751G.00/4–854: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
priority
3782. Limit distribution. Reference Deptel 3520.1 As I have pointed out in my previous telegrams, French Cabinet during past few days has been entirely engrossed with Dien-Bien-Phu, which has had a tremendous impact in France. This impact has so far been to good as all of France has become proud of resistance at Dien-Bien-Phu. Communist press no longer dares attack French Expeditionary Corps. If Dien-Bien-Phu can hold, French morale on Indochina should be better than it has been for a long time. I feel that tension over this matter, coupled with Juin incident, has certainly led Cabinet to make requests which were not well thought out. For reasons which are completely [Page 1293] beyond my comprehension, French War Cabinet which approved request for assistance contained in Embtel 3710,2 was apparently completely surprised by negative US answer. This was told me last night by Maurice Schumann. This attitude may have contributed to obvious lack of careful thought behind request contained in Embtel 3738.3
Having seen Bidault daily and sometimes twice daily during this period, I have found him to be personally far more calm and steady than French position would seem to indicate. Bidault informs me same thing applies to Laniel. Unfortunately, it does not seem to apply to Pleven, who seems at present overtired and nervous.
Confusion regarding airlifting of paratroops to Indochina seems to be entirely personal responsibility of Pleven. Bidault is personally as outraged and upset about delay as we are. On Pleven’s advice, Bidault left a Cabinet meeting early to call me to see him urgently and gave me message which I passed on to you. At that time it was his understanding that airlift was matter of urgency and that days counted. Laniel has also agreed Bidault position but as usual has not taken a really strong position which would have meant overriding Pleven. Embassy officer explained our point of view at length other night to Mons,4 who is convinced of reasonableness of our position and who then went to Pleven to see if airlift could not be speeded up. He was unsuccessful. This morning I again stressed to Bidault our disappointment at French delay and he said he would take matter up again with Laniel. Norstad saw Pleven this morning and gave him Washington reaction to French delay. Pleven at last seemed impressed and told Norstad he would advance date of first departure.
I am very pleased that we took such prompt action in making available additional equipment to French as indicated in Deptel 3534,5 and I feel this will obviate any possibility of French trying to put blame on us for possible loss of Dien-Bien-Phu. If we had not been prompt in our response to this appeal I am certain we would have been blamed as suggested in second paragraph of reftel.
Finally, I am sure that Bidault does treat Secretary’s proposal to Bonnet with great seriousness. His reaction, as reported in Embtel 3729,6 was, I am sure, “the preliminary and hasty reflex of a deeply harassed man”, as stated in reftel. However, it remains true that he feels that outcome of battle of Dien-Bien-Phu, because of psychological and morale effects here and in Indochina will be even more important to eventual result in Indochina than conclusion of agreement for collaboration in accordance with Secretary’s proposal.