Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459, “T”

No. 132
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Barbour)

secret

[Washington,] October 13, 1953.

• Subject: Trieste

Participants:

• Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic
• Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popovic
• Dr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. Walworth Barbour, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

The Secretary resumed the conversation interrupted yesterday (see memorandum of conversation of October 12¹). He stated he had been reading cables regarding the violent speeches, demonstrations and attacks on Americans, involving the burning of the portrait of President Eisenhower, etc., which had been taking place in Yugoslavia. These actions make a distressing impression when friendship and cooperation, which has been fostered so many years, blows up for a cause which is without substance. One wonders how genuine the friendship is. If real, it does not disappear over-night. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to inform his government that we take a serious view of these demonstrations which gave the appearance of being organized and indicated that the population was not acting spontaneously but being incited to anti-American acts and worse. As the Secretary had previously told the Foreign Minister, we have taken action which we believe to be acceptable to Yugoslavia and designed to allay a troublesome problem. Without the Yugoslavs making any effort to understand or appreciate our motives, there have developed attacks on the US and Britain which prejudice years of effort to restore mutually advantageous relations. Whatever the intention of the Yugoslav Government, the violence of its leaders and the fact that the mobs are not effectively controlled is incompatible with the relationship we have tried to create. Between friendly nations there are inevitably differences. We never expect to find fully acceptable solutions to everything. However, if on the first occasion when some action is not liked it leads to such violent outbreaks, it is difficult to see the future since there will always be differences. We have sometimes to accept solutions which are not 100% perfect, although in this case we believe this solution is almost 100% in Yugoslavia’s interest. The US-UK decision was a basic component of a more tolerant understanding. We were not in the slightest motivated by animosity to Yugoslavia, but, on the contrary, felt that the decision would make for better relations which we desire. As for Italy, it is anticipated she would have difficulty with the 1948 Declaration.

The Foreign Minister stated that on behalf of his government he regretted the excesses and did not wish to justify them. However, as the question of the violence of these attacks had been raised in a context which qualified them as a discontinuance of friendly relations, he wished to remark that the bitterness in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Government’s reaction merely are the result of strong feelings and they believe that through this unilateral decision, relations have received a blow which has caused the bitterness. On the other hand, although the Secretary accompanied his remarks by reservations, there is no basis for the assertion that the demonstrations were staged or stimulated by the Yugoslav Government. Even the US press correspondents in Yugoslavia have reported that the demonstrations were spontaneous and that the government had taken all suitable measures. As to the Secretary’s last point the Foreign Minister agreed that it is difficult to reach fully satisfactory settlements. This, he said, is obvious. There is another element involved in the Yugoslav reaction, namely, the equality of nations. Yugoslavia considers the decision both in substance and form as constituting a precedent very hard to accept in the conduct of relations generally, and particularly US-Yugoslav relations. It is difficult for any nation, no matter how much political maturity or wisdom it may have, to decide what is best for another nation. The best motives do not guarantee the results. It is important to emphasize this since another undesirable development has taken place, namely, that the Soviets have started to use the developments for their own and different purposes.

The Secretary noted that, as the Yugoslavs are aware, we have sought for seven or eight years an agreed solution of this problem. Meanwhile, US and UK forces have remained indefinitely responsible for the discharge of functions which were intended to be temporary and which we are not prepared to continue. As a result of discussions with the Yugoslav and Italian Governments, we concluded that the only solution to be adopted was a de facto solution—Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. This is not ideal, but it brings this problem to a conclusion so that we can go forward. If the Italians do not own Zone A, so far at least Zone B does not belong to the Yugoslavs. It is not right that we remain in Trieste forever. We have rights which we have exercised, and we see no damage therefrom to Yugoslavia. The Secretary expressed confidence, in all seriousness and solemnity, that as the Yugoslav Government thinks over the matter it will conclude that this is a sound solution. Yesterday the Yugoslavs expressed concern that the Italians would go beyond Zone A. We do not believe that they have such ambitions and we would take affirmative measures with the Yugoslavs to counter such ambitions if they exist. As far as we are concerned, this is the end of such ambitions, subject only to minor mutually agreeable adjustments.

