740.5/6–2953: Telegram
The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State
polto 2498. Reference: (a) Polto 2486, June 26 (b) Polto 2492, June 27.1
Unforeseen adjournment Bermuda Conference2 renders more vital than ever full use opportunity offered by Ismay paper, reference telegram (a). In addition to thoughts expressed pin reference telegram (b), we wish submit Department’s earnest consideration following further analysis of problems raised.
(1) This office viewed for some time with increasing concern what appears to us basic NATO weakness, namely failure to appreciate seriousness and provide adequate armor against Soviet non-military aggression or subversion: e.g., peace offensive. Ismay’s estimate excellent as far as it goes, but does not go far enough. In confining concern to slow-down military effort and seeking remedies for this ill solely, he failed to attack one fundamental cause of growing public [Page 420] and private lassitude toward NATO which, we believe is precisely over-concentration on military defense. Nothing could restore more speedily and convincingly faith in US leadership in free world and NATO in particular than our prompt filling of the gap in Ismay’s analysis and proposed remedies.
(2) It has been recognized from outset—in theory—that NATO must be more than mere military alliance to survive beyond immediate threat of military aggression. This recognition gave birth to concept of North Atlantic Community. Little has been done to give content and reality to this concept; even less to make people aware of slight progress made. Senator Vandenberg was prophetic when he said during ratification debate that NATO must be more than military coalition, otherwise it would be at mercy of any plausible Soviet peace offensive. This is precisely what happened in last few weeks as result of slight conciliatory gestures by Moscow which cost USSR nothing at all. It is not surprising that military alliance which NATO is today is cracking under increasing pressure of popular belief (wish being the father of the thought) that threat of open aggression receding. It matters not that popular belief has no factual, realistic foundation. What matters is that this popular belief, cleverly nurtured by Moscow without effective challenge of disproof, is widespread and powerful enough to impel spokesmen of some NATO governments to acknowledge its existence and meet its clamor by words and by acts, at least of omission.
(3) To strengthen NATO at this time, it is not enough to reaffirm our belief in the necessity of its existence and re-declare our determination to continue unswervingly military build-up. What is needed, in addition, is cold and imaginative steps designed to develop North Atlantic Community which holds out to the peoples composing it hope for objectives broader and more lasting than deterring or repelling military aggression. What we must do to win against Communism is, as pointed out by Canadian Prime Minister, to develop a “dynamic counterattraction”; this battle cannot be gained by military means alone.
(4) If our analysis in correct, as we believe it is, we must progress beyond actions recommended by Ismay and start developing non-military defenses against long-range Soviet goals aiming to destroy West by promoting confusion, discord and division, lulling Europe and Near East into false sense of security and slyly nurturing neutralist sentiment in Arab-Asiatic bloc stemming partly from distrust of West as set forth in Secretary’s conclusions reached on his Middle East trip.3
(5) There are a number of avenues leading to goal of developing [Page 421] this community in non-military area broadly sketched in Article II. Since time now is essence, it seems to us we ought to concentrate initially on one subject likely to catch public imagination, arouse popular interest and thus revive and accentuate public support for NATO.
(6) We believe that a decisive move toward creation of a public “voice and conscience” of Atlantic Community through some form of parliamentary association would be an effective and dramatic step toward promoting sense of unity and singleness of purpose among NATO members and thus frustrating basic Soviet strategy. An interparliamentary body, soundly conceived and placing sense of responsibility and participation on parliamentarians in NATO legislatures would, with one stroke, accomplish several objectives.
First, it would provide opportunity for exchange of ideas and meeting of minds on both sides of Atlantic. Second, through better understanding of problems and better chances for such meetings of minds, it would insure better legislative support for accomplishment of difficult tasks ahead of NATO in military as well as in political and economic fields. Third, it would help to maintain and strengthen NATO supremacy in vital matters pertaining to security and well-being of whole Atlantic Community so that its frame could comfortably embrace whatever form and at whatever pace European unification develops. Fourth, it would create greater public interest in NATO and therefore rally wider public support for its goals.
(7) This last point leads directly to another important factor which we believe deserves earnest consideration. Apart from obvious necessity of strengthening in this time of stress basic instrument of our foreign policy in Europe, it seems to us that domestic political considerations equally favor a positive move, initiated by us, looking toward some sort of parliamentary association with NATO.
First, we must admit that NATO has barely penetrated into consciousness of average citizen. In order acquaint American people with their stake in NATO, idea and aspirations of this organization must be brought home to grass roots. Best way to accomplish this is through Congressional participation, however limited. (Incidentally, same consideration applies, in varying degrees, in other NATO countries.) Second, and more importantly, we believe that the Executive has unique opportunity to demonstrate at home administration’s desire to bring legislative branch, on bipartisan basis, more effectively into formulation of important foreign policy problems on which Congress must act.
(8) The parliamentary association would not be a debating society. What we envisage is vehicle to bring key Congressional figures, responsible in committees of both Houses for implementing NATO plans [Page 422] and decisions, into direct contact from time to time with International Staff, other national delegations and, above all, with their opposite numbers in other parliaments. Experience has shown that on-the-spot study of NATO and aid matters by responsible members of foreign relations, armed services and appropriation committees of both Houses has often made significant difference in subsequent handling of such matters by Congress. Recurring institutionalized contacts of Congressional leaders, properly briefed by Department with their counterparts from other NATO countries should make process even more beneficial; these should greatly facilitate Executive’s task through better understanding and appreciation by legislative leaders of grave foreign policy problems confronting our government and consequently greater Congressional support for executive proposals to meet or solve them. While this consideration applies primarily to our own domestic situation, anticipated benefits are by no means one-sided, since such recurring contacts are bound to help key legislators of our NATO partners to arrive at better understanding of American views and attitudes.
(9) We are not in position to suggest form and competence of parliamentary association or best method to bring about its establishment. However, certain factors relating to this issue are quite clear to us.
First, the question of parliamentary relations with NATO has been raised several times in past three years by various NATO Ministers and interest was expressed also in Congress. We believe Canada, Scandinavian NATO members, Belgium, and Netherlands would certainly welcome concrete developments of this idea. Second, it is obvious that US is key to any meaningful parliamentary association—as she is key to any effective NATO action. In opinion of other countries such association would produce few beneficial results unless US Government, both executive and legislative, give firm and whole-hearted support. It cannot be emphasized enough that in this as well as in all other respects, half measures and lukewarm support by US would be absolutely futile.
(10) We are, of course, aware that question of parliamentary association has been under active consideration by Department for some time. We also realize inevitable risks inherent in establishment of such body. Arguments in favor and against proposal are presented objectively and with great clarity in position paper for April 1953 Ministerial meeting (D–1/5 A, April 174) and need not be repeated here.
- Polto 2492, supra; Polto 2486, not printed, but see footnote 3, supra.↩
- Regarding the postponement of the Bermuda Conference due to Churchill’s illness, see the editorial note, p. 1710.↩
- Documentation on Secretary Dulles’ trip to the Middle East in May 1953 is presented in volume ix .↩
- Not printed; a copy of NAP D–1/5a, “Parliamentary Relationships with NATO”, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142. For documentation on the April NAC Ministerial meeting at Paris, see pp. 368 ff.↩