Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/6–2753: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

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Paris, June 27, 1953—4 p.m.

Polto 2492. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin. Seems to us there are two general approaches United States might take to Ismay paper.¹ First of these would be to let it run gauntlet in Council with view to its being watered down to complete innocuousness. We believe, however, it would be serious mistake to handle it in this negative fashion. We think we should make our approach as responsive as it can be made and still remain consistent with our general policy. Our reasons for this are as follows:

1. Ismay paper appears to us to provide admirable and dignified opportunity accentuate United States leadership in NAC provided we frankly recognize validity Ismay assertion NATO effort has been slipping in some quarters and provided we promptly demonstrate United States willingness play its part counteract slippage.

2. Clear Ismay considers NATO has come to crossroads. Whether in fact it has is beside point. Other members, particularly smaller powers, will include United States losing interest NATO more rapidly than gloomiest predictions of month ago unless we can find convincing way deal immediately with challenge Ismay has put before Council.

3. We could of course pick paper to pieces. So could others. They probably will unless at outset Council’s discussion we show unmistakably that United States wishes preserve and expand on underlying thesis of paper.

4. History of development of paper over period of last several weeks has shown consistent effort on part Ismay and some members his staff produce something United States could react to help fully and realistically. As reported previously paper has been subjected from time to time to heavy line plunges initiating with other NAC members in effort inject proposals supporting limited national interests which would have been unacceptable to United States. Ismay has withstood these efforts with considerable degree success. Inclusion reference urgent need EDC and German contribution prime example of this.

5. Paper provides excellent chance exploit momentum precipitated by Hughes’ initial statements in NAC. Prompt positive followup on basic issues raised by Ismay will go long way reduce any misgivings which may have arisen on part some NAC members from reference (reported paragraph 6 Polto 2423²) to replacement number permanent representatives.

What seems be required in first round Council discussions on Tuesday is vigorous expression United States views generally favorable basic concept and objectives Ismay paper. Difficult oversee meaningfulness quick United States response since this will set tone ensuing discussions.

If in opening statement United States permanent representative takes favorable line, could open up useful discussion broad range problems raised by Ismay [as] well as number important problems he has passed over.

Will send in separate telegrams our recommendations for more specific handling problems which will arise from ensuing discussions in NAC. Meanwhile light foregoing we recommend initial United States response along following lines to suggestions contained paragraphs numbered 13, 14 and 15 in Polto 2486.³

We would support acceptable implementation all suggestions listed subparagraphs (a) (b) and (c) of paragraph 13 and emphasize action already taken respect Bermuda Conference (Topol 1441,⁴ et cetera).

We would favor suitable and timely declarations individual Ministers in NATO countries based on suggestions listed subparagraphs (d) (i) (ii) and (iii) of paragraph 3. We would agree with Ismay view expressed paragraph 14 that collective NATO statement these matters would appear repetitive and unlikely cause more than ripple in public opinion.

We would of course offer support suggestion that EDC treaty be submitted Paris without further delay. Doubt however, that any really effective expression can emerge from NAC on this at this time, view Parliamentary situations particularly in France and Italy.

We would state in initial go around that suggestion listed subparagraph (d) (V) of paragraph 13, while appearing contain meritorious ideas, would necessarily have to be considerably spelled out before we could really come to grips with it.

We would defer making any statement re suggestion in paragraph 15(a) until we had opportunity hear response other members this point.

Be suggestion listed paragraph 15(b) we would first observe that most impressive evidence of United States awareness of threat is fact that United States forces are here in their present number. Entirely possible that joint declaration, which would have to take into account constitutional, political and other considerations three countries concerned, could actually detract from sense security currently derived from presence forces here. This does not mean, however, that US unwilling discuss possible draft declarations with UK and Canada. US would also be prepared discuss in NAC any actual drafts which might ensue from tripartite consideration suggestion with view obtaining NAC consensus as to whether publication would be helpful.

Re suggestion paragraph 15(c) that NA treaty be extended to 50 years, would of course point to US view that NA treaty not automatically ineffective at end 20 year period mentioned Article 13. Would state assumption suggestion made in order put NA treaty on all fours with EDC treaty. Would conclude that if US administration could be authoritatively assured by representatives EDC countries only thing standing in way EDC ratification was question extension NA treaty to 50 years, US would be prepared seek Senate advice and consent appropriate amendment NA treaty.

Request urgent consideration foregoing recs as to line to be taken initial NAC discussions beginning Tuesday.

This telegram shown Bruce Mission and has their general concurrence.⁵

Hughes

1. Regarding Ismay’s paper, see Polto 2456, supra. No copy of the final draft of the paper, entitled “NATO: The Present Position”, dated June 25 and circulated as C–M(53)87, has been found in the Department of State files. For the text of the recommendations in the paper, see footnote 3, below.
2. Dated June 18, p. 410.

3. Not printed; it transmitted the recommendatory paragraphs of Ismay’s paper as follows:

   “13. If Council agree that we must revitalize NATO, will clearly be necessary have exhaustive discussions with view to devising program of action: We ought make up our minds on immediate measures by end this month at latest. Those which occur to me at first sight as being worthy consideration set out below. My colleagues will doubtless have many other thoughts to throw into discussion:

   (a) Council’s misgivings about situation should be communicated forthwith to governments taking part Bermuda conference;

   (b) Communiqué which will presumably be issued as result of conference should include categorical statement that North Atlantic Alliance is a fundamental feature of foreign and defense policies of participating powers;

   (c) Should be emphasized that discussions at conference will be fully reported to NAC;

   (d) Individual Ministers in NATO countries should aim at any suitable opportunity, without waiting for Bermuda conference, make public declarations reaffirming common resolve their respective governments;

   (i) While remaining constantly on their guard to neglect nothing that would lead to real diminution of tension;

   (ii) To refuse to depart from our present line of policy which has already brought about changes in Soviet tactics, until satisfactory agreements have been concluded;

   (iii) To strengthen defense of West by every means consistent with the politico-economic capabilities of member states;

   (iv) To submit EDC treaty to Parliaments without further delay and to press for immediate action upon it, emphasizing that it is the only acceptable means of securing a contribution by Germany to defense of West;

   (v) To take collective measures in order to ensure a better economic and financial balance between Atlantic nations.

   14. Idea that declaration summarized at (d) above should be subject of collective NATO statement is worth considering. Personally, I feel that it is open to objection that it would be repetitive, in view declaration by Council only three months ago. In any case, it unlikely in present circumstances to capture public imagination any more than did General Ridgway’s recent report.

   15. Other ways and means of signifying that NATO really means business might be found in following cases which have not same urgency as those in paragraph 13.

   (a) Announcement that Prime Ministers would represent their governments at opening session of next ministerial meeting,

   (b) Joint declaration by United States, Canada, and United Kingdom that they would maintain forces on continent so long as threat remained.

   (c) Duration of North Atlantic Treaty to be extended to 50 years.” (740.5/6–2653)

4. Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 414.
5. On June 29, the Department of State informed Hughes that it agreed that Ismay’s initiative should be supported by serious consideration in the Council. Additionally, the Department of State approved a statement along the lines indicated in paragraph 5 subject to certain reservations about paragraphs 13(c), 15(a), 15(b), and 15(c). (Telegram Topol 1509 to Paris; 740.5/6–2753)