Office of the Historian

Radford papers, Indochina papers/Geneva Conference

Memorandum by Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)

top secret
Washington, April 2, 1954—4 p.m.

Memorandum For:

  • Admiral Radford
  • General Twining
  • Admiral Carney
  • General Shepherd
1.

a. On 31 March 1954, the Chairman JCS in a meeting attended only by the four service Chiefs, and apparently on his own authority, asked their individual views as to the necessity or desirability of recommending to the Secretary of Defense, and/or the President, that an immediate offer of assistance by U.S. Naval Air and/or Air Force units be made to the French, to assist in the defense of Dien Bien Phu.1

b. My answer was an emphatic and immediate “No”. My reasons, as then stated, were:

(1)

On the general issue:

Unless the question emanated from proper authority, any such recommended action—for or against—was clearly outside the proper scope of authority of the JCS. This body was not charged with formulating foreign policy, nor of advocating it, unless its advice was specifically sought by the President, or the Secretary of Defense. To do otherwise would be to involve the JCS inevitably in politics.

(2)

On the specific issue:

From the military viewpoint, the United States capability for effective intervention in the Dien Bien Phu operation was altogether disproportionate to the liability it would incur.

From the military viewpoint, the outcome of the Dien Bien Phu operation, which ever way it might go, would not in itself decisively affect the military situation there.

If recommended and executed, intervention by United States armed forces would greatly increase the risk of general war. If the United States, by its own act, were deliberately to risk provoking such possible reaction, it must first materially increase its readiness to accept the consequences.

2.
The Chairman, JCS at about 011800 Apr, orally posed a question which I understood to be as follows:

“If proper authority asked the JCS for a statement of their recommended action in response to a request upon the United States Government from the Government of France for assistance in Indo-China in the form of the intervention of United States armed forces to relieve the Dien Bien Phu garrison, what would the JCS statement be?”

3.
My position within the JCS, with reference to the action I think should be recommended in answering the question in para. 2 above, is likewise an emphatic “No”, and for substantially the same reasons as stated in para. 1.
4.

a. In the JCS Executive Session this morning, the Chairman submitted in writing the question which follows, stating that this question emanated from the Secretary of Defense, who desired a JCS answer:

“If the United States Government is requested by the Government of France to render assistance in Indo-China by committing USAF units and/or naval air forces in combat, what position do the JCS take?”

b. Within the JCS, the action I recommend in response to this question is to deny the request at this time, and for the same reasons as those stated above.

5.
In my opinion, the JCS should limit themselves to stating U.S. military capabilities for rendering assistance in Indo-China by employing any part of U.S. armed forces, and further, should estimate and submit with this statement of capabilities, a statement of the military consequences as the JCS view them, in the event the rendering of assistance of United States armed forces should be directed by proper authority.
M. B. Ridgway
General, United States Army
  1. See memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Mar. 31, p. 1198.↩