790B.5/8–2753: Telegram
No. 92
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1
178. Following Embassy’s views re numbered paragraphs Deptel 118.2
- (1a)
- Influence exercised by BSM now strictly limited and efforts use BSM as lever cause serious resentment on part Burmans reflected in desire terminate advisory function BSM and find alternate supply sources. UK appears overestimate effectiveness this leverage and not fully realize deep resentment it causes.
- (1b)
- Although GUB does not fully appreciate necessity for training and maintenance according our standards, our Attachés believe Burma will seek technical advice and training on ad hoc basis being careful avoid any arrangement which might permit foreigners exercise influence on military planning or policy. Added equipment would also probably provide incentive expand training and maintenance to protect heavy GUB investment.
- (1c)
- Fully agree with Department’s objectives but our insistence on consulting British re procurement list has already unavoidably created some impression we attempting bolster British position notwithstanding Burmese apparent desire disentangle themselves from British. Present BSM training activities of extremely limited scope and value.
- (1d)
- Fully agree Department’s views.
- (1e)
- Fully agree. Unfortunately GUB has only vague idea of cost of desired items and War Office has somehow formed impression that equipment will be sold by US at nominal price, e.g. 10 cents on dollar. Department’s views appear at variance with those manifested by British which indicate basic desire limit equipment Burmese forces according British conception their needs and capabilities rather than according to willingness and ability GUB to pay.
- (2)
- Air Commodore Ward of BSM called at Embassy August 26 and although unable supply information desired paragraphs 2 a, b, c gave British views in general terms pending detailed study of lists in London. Left memo which says Burmese requests are “entirely accordance actual requirements” of ten duplicate requests already made of British, and would cause undesirable mixing British and American equipment. Adds “British continue regard Burmese as traditional customers particularly in respect requirements for armed forces, and willing, able meet almost all Burma’s real needs. She would, however, hope for and indeed welcome sale from America those requirements which she unable meet either because no British equivalent or because urgent need early delivery which she cannot achieve.”
Memo states British can meet most if not all naval requirements but considers requests far in excess of needs and cost well beyond means. Of army requirements, British can supply equivalent most items within “reasonable period” although “in some respects unable match US delivery dates”. Re air requirements British can supply equivalent most US types and delivery dates probably favorable.
Although Ward had not seen latest GUB reduced lists it apparent that British now willing agree supply practically entire quantities requested in effort maintain present favored position. We believe, however, that in light past British delaying tactics this mere agreement will not deter GUB from seeking new sources.
In view adverse reaction GUB if US refuses satisfy Burmese desire to establish additional source of supply, believe we should make every effort induce British agree to reasonable list equipment to be supplied by US even if British could furnish. This should especially include items in which US has comparative advantage in quality price of ready availability.
Service attachés submitting latest preliminary lists received from War Office and copies being pouched for Department’s information with Embassy’s comments.3
- Repeated to London.↩
- Document 90.↩
- Not printed.↩