751G.00/4–254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
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[Received 4:11 p.m.]
3692. Repeated information Saigon 413. Eyes only Ambassador. Limit distribution. Pleven told General Norstad and myself this afternoon that he wanted to give us his personal views on the situation in Indochina. He said that he had informed Laniel of our visit and Laniel knew that he was giving us his views.
Pleven said that he was very concerned about the situation. The Viet Minh efforts re Dien Bien Phu did not seem to affect the ability of Viet Minh elsewhere in Indochina. Their forces were very active and aggressive everywhere. The situation in Dien Bien Phu itself was difficult, and if it should be lost the French would lose with it some of their very best troops, namely French paratroop battalions. He said that last night it had been possible to re-supply the garrison with ammunition but reinforcement of personnel by parachute had not been possible.
Pleven was particularly concerned by the situation in the Vietnam Army during the last six weeks. He felt there had been no progress during that period whatsoever. If Dien Bien Phu should be lost, it would mean a terrible blow to the morale of the troops in Indochina and, particularly, to the local population and the Vietnamese forces, with a corresponding boost in morale of the Viet Minh. As a result of this, drastic action was necessary. In the first place, it would be necessary to provide replacements for the paratroop battalions’ losses in Dien Bien Phu. They were suffering heavy casualties, and were [Page 1219] the only effective reserve available to General Navarre. In the second place, substantial air reinforcements were necessary, as at present all aviation was tied up in the Dien Bien Phu operation. This meant that nothing was available to attack Viet Minh operations elsewhere in Indochina. The situation was very definitely being taken advantage of by Viet Minh to move more freely and openly.
To take care of this situation, Pleven plans this afternoon to make the following proposal to the French Cabinet:
1. Two additional battalions of French paratroops now in North Africa should be sent immediately to Indochina. It would be necessary for this movement to be carried out in great secrecy so that Vietnamese did not know of it and relax their efforts, and so that opposition could not be stirred up in metropolitan France, and so that the Viet Minh would not be informed and redouble their efforts prior to the arrival of these troops.
In order to move them with the greatest speed, Pleven will propose that French ask the US to airlift the two battalions and their personal equipment to Indochina. General Norstad told Pleven that if the French Government makes this decision, preliminary planning will be started here at once without prejudice to the eventual decision, which must, of course, be taken in Washington. Pleven pointed out that these two battalions were vitally needed in North Africa in case of any possible trouble there but that, nevertheless, he felt the need was so urgent that he was going to recommend their movement even though this would entail risk in North Africa.
In answer to the need for aviation reinforcements, Pleven said there were some 80 or 90 French naval aviation pilots who were available to fly planes of the type presently being used on the French carriers in Indochina. He said it would be most helpful if the US could provide a large carrier (US-manned) and aircraft of types familiar to French pilots as an operating base. The French would provide the pilots and air crews necessary to carry on operations.
Pleven said that for the moment these were his personal ideas but that they were being submitted to a ministerial meeting this afternoon and he was giving them to us so that we could commence thinking about them in anticipation of any possible request by the French Government.1
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In telegram 3693, transmitted from Paris at 8 p.m., Apr. 2, Ambassador Dillon provided the following additional information: “Bidault sent for me at 7 o’clock tonight to tell me that French Government was officially requesting US airlift to Indochina for two paratroop battalions, as described in Embtel 3692.
“Norstad commencing preparations for airlift immediately as training exercise prior to final decision in Washington. Bidault repeatedly emphasized need for utmost secrecy and utmost speed.” (751G.00/4–254)
Telegram 3470 to Paris, Apr. 3, repeated to Saigon for information as telegram 1850, read as follows: “Defense has approved airlift proposal and Norstad has received authorization to implement. Bonnet informed.” (751G.00/4–254)
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