Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] April 8, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• M. Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador
• The Secretary of State
• C—Mr. MacArthur
• EUR—Mr. Bonbright

M. Bonnet came to see the Secretary at 10 this morning to give the preliminary reaction of his government to our proposal for united action in Indochina. The Ambassador began by stating that he feared the Secretary would not regard the first answer from Paris as being completely satisfactory. M. Bidault wished the Secretary to know that he was very happy with this indication of increased solidarity between the United States and France in connection with a struggle which the French have been carrying on for over seven years. It was most encouraging to the French Government to know of our desire to be of even further help and the French Government in return wished us to know that they have no intention of delivering Indochina to the “Bolsheviks”.

The Ambassador stated that our proposal had been debated in the Cabinet where it was regarded as an initiative of very great importance but one which required further study. The French view is that there is time for this further study and the immediate problem is the outcome of the battle for Dien Bien Phu. He went on to say that no French government could neglect even the slightest chance for bringing about peace in Indochina and it was felt that nothing should be done which would jeopardize in advance the chances of obtaining peace at Geneva. M. Bidault had talked along this line to the Secretary at Berlin and it was their present belief that the formation of a powerful coalition would give the impression to China and the world that we do not want peace. They believed that “an honest warning” was a good thing but in their view this is what the Secretary had done in his talks with Molotov¹ and in his speech of March 29. Before going further than that there is time to study various aspects of our proposal, including the important ramifications which it might have for peace in the Pacific.

M. Bonnet then referred to reports out of London which indicated that there was reluctance on the part of the British Government. He also thought there would be reluctance in Thailand and the Philippines to join a coalition against Communism.

The Ambassador then repeated that in the view of the French Government our proposal should be considered in connection with a possible second step in the event that it appears that things are not going well at Geneva. In the meantime, we could study a number of factors in our proposal, including what US forces would be involved and what would be the commitments of the other parties. This could be studied by the Far East staff agency. Other questions to be answered were the nature of the mutual guarantees and how and when the coalition would go into action. He said it was M. Bidault’s hope to discuss some of these questions with the Secretary in Paris at the time of the NATO meeting.²

The Secretary then interposed to inform the Ambassador that there was a new development since last night. The British Government had asked the Secretary to come over right away to discuss the problem and the Secretary planned to be in London on Monday.³ He had sent word to M. Bidault last night that we did not wish to talk just in London and that he would be glad to proceed on to Paris if that were convenient. He added that the French reaction had been to recommend this but that for internal reasons the French Government had wished to keep the visit quiet for a day or two in order to avoid a debate in the Assembly prior to the Easter recess.⁴ With regard to this point M. Bonnet pointed out that he had already received press reports of press leaks out of London to the effect that the Secretary is leaving immediately for London and Paris on his own initiative because his proposal had not been accepted. (Later in the conversation, in response to a direct inquiry from the Ambassador concerning the initiative for the visit the Secretary explained that in the course of the exchange of views with the British on the proposal, we had indicated that if further clarification were needed and it would be useful, we would be glad to send someone to London and Paris. The British had replied that they would be glad to have the Secretary come over and he had agreed to do so.)

The Secretary then stated that the fallacy in the French attitude is that the French Government apparently thinks that in order to get peace in Indochina we must go to Geneva in a weak position and that if we go there in a strong position we won’t get peace. In other words, they are afraid that the Chinese won’t like it. M. Bonnet stated that he could not agree with this interpretation as he had indicated before that the French Government regarded the Secretary’s public statement of March 29 as good. M. Bonnet regretted that the French reply was disappointing to the Secretary but his government believed that if we went too far the Geneva Conference would be a farce. The Secretary replied that he would not put it that he was disappointed. Our belief was that the dangers to South East Asia will not be met without unity of will and unity of action. If we meet the threat, one by one all will be lost. Indochina will go, Thailand will go, Malaya will go, or will be held only by very costly operations. Indonesia will almost surely be lost. The dangers to Australia and New Zealand will be greatly increased. He pointed out again that the danger was further from us and if others would not go along with us, we would know where we stood. If it became necessary for the US to base its defenses on the shores of this country—all right. The French were apparently afraid if we all stood together. But it was “crazy” to think that the US would be drawn into a war without any political prearrangements of any kind or description in order to save one outpost such as Dien Bien Phu and when we were not attacked and were without Allies. He pointed out that we did not have an alliance with France in regard to Indochina. M. Bonnet concluded by saying that he knew our country and Congress well enough to know our position in this regard.

1. Reference is to discussions during the Berlin Conference.
2. The North Atlantic Council was scheduled to meet at Paris on Apr. 23.
3. Apr. 12.
4. In telegram 3778 from Paris, Apr. 8, received in Washington at 7:44 a.m., Ambassador Dillon reported that he had conveyed to Foreign Minister Bidault the message from Secretary Dulles regarding the desire of the latter to visit Paris for talks on Apr. 14 (see telegram 3535 to Paris, Apr. 7, p. 1286). Bidault expressed agreement, but asked that the announcement of the visit be withheld until the evening of Apr. 10, Paris time. (751G.00/4–854)