PPS files, lot 64 D 653, “Korea”
Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Nitze)
Subject:
- UNA Working Paper, August 14, UN General Assembly Action in the Event of Continued Inconclusive Armistice Negotiations.
- 1.
-
This UNA Working Paper1 calls for the U.S. Delegation to seek passage of a GA resolution which would express GA support for the efforts of UN troops; express confidence in the conduct of armistice negotiations [Page 505] by the UNC; approve the position taken by the UNC in regard to the question of prisoners of war and call upon the Communists to accept an armistice which recognizes the principle of nonforcible repatriation; and would request the President of the GA to transmit the resolution to the Communist authorities and to report within a specified period on any reply received or on the absence of such a reply.
If no reply, or a negative reply is received from the Communists the Working Paper calls for convening of the Additional Measures Committee and attempts on the part of the U.S. Delegation to secure recommendation of the imposition of a total embargo against Communist China and North Korea.
The Working Paper then proposes that after a recommendation has been made to the GA by the Additional Measures Committee, the Delegation should attempt to secure passage of a further GA resolution which would among other things call for intensification of assistance to the UN action, recommend that all states sever, limit or refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the aggressors, and recommend that all states take the actions recommended by the Additional Measures Committee.
- 2.
- This Working Paper has been informally discussed with the Commonwealth Governments, all of whom have objected to the proposal for a full embargo, and to various elements of the proposed second GA resolution.
- 3.
- At this stage of the Korean affair it would be highly inadvisable
to follow the procedure proposed in the Working Paper for the
following reasons:
- a.
- With possibility that the negotiations at Panmunjom may be entering a delicate phase in view of the proposed Presidential démarche or other proposals now under consideration, it would be unwise to undertake any actions in the UN which might tend to lead toward transfer of negotiations from the manageable Panmunjom forum to the unwieldy UN Assembly.
- b.
- If the Presidential and accompanying proposals are unsuccessful, and if the negotiations should take on something approaching the character of an indefinite recess, it would continue to be to our interest to keep the negotiations out of the UN forum, rather than to follow a course of action which might be calculated to encourage UN intervention.
- c.
- The proposed Presidential statement and other proposals under consideration are designed to enable the Communists to conclude an armistice without publicly accepting the principle of non-forcible repatriation. It is hardly the time for a UN resolution which calls on the Communists to publicly accept that principle.
- d.
- The prospects of securing GA approval of the line of action proposed in the Working Paper are very dim, and such approval could at best only be secured by a narrow margin and by considerable U.S. hectoring of our Allies.
- 4.
- What we want at the UN at this stage is an action which will meet the parliamentary situation arising from the fact that Korea will be on the agenda; an action which is not calculated to get the UN involved in the actual negotiations, and an action which will be willingly approved by the greatest possible number of UN members.
- 5.
- It is proposed, therefore, that the U.S. Delegation be instructed
to undertake no further efforts in support of the position outlined
in the Working Paper and limit its efforts to encouraging passage of
a General Assembly resolution which would:
- a.
- Express the full support of the General Assembly for the gallant efforts of the United Nations troops in Korea;
- b.
- Approve the position taken by the United Nations Command in the negotiations at Panmunjom;
- c.
- Call upon the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities to conclude an honorable armistice of the nature of that proposed by the United Nations Command;
- d.
- Pending the conclusion of such an armistice, urge upon all states the need to increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea and in particular to contribute additional forces to the Unified Command.