357.AB/11–1752: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State1
priority
2063. Personal Acheson from Bowles. We here New Delhi convinced US–UK resolution on Kashmir serious mistake. Although we did not have opportunity express our views before resolution became public, we cabled Dept few days ago giving our analysis problems created here (Embtel 2028, Nov 13).
Two long talks Bombay Thursday and Friday with our good friend Sir Girja Bajpai plus further crystallization Indian attitudes has convinced me that cable directly to you with request you personally review our position amply justified. If you decide present position Security Council correct I will of course loyally support position regardless consequences here. But I sure you and your associates must agree I have responsibility make certain implications our action shld be clearly understood before final die is cast.
Bajpai stated he had two long telephone calls from Prime Minister Nehru, one Wednesday and one Thursday. Although purpose first call to ask if Sir Girja wld accept Trygve Lie’s position if it offered him; Nehru also discussed Kashmir. Second talk largely on Kashmir. Prime Minister made fol points with considerable emotion:
- 1.
- Resolution strikes deliberately at Indian position and Churchill govt clearly responsible. UK seems Lave two primary purposes (a) win support major Muslim nations, i.e., Pakistan, in order help restore former UK prestige Middle East following failure in Iran and elsewhere (b) to split neutralist Arab-Asian bloc at UN.
- 2.
- US role puzzling. Difficult believe US did not understand full implications. Possibility our support given to ease UK resentment over our stand colonial question. But why did we appear go along with Jebb’s “obviously anti-Indian presentation”.
Sheikh Abdullah’s speech before Kashmir Assembly Friday followed this same general line.
Sir Girja took moderate view as to motives, expressed his keen disappointment over our position, said he fearful we wld lose much ground recently won with GOI and advised me not to discuss situation with Nehru at this time as I wld only draw forth emotional reaction.
Another and less tolerant explanation here in Delhi assumes our resolution reflects hardened attitude of new US admin and next step will be bases in Pakistan. New York Times article by Knowles November 12 issue used as “evidence” bolster these charges. Another news story over Wash dateline November 15 flatly states US military strategists anxious make deal with Pakistan’s 80 million people for military [Page 1303] assistance and for “airbases only 90 minutes flying time from Sov industrial centers.”
I know these latter explanations ridiculous and I record them only to indicate intensity reaction high circles here. If resolution cld have brought Kashmir agreement nearer or if it cld have served some critically important purpose elsewhere it would have been justified regardless GOI attitudes. But we must face fact that if we pursue our present line whatever chance agreement on Kashmir through UN will be eliminated. Ind attitude towards Pakistan will harden, Soviet will be given golden opportunity denounce US and UK and pose as friend of Kashmiris and 360 million Indians, and we will receive sharp setback.
Our general relations here with GOI and Indian people have immeasurably improved. This largely result patient understanding approach developed by Dept and ourselves which has gradually won GOI confidence our motives, in our dedication to peace, in our understanding of their own peculiar problem, and in our willingness help.
Seems most unfortunate for us depart at this stage from this proven approach in Indo-US relations. My long letter Oct 30 to you urged high level policy decision as to India’s importance in global situation and steps we might take increase chances she will remain democracy with growing strength and with increasing willingness support West in cold war and possibly hot war conflict. Our acceptance US–UK resolution represents serious backward step.
In light all these factors I would hope US would be able devise more moderate position in SC on Kashmir. I realize how difficult it wld be wholly abandon our support present resolution. However, we could at least disassociate ourselves from those remarks of Jebb which GOI believes challenge agreements already reached in SC. After hearing both parties we could also amend resolution to remove unacceptable provisions and to broaden Graham’s terms ref to permit approach by him to two Prime Ministers to seek overall solution whole Kashmir question.
We have said many times last ten months that we held no brief for GOI’s delaying tactics on Kashmir and we have no illusions as to her motives. But our present approach eliminates all hope settlement because it allows GOI debate case on legal ground where she believes herself to be strong.
Our only hope for settlement lies in earnest, perhaps somewhat emotional, unbiased appeal to two Prime Ministers to bury differences, bring two nations together not only on Kashmir but on other issues such as water and thus to demonstrate to world that bitter conflicts can be solved by peaceful means. Partition with Azad–Kashmir to Pakistan. Jammu to India and plebiscite confined to Valley is only practical basis for actual agreement.
[Page 1304]If such approach fails we should express our regrets, hope further attempts will soon be made, resist temptation offer moral judgments and continue to maintain patient unprejudiced friendly relations with both nations.
Again let me say I understand many difficult problems with which you and Dept faced in this peculiarly unsettled atmosphere but I know you will want have facts as we see them.
- This telegram was repeated by Washington to New York as telegram Telac 63, Nov. 18.↩