Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/8–2253: Telegram

No. 91
The Chargé in Thailand (Brown) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bangkok, August 22, 1953—1 p.m.

389. Summary of unresolved questions facing Embassy and US committee representatives believed useful this stage.

1. US company grade officers required on control teams to assist representatives other delegations supervise evacuation and disarmament. (Embtel 155, July 18)² Until final evacuation plan approved government level number personnel required cannot be determined. Believe US good offices should be extended to include one representative each control team. Alternative plan V, if adopted, should mean number teams reduced compared earlier plans.

2. In view relatively favorable report from Shao³ (Embtel 378, August 20 to Department)⁴ Monghsat visit committee no longer appears required or advisable. Chinese refuse guarantee safety Burmese representatives whereas we have maintained representatives entire committee should go or none. We have little time to spare and delay involved in overland trip not justified as concrete results not assured. Further, work of sub-committee entering critical stage of developing final plans in conjunction with representatives foreign forces. Believe with Shao in Monghsat final withdrawal arrangements can be made by committee in Bangkok and that committee justified limiting entrance into Burma to easily accessible Tachilek safety zone area. While Department’s insistence on trip was well justified (demonstrate stubbornness Li Mi’s forces to Burma) new instructions re dropping tentative plans committee visit Monghsat now requested.

3. Embtel 382, August 21.⁵ Thai commitment on sharing costs evacuation limited two million baht. Formal reply my note to Foreign Minister August 8⁶ not received but several discussions indicate Thai will refuse commit themselves pay more. While giving lip service ideal sacrifices to cause peaceful settlement disputes they are firm in stating they do not feel obligated pay anything and two million is, therefore, adequate contribution. We forced admit financial stringency Thai Government at time when export returns falling and it is faced with increasing military expenditures meet external threats. Appears cost alternate plan V proposed by Thai representatives for overland evacuation Tachilek to Chiengrai approximates 930,000 baht. Whether balance of 2 million baht would be applied to airlift is problematical. Thai have said nothing on cost of proposed improvement Chiengrai field with pierced steel planking to make operational for C–46 aircraft in support of alternate plan V. We well aware arguments against expensive airlift, but must consider negotiation delays necessarily involved if we attempt with no assurances success persuade Thai accept overland movement to Bangkok. Obviously time is very short. Our cost figures Chiengrai–Formosa airlift based on movement 3,000 but appears probable fiscal figure will be considerably less.

4. Question overseas Chinese unsolved. Chinese Nationalist representative will not sign draft tentative agreement or evacuation plan until question satisfactorily settled. US representative has maintained question outside committee scope but would consider if Burma and China agree. Burma refuse discuss committee level. Agreement reached prisoner and Chinese refugees with details incorporated into evacuation plan.

5. Taipei’s 109 to Department.⁷ Li Mi statement Americans have said nothing evacuation Monghsat is at variance with facts. Evacuation Monghsat insisted on by Burmese and provided for evacuation plan and draft tentative agreement which have not been signed by Chinese Nationalist representative. With evacuation on volunteer basis, there is no assurance that any area will be completely evacuated. Problem will come up in sub-committee conferences with Monghsat representatives near future.

6. General comment: While assurances Colonel I and Li Wen-pin some of Li Mi troops ready evacuate, subject certain conditions, and that first group 500 will come out probably followed by other groups similar size are gratifying, we are, of course, clearly aware that Chinese may be giving in this extent in hope this limited performance will suffice protect them in forthcoming UNGA session. In light other evidence stalling, etc., they may well have no intention bringing out any more troops. Major question, therefore, is whether we set plan in motion on basis these limited assurances. Burmese may well answer in negative when matter reaches committee in next few days.

Recommendations:

1. US should make available limited number control team officers.

2. Tentative plans committee visit Monghsat should be dropped.

3. US representative should support Thai-proposed alternative plan V airlift Chiengrai–Formosa and obtain Thai agreement contribute to airlift.

4. Our position re overseas Chinese be maintained until solution reached possibly along lines Rangoon’s 152, August 20⁸ to Department.

5. US representatives should continue support Burmese in getting all possible assurances re evacuation Monghsat area.

In general, I believe we should accept limited Chinese assurances at face value setting plan in motion as quickly as possible, but emphasizing to Chinese at every step that token evacuation some 500 or 1,000 will have only limited effect on success their case in UNGA.

Brown

1. Repeated to Taipei and Rangoon.
2. Not printed.
3. Dr. Shao Yu-lin, adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to President Chiang Kai-shek, had been sent to Mong Hsat as Chiang’s personal representative; he had arrived in Bangkok with Li Tse-fen on Aug. 8 and had left Bangkok for Mong Hsat on Aug. 14.
4. This telegram reported that the troop leaders in Mong Hsat sent a message through Li Wen-pin that 400 troops and 100 dependents planned to evacuate before the end of August. The next group, of unknown number, would not be ready until 2 or 3 weeks later because of the difficulty of movement. The message set out five conditions for evacuation; in particular, the Committee should guarantee an immediate ceasefire by Burma and the men, their arms, and their ammunition should be airlifted to Taipei. (690B.9321/8–2053)
5. Telegram 382 reported that at a Committee meeting on Aug. 20, the Thai representative presented alternate evacuation plan V, which provided for transporting the troops by land to Chiengrai and thence by air to Formosa; the Thai Government insisted on this in order to avoid the movement of the troops through Bangkok. (690B.9321/8–2153)
6. Not printed.
7. Not printed. (911.6294A/8–1953)
8. This telegram commented that Sebald thought the Burmese could be persuaded to accept a Thai compromise plan providing that Chinese civilian internees desiring repatriation could return to Formosa but that others would be treated in accordance with Burmese law. (690B.9321/8–2053)