Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.5/9–2853: Telegram

No. 115
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret

Washington, October 20, 1953—6:28 p.m.

2122. London’s 1166² Rangoon’s 287.³ Department believes would be helpful if Service Departments UK Government would send to British Services Mission soonest their detailed comments on schedule items Burmese Government wishes buy from US Government (enclosure 5 to Rangoon despatch 66)⁴ in order that US Service Attachés Rangoon may complete consultations with BSM undertaken with view coordinated action GOB’s request reimbursable military aid.

Embassy London requested inform Foreign Office of foregoing and at same time outline general position Department summarized below.

Although situation Burma obviously not ideal Department believes (a) ruling group not seriously challenged by Communist opposition (b) leaders form combination most capable safeguarding Burma independence (c) strongly nationalistic sentiment which induces leaders oppose any semblance foreign control unfavorable extension Communist influence and yet receptive assistance from West to strengthen position.

Since Burma’s independence important to security free world Department believes prompt and favorable action should be taken on GOB request for military items it is ready to pay for and which will help it maintain order and guard frontiers. Inaction on our part seems likely not only damage relations US and UK with Burma and render more difficult task BSM but also force Burma look elsewhere for arms it wishes buy. If Burma feels obliged seek supplies from Communist sources elements friendly to US and UK within Burma and Burma’s ties with free world will be weakened. Department doubts anything US or UK Governments do likely modify determination GOB not limit its source arms supply to one country, on contrary delays and restrictions which Burmese consider unreasonable will tend strengthen this determination and weaken influence UK and US.

Our service attachés Rangoon have screened Burmese lists with BSM and find them not unreasonable. Defense Department expresses same view after preliminary examination. Limits Burmese ability pay should check any tendency order excess needs. Department wishes completion discussions with GOB and BSM Rangoon under procedure phase II Deptel 6190 London, 1459 Rangoon,⁵ and move into phase III soonest. Department hopes UK London’s comments as requested by BSM may be taken into account in discussions under phase II. If however these comments are long delayed we may feel desirable, order not risk weakening position US and UK Burma, suggest to GOB all items on list already submitted informally be included in formal request for price and availability.

Embassy Rangoon requested clarify statements paragraphs 4 and 5 enclosure 1 despatch 66⁶ re British position on vehicles, engineering equipment and animals included schedules B, C and D Army Supply list. Department reluctant base action solely on British inability to comment and absence specific instructions those items. If the Embassy view BSM clearly has no objection US selling those items Embassy should suggest to Burmese Defense Ministry that to expedite action formal request for availabilities and prices items schedules B, C and D Army Supply list be submitted now through diplomatic channels (phase III Deptel 1459 repeated London 6190).

Following receipt Embassy Rangoon reply preceding paragraph Embassy London should inform Foreign Office accordingly.

Dulles

1. Also sent to Rangoon.
2. Document 100.
3. Document 105.
4. Not printed.
5. See footnote 3, Document 70.
6. Not printed.