Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.00/2–2452: Telegram

No. 195
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
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Djakarta, February 24, 1952—11 a.m.

1261. Called to PriMin home 6 p.m., 23rd. Sukiman confirmed Cabinet had returned mandate to Pres who had accepted. He said Parl in recess and wld not reconvene until new govt formed. He did not yet know who wld form govt but was to discuss this with Sukarno 24th.

Sukiman expressed concern over possibility deteriorating relations with US. Referred to Aneta article from Washington to effect MSA aid wld be cut off if Subardjo negots repudiated.

I asked Sukiman if at anytime his govt had passed on substantive merits of MSA assurances which Subardjo had given. He replied negatively. I asked if FonMin had been put out solely on procedural ground. He replied affirmatively. I asked if in absence repudiation Subardjo agreement it was still valid. He confirmed it was. He volunteered that sentiment in favor thereof had improved in recent days. He said leaders planned distribute certain docs pertinent to agreement among leaders Parl next few days to gain support for MSA agreement. He inquired along lines our last mtg (Embtel 1249)¹ whether objectionable features of 511 (a) agreement might be removed. He referred particularly to para 3. I reminded him US had conceded on all points raised by Subardjo for his govt.

I recalled to Sukiman that when negots commenced I had explained 511 (a) and (b) alternatives fully to Subardjo and that Indo Govt then had entire freedom choose which either it desired.

I said at loss understand action his govt in throwing out Subardjo on procedural ground without merits his agreement being passed upon by Cabinet. I reminded PriMin he himself had been aware of Subardjo negots with me. I said it seemed to me that he as PriMin had responsibility to inform other cabinet members of negots if such practice required.

I insisted I had negotiated honorable agreement with FonMin of govt in power. Agreement still valid altho govt now defunct. I cld not at this juncture negotiate with demissionary govt or make any commitments whatever. I said it wld detract from dignity both our govts, be most unfair to Subardjo, and of doubtful legality if US Govt and successor Indo Govt wld negot new MSA Agreement without original agreement having been repudiated or considered on merits in Cabinet or Parl.

I recalled to FonMin reasons Subardjo and I had favored 511 (a) agreement: Police equip still arriving and prospective serious need for mil aid. I said I was still willing help successor Indo Govt obtain aid for these purposes. I said Indo financial position such that it might be difficult convince Cong Indo required grant econ aid alone. I said if Indo now failed to stand by 511 (a) and bargained for weaker terms, this wld be particularly noted at such time as Indo statement position on Battle Act may become known (Embtel 1054).² I said all of this might make US-Indo relations worse than now.

I recalled Indos had not sought ratification ECA bilateral and not one friendly official Indo voice had yet been raised in behalf US aid or US position. I said I cld not yet understand how Indo Govt which had fallen on MSA issue cld about-face and present any other MSA Agreement unless and until original agreement might be turned down by Parl. Sukiman then admitted there were various Indo polit problems involved. I told him I did not intend ask my govt suffer further humiliation while Indo leaders playing domestic politics not willing or able defend relationship with US.

Would like point out to Dept that in view fact Sukiman Cabinet now defunct there cld be no advantageous purpose in reopening negots with it now on very subj which brought about its demise. Only action open to US which wld enable us to secure strong position Indo eyes and respect of Indo Govt is to leave with Indos proposition that they stick by agreement which they entered into and which we still consider to be only agreement under MSA which wld prove to their advantage. Under it they may secure police and mil equipment which they badly need to defend their democracy and make it possible for them to utilize fully their resources. Any agreement less than this can bring them only small amt of grant aid which they do not need and which can make no significant difference to them since it wld form only small fraction favorable dol balances. However, if we allow Indos get this small amt grant aid under formula similar Burma means grave difference to us because we run risk:

(1) Of leading Indos to believe there was readily available for serving their purposes an easier formula than Subardjo negotiated, giving credence to belief already expressed to Lacy (Deptel 920)³ that Subardjo was “our man”;

(2) Of being criticized for giving Indo only small fraction of aid granted India and Pakistan, not to mention Eur countries;

(3) Of giving currency to view that US in endeavoring elicit concessions from Indo but in last analysis needs Indo so badly that it will if subjected hard bargaining concede to Indos everything they want. Wld then become far more difficult for us obtain purchase contract on tin at reasonable price, make arrangements for Amer investors enabling them to get fair profit, to defend perfectly just US claims in any other spheres. In addition, very strong possibility exists that even if we wld state to new Indo Govt our willingness accept this humiliating and needless defeat, that govt wld lack courage and ability to defend its views before Parl and nation. This wld as consequence drag us through entirely new campaign of suspicion and mud-slinging and result in failure to conclude any type MSA Agreement. Believe we must act on most pessimistic rather than most optimistic estimate of outcome.

As consequence, urge Dept issue statement along lines Embtel 1250.⁴ This statement will clear atmosphere here, will sharpen alternatives to Indos, and will enable formateurs of new Cabinet to understand distinctly from beginning that we will give them what they need and what they have agreed is to their best interest, but we will not afford them chance to continue indecisive fence-sitting on one hand while getting totally unnecessary slice of Amer taxpayer’s money on other. Immed statement shld help formateurs in shaping new Cabinet and will certainly clear us of any charges that we have never made our beliefs and intentions clear to Indos. Statement cannot possibly damage our relations with Indo and might result in much-needed realization by Indo that US wants to help in any way in which help needed but that in last analysis, it is Indo security at stake, their country which is petitioning us, and not US which needs support.⁵

Cochran

1. Document 192.
2. See footnote 13, Document 184.

3. The first paragraph of telegram 920, Feb. 21, reads:

   “Min Darmawan Chairman Indo Tin Del called on Lacy Feb 21, accompanied by Indo Emb officers Maramis and Thajeb. Maramis led off with attempted witticism saying: ‘I offer you my condolences on the loss of Subardjo as Indo FonMin’. Lacy replied: ‘Subardjo was your FonMin. It is Indo security which is at stake; the security of the US is not at stake; my country will survive regardless of who is FonMin of Indo.’ Maramis interpolated: ‘My country will survive too.’ Lacy said he hoped this is the case, and that all our efforts here have been directed to this end.” (856D.2544/2–2152)

4. Document 193.

5. On Feb. 25, the Department of State sent the following message to Djakarta:

   “Dept considers reasoning underlying position adopted ur 1261 Feb 24 sound and concurs ur view that ‘no advantageous purpose in reopening negots with [Sukiman Cabinet] now on very subj which brought about its demise’. Dept considering your recommendation statement (Embtel 1250) but is at present of opinion that disadvantages including the actions U.S. may outweigh advantages, particularly in view Indo Govt statement Embtel 1262 Feb 24 [not printed]. Emb requested similarly defer any press release at present.” (Telegram 931; 756D.00/2–2452)

   The Indonesian Government statement referred to indicated that the resignation of the Cabinet did not mean that Indonesia would shirk any obligations proceeding from a commitment made through an agreement with a foreign country. (756D.00/2–2452)