The Foreign Minister asked the Secretary to permit him to reply frankly. The Yugoslavs recognized that the US motives may have been as set forth but it is hard for them to accept the motivation as justification for the decision either as to its substance or its form. He agreed that US troops should not have to stay indefinitely in Trieste, but he also could say that the US did not have the right to take decisions affecting the rights of the Yugoslav Government and the Yugoslav people for the purpose of removing US troops. Concerning US exercising efforts to counter further Italian ambitions, is it possible for the Yugoslavs to consider that sufficient? This decision, if implemented, already effectively settles the main part of the issue we are discussing in favor of Italy. To direct the conversation toward a way out of the situation we are in, the Foreign Minister said he would like to refer to the Yugoslav proposal for a four-power meeting.

The Secretary said that he could not reply concerning the four-power proposal today because of the necessity for coordination with the UK. In response to a further question from the Foreign Minister as to whether the issue of a four-power conference should be decided urgently, in view particularly of the note now received from the Soviet Government,² the Secretary agreed on the urgency, but added that it could be better dealt with if the Yugoslavs dropped their talk of the use of force and violence, which is out of keeping with relations between our two governments. As I understand it, he continued, Tito says that as soon as any Italian sets foot in Zone A, the Yugoslavs will march in. At that point there will still be British and US troops there. The Secretary said that he was not necessarily asking the Foreign Minister to reply, that the latter could if he wanted to, but also, if he should so wish, his question could be treated as a rhetorical one, carrying its own answer. The remarks made by Tito indicate a forceful intent.

Foreign Minister Popovic replied that he could answer the question with full responsibility. He said he thought it would be incorrect on the part of his government to make statements which could be interpreted as bluff. The Yugoslav Government has stated that it will react “by corresponding means against an action which, if it comes about, could be characterized only as the forcible introduction of Italian troops into Zone A”. If that should happen, it would be unfortunate as American troops would act as a shield for such introduction. Precisely to avoid such consequences, which would be unavoidable if the decision is implemented, the Foreign Minister requested urgent consideration of their four-power conference proposal.

The Secretary said he would carefully consider the suggestion and added, in response to a further question as to whether in the Secretary’s personal view the suggestion appeared appropriate to the interest and prestige of various countries involved, that he had made it clear he would have to consult the UK and he could not express a personal view.

Yugoslav Ambassador Popovic interjected at this point to inquire whether, in view of the Soviet action in raising the matter in the Security Council, on which discussions could take place within 48 hours, it could be stated in the SC that conversations between the US, UK and Yugoslavs had already begun.

The Secretary declined to answer except to reiterate that he would consider the proposal as a matter of urgency and let the Foreign Minister know. He inquired whether the Foreign Minister had thought of returning to Belgrade to report to his government on these conversations or whether he would stay in New York. The latter replied that he expected to stay in New York in view of the Security Council development.

The Secretary expressed the hope that he could make it very clear to Marshal Tito that we cannot take a very favorable view of the threat to use force in areas outside Yugoslav territory. The Foreign Minister said that he would fully convey everything that has been said and particularly the foregoing remark, but he would like to comment that while the territory is not Yugoslav, it is not Italian, and to express, in the interest of calming the situation, regret that he had only received a reserved response in respect to the four-power conference.

The Secretary concluded that the Yugoslavs will have seen the announcement that he is flying to London tomorrow, that he will confer with Mr. Eden on Friday³ in connection with the foregoing, and that in the circumstances we might postpone expression of our views in the Security Council by obtaining a recess for a few days following the presumed Soviet presentation on Thursday.

1. Supra.
2. Reference is to the Soviet note delivered to the Embassy in Moscow the afternoon of Oct. 12, the text of which was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 461 from Moscow, Oct. 12. The note contained the Soviet Government’s protest that the U.S.-U.K. decision on Oct. 8 constituted a violation of the Italian Peace Treaty. (750G.00/10–1253)
3. Oct. 16. Regarding the meeting in London, Oct. 16–18, see Document 137.