Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 133
Memorandum of Discussion at the
166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,
October 13, 19531
eyes only
Present at the 166th meeting of the Council were: The President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force (for Item 3); the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil, and Francis J. McCarthy, of the Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, General Twining, and Lt. Gen. Thomas, USMC (for Item 3); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President (for Item 3); the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; James C. Hagerty, Secretary to the President (for Item 3); Brig. Gen. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
[Here follows discussion of a subject unrelated to Trieste.]
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence first discussed the situation with respect to Trieste, and pointed out that the great danger does not appear to arise from the likelihood that Tito will move Yugoslav armed forces into Zone A, but rather that there will be local [Page 313] incidents by his more headstrong supporters. The climate in Trieste at the moment was very changeable and drafty.
The President interrupted to inquire whether it was not the Serbs who had been historically the firebrands of this area, but Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Croatians and the Slovenes were the more volatile people, while the Serbs were the better and the more stubborn fighters. Mr. Dulles went on to say that the Soviet note with respect to the Anglo-American action had reached Washington last night.2 There was no specific mention of Yugoslavia. The note merely called attention to the alleged violation of the Italian peace treaty and of the alleged desire of the West to make Trieste a base for aggression. Mr. Dulles stated that time had not permitted as yet a coordinated estimate of what was likely to happen in Trieste. CIA by itself, however, had come to the preliminary view that Tito would not risk a clash as long as U. S. and U. K. forces remained in Zone A.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Trieste.]
- Presumably prepared by Gleason on Oct. 14.↩
- Regarding the Soviet note, see footnote 2, supra.↩