Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/4–3052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

secret

Washington, April 30, 1952—7:34 p.m.

411. Re Tunisia. (Para 4 urtel 752 Apr 28)² Inform Gonzalez as fol:

(1) We greatly appreciate his telling us in confidence of approach made him by Bokhari and his seeking our views on substance Tunisian case as well as more specific question special session. In return we are happy inform him basis our thinking.

(2) Our position on this difficult and important matter has been motivated entirely by a desire fol whatever course holds most promise successful results. We are sure all concerned wld agree that most desirable end is Tunisians shld obtain satis their legitimate aspirations through orderly negots with Fr without outside pressures. Our decision abstain in SC resulted from our sincere conviction a debate at this time far from assisting interested parties reach agreement wld serve to drive them further apart. This being so, we felt the question of timing was important and so indicated in our statement in SC on Apr 10. At that time we also pointed out that it remains open any member bring question to Council’s attention again and if that were done US wld reassess situation. On other hand, we believe, and Charter so provides, that parties must be given adequate opportunity negotiate.

(3) Negots in Franco-Tunisian Mixed Comm were scheduled commence Apr 24. We regret that for various reasons this sched was not met and Mixed Comm has not yet been appointed. We understand new Fr target date is mid-May and we are urging Fr strongly no further delay be allowed intervene. In this connection it is of course equally necessary Tunisian Govt act with despatch in appointing their members of comm. In our view situation in Tunisia justifies allowing parties concerned at least another few weeks get comm established and to negot. If negots are not started or prove unproductive it is obvious that all of us wld wish reexamine question in light new situation. It is equally obvious that any effort impose specific time limit on negots wld merely play into hands of those who do not desire negots succeed.

(4) For reasons indicated above, we are convinced discussion now Tunisian question in any UN forum wld be harmful. If negots have not been resumed after reasonable period (say four or five weeks) and if Arab-Asian group shld then feel they must present question in UN, it seems to us that more logical way wld be to request new mtg SC and ask members review decision Apr 14. In our view such procedure wld be preferable to any move for consideration Tunisian question in special session GA. At such time we wld be prepared to reassess situation. We cannot of course now know what our decision wld be after such reassessment.

You shld inform Fr and UK dels that you have been confidentially approached by Gonzalez and that you have replied to him along foregoing lines. You shld further inform Fr and UK dels that we view with concern idea of special session on Tunisian question. In such special session so-called “colonial powers” wld be pitted against African-Asian group of 15, Sov bloc of 5, Yugo, certain number of Latin Americans, and perhaps Scandinavians. It is unlikely “colonial powers” wld be able obtain majority support for their positions. While they cld probably muster enough votes prevent adversaries from obtaining necessary two-thirds majority, it may be impossible avoid bitter debate of and adoption in comite of one or more drastic res which might condemn Fr and propose UN Comm be sent to Tunisia. Loss of leadership on Tunisia question wld drain away future Assembly support from Western Powers on East-West issues and greatly strengthen trend toward radical measures in Assembly on behalf of under-developed and dependent areas. For this reason, if we are ultimately faced with choice between prospect of special session and SC consideration, we wld prefer latter.

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Bonbright (EUR), Hickerson (UNA), Wainhouse (UNP), and Stein (UNP). It was cleared by S/A and the office of Bourgerie (NEA) and repeated to London and Paris.
2. Not printed. It reported Gonzalez had informed the U.S. Delegation the Pakistani Delegate wanted him to circulate an unidentified document to the Latin American delegates and call them to a meeting to hear Bokhari discuss it. He assumed the unidentified document was the Indian aide-mémoire (see telegram 3928, p. 732). Gonzalez felt the Latin American delegates should hear Bokhari, but should not take any action as a unit. Paragraph 4 of the reference telegram transmitted Gonzalez’ request for U.S. views on the substance of the Tunisian case and the U.S. position on a special session on the matter. It was not certain whether Venezuela would support a special session, but there was much strong anticolonial sentiment in Latin America which would support it. (772.00/4–2852)