National Defence.
3. Lord Mountbatten had been Viceroy of India, March–August 1947 and Governor General of the Dominion of India, August 1947–June 1948. Since 1950 he was Lord Commissioner of the British Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord, and Chief of Supplies and Transport.