Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

Tokyo, September 11, 1952—2:35 p. m.

CX 55003. Refs: A. JCS 917910.¹ B. C 54499.² C. JCS 917927.³ D. C 54495.⁴

1. My primary objective has at all times been to secure an hon armistice which would prov for the scty of UN Forces in Korea and would assure the UNC of return of the preponderance of POWs now held by the Communists. I am in full accord with any proposal which will achieve such an armistice; does not compromise the principle of no-forced repatriation; and which does not result in only a temporary advantage for the UN, and which we would subsequently regret.

2. I have prevly pointed out the dangers which I consider inherent in having the ques of disposition of non-repatriates remaining unresolved for an indefinite period and being referred to the political conf as a form of “subsequent negotiations”. I feel that to achieve an armistice which would release the Communists from the pressure of present mil opns, particularly by air and naval bombardment and at the same time leave a major issue unresolved has many disadvantages from a mil point of view. There are increasing indications that the cumulative effects of our air opns are having increasingly severe results on the enemy; they can be expected to multiply as the intensity of our atks remains unabated. I believe that to leave the decision as to disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations may well result in an armistice which would ultimately prove to our disadvantage.

3. If it be the decision to proceed genly along the lines indicated in ref A, I concur with the proposed presidential statement. I strongly recm that the proposal to leave the disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations, including the President’s statement, be presented to the Communists only after they have rejected those portions of ref B of which you have indicated gen approval in ref A. My reasons for this are:

a. We should endeavor to achieve an armistice which includes agreement to ultimate disposition of non-repatriates. The proposal as set forth in ref B, if acptd by the Communists, would achieve this.

b. A proposal to leave disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations may well be more palatable to the Communists than that proposed in subpara A above and probably would be acptd by them without considering the proposal set forth in ref B.

c. I believe that the max support will be generated for United States as exec agent of the UN in discussion of the Korean ques in the UNGA if the UNC over a short period of time has presented several distinct separate solutions any one of which might achieve an armistice.

4. In view of the foregoing, I recm that the proposal as set forth in ref A be presented to the Communists in the folg sequence with the initial presentation to be accomplished on or about 20 September:

a. Gen Harrison presents in one session that portion of ref B tentatively approved in ref A, modified in accordance with paras 6, 7 and 8, this msg.

b. Upon completion of presentation of a above, Gen Harrison would, if he deemed aprop, recess with or without Communist concurrence for a min length of time to allow the Communists opportunity to study the proposal as made that day.

c. Should the Communists categorically reject our proposal in the same session in which it is made, Gen Harrison would still insist upon the recess for the announced purpose of affording them the opportunity to study the proposal and to prov adequate time for issuance of presidential statement. Should they categorically reject the proposal in the session subsequent to the one in which it was presented, Gen Harrison would insist upon again recessing to allow them additional time for study, and to prov adequate time for issuance of the presidential statement.

d. At the conclusion of session in which Gen Harrison presents the proposal in support of presidential statement, he will recess with or without Communist concurrence for a pd of aprxly 1 week or 10 days to allow the Communists opportunity to consider our offer.

e. Should the Communists reject General Harrison’s proposal in support of the presidential statement, I believe that we should then unilaterally recess as outlined in para 10 of this msg.

5. Modification of pertinent agreed paras of the armistice agreement will, of course, depend upon the proposals presented and Communist acceptance of same. I have, however, dird that paras 51, 52, and 54 be redrafted as nec in order to include each of the alternatives contained in part II, para 1b (1), (2), and (3), of ref A. Proposed redrafted paras will be transmitted to you ASAP.⁵

6. Re part II, ref A, the alternative contained in para 1b (2) which involves the dlvr to the demilitarized zone of non-repatriates where they would be freed from mil control and interviewed has already been made, and is included in para Ad (2) ref B which you have approved. Since it is not a new proposal, it appears more desirable to retain it as that part of Gen Harrison’s statement which reviews all proposals made to date.

7. If, as indicated in para 3, ref A, you consider that any plan which involves turning over responsibility for POWs to a neutral body has over-riding disadvantages, it appears then that we may make only one new proposal as outlined in para 4e (1), ref B. The alternative you include in part 2, para 1b (1), ref A, requires the POW, at the time of ident, to state his preference. Since this so closely parallels screening or interviewing, it is essentially the same as proposals already made. Hence, I consider it more desirable to offer a plan to the Communists along the folg lines:

As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective all POW who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. As soon as possible thereafter, and concurrently, if log capability permits, those POW who have prevly expressed their objections to repatriation will (after prior orientation for purposes of mvmt to the demilitarized zone) be dlvrd in groups of aprop size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the mil control of both sides, and without questioning, interview, or screening, each indiv so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this mvmt and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the obsn of one or a combination of the ICRC, joint teams of mil observers, or Red Cross reps from both sides.

8. I consider that a shift to the exec form of plenary sessions as indicated in para 4 of ref A would have grave disadvantages that far outweigh the possible gains envisioned. I believe that the serious nature of a proposal emanating from the President of the US cannot possibly be reinforced, or detracted from, by action originating at this level; and that although exec sessions permit the opportunity for nonpropaganda discussion, there is no assurance that the enemy will not engage in propaganda statements. My objections to a shift to exec session is based on the recurrent pattern of Communist behavior which has circumvented the usefulness of this negotiatory device repeatedly in the past and which has resulted in positive setbacks to the UNC psn with respect to the support of US and fgn pub opinion. Despite our hopes, no mat progress has been achieved in the negotiations by resorting to exec sessions. On the contrary, they have raised unwarranted hope in the minds of the free world for an early armistice. It is equally true that the Communists have invariably violated the exec nature of the sessions by “leaking” info and disseminating their views which have been picked up by our own news media as the sole source of info. By this means the Communists have succeeded in presenting to the world a distorted picture of the progress of negotiations. One of the most important considerations in the issuance of a presidential statement, and in offering our detailed proposals at Pan Mun Jom, is to present to the world a correct picture of the armistice sit and thereby retain and encourage strong US and allied support for our conduct of the armistice negotiations. Entry into exec session will almost certainly destroy any hope of achieving these ends. I therefore strongly urge that the entire presentation be made in open plenary session.

9. As pertains to the form of subsequent negotiations as set forth in para 1B (5) of part 2, ref A, I consider it undesirable for resolution of the ques of disposition of non-repatriates to be referred to the MAC:

a. Mil pers would still be required to resolve a problem which had not been solved even with the Communists under mil pressure. It would be a temp expedient and place upon the MAC an unwarranted problem which would detract from the attn which they should devote to the missions asgd to them under the approved paras of the draft armistice agreement. I consider this to be a full-time job for the orgn.

b. With a maj unresolved ques referred to the MAC, I consider that the Communists would designate present members of their negotiatory team as members of the MAC. I do not consider this desirable from the UN viewpoint and this procedure, if adopted by the Communists, would place UN members of the MAC at a distinct disadvantage.

10. With respect to the type of recess proposed in para 4 of part 2 of ref A, I strongly recm that I be authorized to recess unilaterally for an indefinite period, maintaining contact through liaison offs. Gen Harrison would upon recessing notify the Communists that we would agree to reconvene plenary sessions only after they submitted in writing any further proposal they might desire to offer. It is my strong personal conviction, shared by the UNC del, that such a unilateral recess is absolutely essential to the firmness and dignity of the UN and US psns.

1. Dated Sept. 8, p. 499.
2. Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 499.
4. Dated Sept. 1, p. 467.
5. The revised language was transmitted to the JCS in telegram CX 55297, Sept. 17, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).