690D.91/11–1352: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State1
2028. At dinner Saturday night, Sir Benegal Rau, who is here in Delhi for two months’ visit, volunteered info confidential talks might take place between GOI and GOP on subj of Kashmir and added proposed solution might take form of partition with Azad–Kashmir going to Pak, Jammu to India and pleb confined to Vale. I fol up this conversation at long 3 hour luncheon with Sir Benegal, during which he made fol points:
- (1)
- Partition with limited pleb is only practical way out of present dilemma. Under no circumstances can Ind accept presence Pak troops on Kashmir soil during pleb and proposals for various troop ratios seemed ignore this point. If Azad–Kashmir actually goes to Pak under partition quantum forces agmt will be much easier for both GOI and GOP.
- (2)
- Acceptance partition proposal with limited pleb wld create potential polit problems for both Ind and Pak but these pressures wld not be so great they cld not be handled by both govts.
- (3)
- US–UK were mistaken in making proposals to UN on quantum forces since we knew in advance Ind wld reject them. Although he did not personally question integrity of our position, he said there is much resentment in GOI circles and if we went any further along present line this resentment wld sharply increase and might eventually wipe out gains which have been made in Indo-Amer relations in last several months.
- (4)
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Sir Benegal said it was particularly unfortunate we allowed Jebb to present resolutions since Ind’s have long been convinced he is unfriendly to them. By separate tel (Embtel 2029)2 we are sending Dept substance of article obviously inspired by GOI which appeared in principal Delhi papers today. Article described Jebb’s speech on US–UK res as calculatingly sinister attempt to rewrite UNCIP report and as breach of solemn agmts between UN, Pak and Ind.
Sir Benegal further stated Jebb seemed to go out of his way to attack Ind position on point which had already been accepted by Graham, i.e., Ind responsibility for security of state.
- (5)
- Sir Benegal indicated negots presumably between Ind and Pak may “start in day or two” but did not volunteer any details. I did not feel it proper to press him. I am confident Dept will carefully protect me on this point.
I deeply apprec consistent solid support Dept has given us here in Delhi on many delicate and potentially controversial situations during past 12 months. Indeed, I believe question of how best to handle Kashmir is only point on which we have been in disagreement. However, I am sure you will agree it is my responsibility to describe situation as we see it here and to urge what we believe to be best course of action, even though we know in advance it may not strike responsive chord.
In that framework, I must again express my conviction there is no hope whatsoever for solution Kashmir question by our present approach. Quantum of forces argument strikes directly at basis for Ind’s entire claim to Kashmir. Whether we agree or not this is one of facts we must face if we are to make progress towards a solution. In our opinion, Ind is anxious to postpone pleb as long as possible on theory that time is on her side and that GOI position in Kashmir will constantly grow stronger. It is wholly possible that regardless of what position we take or even what concessions Pak is prepared to make Ind will refuse to go along. However, our best hope lies in presenting Ind with a proposal which in view of their past statement, wld be far more difficult for them to reject than present US–UK res.
If we continue to press res which was presented this week, Ind position will, in our opinion, crystallize even more sharply and much of the ground we have worked so hard to gain will be lost. A moral judgment against either party can only lead to still greater bitterness on all [Page 1301] sides and elimination of whatever small hope may exist of GOI–GOP agreement.
As indicated most recently Embtel 1513 Oct 9 to Dept, I have long felt Graham’s terms ref shld be broadened by SC either by ref Sir Owen Dixon’s auth under SC resolutions Mar 14, 1950 or by specific wording new res. Such broadened terms ref wld permit discussion solution along lines of partition. SC might call upon and urge Pak and Ind PriMins meet further discussions with assistance Graham as UN rep. Such discussion might not only consider results Geneva talks but also any suggestions for overall solution. Acting under auth such res Graham shld be in position conduct advance exploratory talks both PriMins and be able bring them together when he considers moment propitious.
There is likelihood Kashmir question at this time simply cannot be solved regardless of what we say or how many resolutions we may pass. In that case our tactics shld be to maintain position of friendliness to both countries and, above all, not to get caught in middle. We feel US already much too prominent in Kashmir dispute. UN mediator is Amer, pleb admin is Amer; nearly half UN officers responsible for ceasefire line are Amers. In a situation of such actual and potential bitterness this may present bad tactics, and explosiveness of situation may be intensified if we stand behind resolution which we know in advance Ind cannot accept.
We can count on Sov Union to take full advantage this situation whenever possible. Last week Radio Moscow beamed at Ind stated that US Govt was violently opposed to any Nehru–Sheikh Abdullah agreement, and that I had been instructed to tell GOI no further econ aid wld be forthcoming unless this agreement was dissolved. There is no point in giving the Soviet Union any opportunity to denounce US and UK as imperialists and pose as friend of Ind and Kashmir by possible veto of proposed resolution in SC.
It seems to me inevitable that, in present confused world situation we cannot avoid at times becoming irritated at policies of some of our closest friends incl Ind and Pak. However, what we need is patience and willingness to ignore many inconsistencies and irritations which for some time to come will plague our efforts in South Asia. But stakes here are crucially important and it is mistake for us to allow ourselves to deviate from an approach which has already proved successful in dealing with GOI. During recent weeks I have sent Dept a number of tels re Kash such as Embtel 1513, Oct 9 and 1894 Nov 5,3 thus far have recd no answer or comment. I am sure you understand spirit in which I have again stated my own strong convictions and those of our political section. But I am sure you wld not respect me if I did not tell you what I thought.