Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/10–1353: Telegram

No. 114
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 17, 1953—1:20 p.m.

326. Since Burmese walkout Chinese have consistently pressed for evacuation with help US and Thai good offices and have not required other assurances than that they will not be attacked while evacuating. Department believes Burmese views as set forth Rangoon’s 342² and amended Rangoon’s 362³ should suffice for such assurances. Burmese committed not interfere with evacuation and to cooperate fully with committee, and if Chinese accept Burmese views without delay no military action will be taken before November 15. Embassy Taipei therefore urge Foreign Minister “accept views” without delay and instruct Bangkok representative make this known and set evacuation machinery in motion soonest. If Chinese sincerely wish evacuation now is time to start and if they accept within next few days there should be time for evacuation in stated period.

According Bangkok’s 748⁴ evacuation groups can start moving in two weeks during which time US control teams should be able arrive and Thai administrative arrangements be ready. Department does not however believe Burmese should set hard and fast time limit for ceasefire especially in view factors beyond Chinese control such as US and Thai arrangements, which cannot begin until GUB terms agreed on. Embassy Rangoon should make this clear to GUB and make every effort obtain assurances no evacuees will be attacked within reasonable period after November 15 if bona fide evacuation still going on. This is clearly within spirit of Prime Minister’s statements on subject (Rangoon’s 353).⁵

Thai will presumably soon obtain “direct” assurances similar those given Sebald by GUB. Immediately these obtained and Chinese assent to move Embassy Bangkok should press Thai proceed their arrangements and should request US control teams report soonest.

Department believes arms question should be left open with arms placed in committee custody till inventoried for evacuation record, disposition to be decided later. Possibly could be sold to Thai or Burmese, proceeds to form part of Chinese contribution to costs evacuation. To extent possible evacuees should bring not only rifles but such heavier equipment as befits size of units.

Department concerned troublesome consequences foreseen Bangkok’s 741⁶ re Chinese interpretation evacuation of bases and prefers if possible proceed without reference ten-day extension for bases only (Rangoon’s 344 amended 362)⁷ which in any case not clear as pointed out Bangkok’s 741.⁸ Department considers wording evacuation plan, Section 5 a (11) a, b,⁹ holds implicit Chinese agreement evacuate bases peacefully but recognizes Chinese Government unable influence all troops now in six bases to depart. Chinese Government should nevertheless make every effort insure that those who remain fully appreciate Burmese Army plans occupy bases soon as committee informs GUB those intending to go have left. This may act as lever induce as least some of remainder to leave bases even though not leaving Burma. Taipei request Foreign Minister clarify Chinese position this respect.

Smith

1. Also sent to Bangkok and Rangoon; repeated to USUN.
2. Supra.
3. Dated Oct. 16; Sebald reported that he gave the Foreign Minister a memorandum incorporating his understanding of Burma’s undertakings with regard to the evacuation; it specified that the undertakings were contingent on the Chinese Government’s acceptance of the proposals without delay. (690B.9321/10–1653)
4. Not printed.
5. Dated Oct. 15; it quoted reports of an Oct. 13 press conference by U Nu during which he stated that troops that were actually evacuating would not be attacked. (690B.9321/10–1553)
6. Dated Oct. 15; it reported a conversation with the Chinese representative on the Committee, who stated that the troops were still ready to evacuate and that the bases would be evacuated. The reference here is to a comment that the Embassy believed that “evacuation of bases” applied only to those willing to go to Taiwan. (690B.9321/10–1553)
7. See footnote 4, supra.
8. Reference is to a comment that the Embassy did not see how the additional 10-day ceasefire could apply only to the bases since the troops would presumably be en route to the evacuation point. (690B.9321/10–1553)
9. This portion of the evacuation plan is quoted in Document 95.