Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

March 25, 1954

[Extracts]

Present at the 190th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); Mr. Slezak for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 3, 4 and 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 3, 4 and 5); the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Department of Defense; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence described the situation at Dien Bien Phu as relatively quiet. The Vietminh still appeared short of ammunition and supplies for their next attack. The French position had improved somewhat, as had the French chances of holding their position. The French Union forces were making effective use of napalm, but there had been no further replacements over and beyond the two battalions previously air-dropped and which brought French Union strength approximately to the level prior to the attack. Mr. Dulles further commented on the heavy psychological blow which would be dealt the French if Dien Bien Phu were lost.

The President inquired why the French had not sought to prevent the 308th Vietminh division from returning to Dien Bien Phu after its incursion into Laos. The President believed that the French should be able to interdict the only road available to this division.

Mr. Dulles said that he did not know why the French had permitted this division to retrace its steps. General Ridgway stated that the French explanation was that there was too much guerrilla resistance to enable them to prevent the division from returning.

The President commented that if the point had been reached when the French forces could be moved only by air, it seemed sufficient indication that the population of Vietnam did not wish to be free from Communist domination.

The President then inquired of Mr. Dulles whether General Navarre actually had a free hand in prosecuting the war in Indochina or whether in fact his freedom of action was circumscribed by the Paris politicians. Mr. Dulles offered the opinion that it was likely that General Navarre had freedom of action within the limits of the Navarre Plan itself but not outside of it. Dien Bien Phu, of course, was not included in the Navarre Plan.

. . . . . . .

2. U.S. Policies With Respect to Certain Contingencies in Indochina

Secretary Dulles referred to a memorandum which set forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to what the United States might do in the event of a French withdrawal or defeat in Indochina.² He read paragraph 11 of the JCS memo, which read: “The National Security Council consider now the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either: a. In concert with the French; or b. In the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally.” Secretary Dulles recommended that the Council instruct the Planning Board to prepare the desired report, and explained that Secretary Wilson also favored this proposal.

Mr. Cutler replied that the Planning Board would undertake the study at once, but inquired whether it should envisage U.S. intervention with military forces. He reminded the Council that this subject had been studied in a Special Annex to the recently adopted policy on Southeast Asia,³ but that the Special Annex had not met with a favorable response from the Council and that all copies of it had been withdrawn for destruction.

The President replied to Mr. Cutler by stating that what he was asking was the extent to which we should go in employing ground forces to save Indochina from the Communists. The President pointed out, however, that there were certain omissions in the JCS memorandum. There was, for example, no reference to the UN taking cognizance of the aggression in Indochina. While he knew that the French were much opposed to any appeal to the UN, he himself did not see how the United States or other free world nations could go full-out in support of the Associated States without UN approval and assistance.

Secretary Dulles expressed the belief that while it might not be impossible to get a two-thirds UN vote in favor of intervention in Indochina, it would be far from easy, since we could count on the opposition of the Asian-Arab bloc, among others.

The President said he believed that the UN would certainly not intervene merely on the strength of a French appeal, but might do so if Vietnam called for assistance and particularly cited Chinese Communist aid to the rebels. In any case, said the President, he was clear that the Congress would have to be in on any move by the United States to intervene in Indochina. It was simply academic to imagine otherwise.

Secretary Wilson raised the question of what our reaction should be in the event that the Chinese Communists sent in MIG aircraft for operations over Indochina. Mr. Cutler answered that the existing policy paper on Southeast Asia was quite clear on this point. If the Chinese Communists flew aircraft into Indochina they would be guilty of overt aggression, and our response to such aggression had been clearly set forth in NSC 5405.

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Cutler’s response to Secretary Wilson’s question, but pointed out that even so, the Executive would still have to go to Congress before intervening in the Indochina war. He then reminded the Council that the Attorney General was presumably preparing an opinion with respect to the prerogatives of the President and of the Congress in the matter of using U.S. military forces to counter aggression, and he hoped that the Attorney General would hasten completion of his report. The President suggested that Mr. Cutler prod the Attorney General, and suggested that this might be the moment to begin to explore with the Congress what support could be anticipated in the event that it seemed desirable to intervene in Indochina.

Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that a lot more work needed to be done by the NSC on this problem before we were ready to take it up with Congress. He pointed out that the fighting season in Indochina would end soon, and he believed would end without a clear military decision. Furthermore, he thought it quite unlikely that the Chinese Communists would engage their MIGs in battle over Indochina prior to the Geneva Conference. The Communists were seeking a political rather than a military victory at this stage, and we could therefore safely discount overt Chinese intervention in Indochina. Nevertheless, the United States would certainly have to reach a clear-cut decision vis-à-vis the French. We were witnessing, said Secretary Dulles, the collapse or evaporation of France as a great power in most areas of the world. The great question was, who should fill the void left by the collapse of French power, particularly in the colonial areas. Would it be the Communists, or must it be the U.S.? In its consideration of the problem of U.S. intervention in Indochina, the Planning Board should give consideration to the fact that the United States could not move into the position abandoned by France in Indochina without estimating the repercussions in other parts of the world. Secretary Dulles expressed the belief that the French had actually reached a point where they would rather abandon Indochina than save it through United States intervention and assumption of French responsibilities. All this constituted primarily a political rather than a military problem. Accordingly, it could be settled after the end of the fighting season in May. In any event, Secretary Dulles did not believe that there was any need for the Council to proceed on the assumption of an imminent French military withdrawal. There was, accordingly, time allowed us to work out some kind of suitable UN action.

Governor Stassen suggested that the logical first step in UN action to save Indochina would be the prompt dispatch of UN observation teams to Indochina.

(At this point, Admiral Radford entered the meeting.)

The President raised the question of what specific nations might be induced to join us in a broadened effort to save Indochina.⁴ It might be done, he thought, on the basis of expanding the ANZUS Treaty. There were in any case only two possible ways of carrying this thing through. One was to induce the United Nations to intervene. The other was to get Vietnam to invite certain specific nations to come to its assistance on the basis of a treaty between Vietnam and each of the assisting nations. This latter offered the United States a good chance, since we could in all probability get the necessary two-thirds majority vote in the Senate on such a treaty. There was the added advantage, continued the President, that this procedure avoided solely Occidental assistance to Vietnam.

Admiral Radford agreed that we might well reach the point where it would be necessary to consider something like the President’s proposals, although he had, up to now, been very reluctant to expand the membership of the ANZUS Treaty powers.

Governor Stassen expressed the belief that the best way to proceed to give the Associated States the necessary outside assistance would be to call for an economic conference of the Asian nations and thereafter gradually introduce the military security factor. That, in essence, was how NATO got started.

After further discussion of the governments and nations who might be approached to assist the Associated States, the President said that he thought that such a grouping of nations would probably have to be confined to those nations in or near Southeast Asia itself. If an attempt were made to expand the number to include, for instance, Japan and Korea, we would run up against the hostility which exists between so many of the Asian nations. It would perhaps be better, therefore, to consider Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Formosa, the free nations of Southeast Asia, the British, and the French. That was enough, wasn’t it?

Secretary Dulles commented that of course the real problem which one immediately encountered in trying to decide on procedure, was France. Either it would be necessary for the United States to beat the French into line, or else to accept a split with France. Both courses of action involved the gravest difficulty, particularly in relation to EDC.

The President commented that of one thing at least he was absolutely certain: The United States could not go into China unless the Vietnamese welcomed our intervention.

Secretary Wilson asked whether it would be sensible to forget about Indochina for a while and concentrate on the effort to get the remaining free nations of Southeast Asia in some sort of condition to resist Communist aggression against themselves. The President expressed great doubt as to the feasibility of such a proposal, since he believed that the collapse of Indochina would produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of all of Southeast Asia to the Communists.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Directed the NSC Planning Board to consider and make recommendations, prior to the Geneva Conference, as to the extent to which and the circumstances and conditions under which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists, in concert with the French or in concert with others or, if necessary, unilaterally.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board in this connection to avail itself of any longer-range plans developed by the Special Committee in accordance with NSC Action No. 1019-b.⁶

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Mar. 26.
2. Reference is to a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense titled “Preparation of Department of Defense Views Regarding Negotiations on Indochina for the Forthcoming Geneva Conference,” Mar. 12, 1954. Secretary of Defense Wilson transmitted the JCS memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles by letter of Mar. 23. For text of the memorandum and the covering letter, see vol. xvi, p. 471.
3. Reference is to the Special Annex to NSC 177 (renumbered NSC 5405). For extracts from NSC 5405, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” Jan. 16, 1954, see p. 971. For text of the Special Annex, recirculated on Mar. 29, see p. 1183.
4. For additional documentation on united action, particularly as regards broader aspects of the defense of Southeast Asia, see volume xii.
5. Points a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 1074, Mar. 25, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)
6. For NSC Action No. 1019, see extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Jan. 21, p. 986. Regarding the reports prepared by the President’s Special Committee on Indochina, see memorandum from Smith to the President, Mar. 11, p. 1108; the first editorial note, p. 1148; and footnote 8, p. 1257.