772.00/5–152: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

secret priority

769. Re Tunisia. Gonzalez (Venezuela) came to USUN at 3 o’clock this afternoon bearing copious notes from morning mtg with AsianAfrican group.1 He reported that there had been present reps of Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Yemen for ASAF (Asian-African) [Page 740] group and all LA reps except Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. He saw no significance to absences.

Gonzalez appears to have had unfavorable reaction ASAF’s. Among contributing reasons for his discontent are unsuccessful attempt by Bokhari to make him preside mtg, which he interpreted as effort to create impression ASAF’s meeting with caucus, despite clear understanding attendance was on individual basis; contradictions between statements of individual ASAF’s and between attitude of Bokhari and Tunisian rep, presumably Ladgham (former cabinet minister escaped from Tunisia) toward primary objective of group in desiring special session and objective as announced in Indian aide-mémoire and other ASAF statements; and suspicion that ASAF’s have not thought this matter through and are not united in their thinking.

Gonzalez’s account of mtg is as follows: Bokhari, explaining group preferred this informal “affectionate” way of appealing to their dear LA friends, feeling that this was better than formal, more impersonal diplomatic approach on govt level, stated Tunisian case has become matter of honor for ASAF’s; colonial question has become serious problem and becomes more serious with delay; Tunisian case is not domestic matter; case must be settled because it is dividing world, setting Europeans against non-Europeans and developed countries against undeveloped countries; and two actions now possible; in SC or in special session. Bokhari did not know whether the group would be successful in attempting to obtain session, but would make good try.

Khalidy (Iraq) declared SC useless and special session necessary. Dayal (India) stressed necessity of UN discussing every question, such as present one, which transcends domestic character.

There then followed long exposition by Tunisian rep of French oppression, ending with plea for LA support for special session. When Uruguay inquired date for such session Bokhari replied nothing set, but ASAF’s impatient. Bokhari emphasized that ASAF’s want is only to get French and Tunisians negotiating around table.

Santa Cruz (Chile) after affirming Chile’s unwavering support for free UN discussion and its disapproval of blocs in UN, asked (1) what measures of French would satisfy ASAF’s and lead them to withdraw complaint? (2) has such information been communicated to French Govt? (3) what does Tunisia want, complete independence or autonomy within French Union? Bokhari replies only to third question, indirectly saying that primary objective of ASAF’s is to reduce tension, that freeing political prisoners would enable Tunisians to talk with French and thus would threat to peace disappear. If negotiations then failed, UN could send rep as mediator to offer his good offices, etc.

Tunisian rep, replying contradictorily to third question, said Tunisia [Page 741] aspires to recover absolute independence but does not want in so doing to break with France. Therefore, Tunisia wants negotiated (“agreed”) independence, safeguarding French culture and economic interests as well as France’s strategic interests on regional and world scale. Re French Union, he was bearish, saying experience with operation of union has not been good and religious consideration i.e. Moslem-Christian was obstacle. Furthermore, he said, French system is cut out for republics, not for monarchies. And finally he said colonials are opposed to even Tunisian autonomy within union.

Colombian rep asked whether special session is urgent and whether purpose thereof is to be understood as to find peaceful way to arrange Tunisian independence. (In conversation after mtg Colombian told Gonzalez he wished to inform his govt clearly whether purpose of ASAF’s is independence or merely to find ways to get negotiations started since if former is case it is obvious LA support of special session will, to a degree, commit LA’s to support Tunisian independence.) Bokhari replied in affirmative to both questions.

Indonesian spoke up to say that most important thing is to obtain good offices. He thought good offices might come from SC action (Gonzalez interpreted this as attempt to play down independence talk and showed Tunisian disagreement therewith).

Finally, Bokhari said ASAF’s will invite LA’s to second mtg after they have received govt’s reactions from reports of this one. He said also ASAF’s intend approach other UN members.

Commenting on mtg, Gonzalez said all LA’s were reserved and weighed words carefully. He personally did not know whether second mtg would materialize since questions were individual and not for caucus and LA’s would be called on to take positions.

When I inquired Gonzalez’s opinion whether LA’s would favor special session, Gonzalez found uncertainty but said he rather felt that many LA’s will have to support calling of session if it is for independence of Tunisia.2 He thought Bokhari was clever in putting up independence idea since it will appeal to LA govts. An appeal on basis of human rights would meet poor response.

I then inquired whether, if France sought similar mtg, LA’s would attend. I stressed I had no idea that French had any such intention, but was interested in LA attitude. Gonzalez replied all LA’s would go and French ought to seek such mtg. I then expressed our gratitude to Gonzalez for his cooperation and made comments based on Deptel 411, April 30.3 Gonzalez thanked me for this expression of views and said he would be talking with LA colleagues since his govt would [Page 742] wish him to. Reverting to contradictions, he pointed out Bokhari had said primary objective is to reduce tension, but then had spoken of urgency of special session which Gonzalez thought would only raise tension; Bokhari had said purpose was to find peaceful means of getting negotiations started, but later had said objective was independence and had been confirmed by Tunisian rep; Indonesian had contradicted Bokhari and Tunisian rep by saying most important thing was to obtain good offices.

Gross
  1. USUN telegram 767, Apr. 30, reported the Latin American delegates would meet with the Asian-African delegates the following day. The Asian-African group had circulated a Spanish translation of a memorandum entitled “The Problem of Tunis and the UN.” One section of the memorandum dealt with the unsuccessful attempt to have the Tunisian case placed on the Security Council agenda. It concluded that it was therefore necessary to consider a special meeting of the General Assembly to publicly discuss Tunisia. (772.00/4–3052)
  2. Telegram 803 from New York, May 12, informed the Department of State Gonzalez told the U.S. Delegation he had received instructions to oppose calling a special session and understood similar instructions had been sent to a number of other Latin American representatives. (772.00/5–1252)
  3. Supra.