Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/7–2153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

secret

[Washington,] July 21, 1953.

Subject:

• Joint Policy Declaration¹ in Connection with the Korean Armistice.

Participants:

• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador
• Sir Percy C. Spender, Australian Ambassador
• Mr. G. R. Laking, Counselor, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

At the conclusion of a discussion of the status of the Commonwealth forces in Japan, which had been the original purpose of their appointment with the Secretary, the Commonwealth representatives raised the question of the Joint Policy Declaration.

Ambassador Wrong commented that there are several alternatives which might be adopted with respect to the warning statement, ranging from issuing it as originally drafted immediately after the conclusion of the armistice to suppressing it entirely in view of the recent communiqué issued by the three Foreign Ministers.² Ambassador Spender then said that, as he had told Mr. Robertson the day before,³ his Government’s view was that the Declaration should be made publicly and promptly after the armistice, with the French addendum. Despite the issuance of the communiqué by the Foreign Ministers, the Declaration would have considerable additional deterrent value, in part because it would come from all sixteen participating nations. Ambassador Makins then said that the Secretary knew the British position from the recent talks and stressed that there is real need to give the whole question more thought, especially since there is a possibility of a breach of the armistice from either side.

The Secretary said that since the Foreign Ministers meeting we have been giving a good deal of thought to this question and have had an opportunity to talk it over with Mr. Robertson in the light of his discussions with President Rhee. In our view, it is not necessary to change the language of the Declaration except to make the French addition,⁴ which we understand has now been accepted by all of the participating countries. One feature of the language which is particularly important is the reference to the fact that if hostilities should be resumed it is doubtful whether they can be confined to Korea. In the armistice discussions, our military had been considerably concerned about the lack of restrictions on rehabilitation of airfields in North Korea and had receded on this point only in consideration of the Joint Policy Declaration. This Declaration balanced the possibility of attacking the Communist rear bases on the other side of the Yalu if hostilities were resumed against the possible Communist development of forward bases in North Korea. We therefore think that the agreement should be completed and signed as soon as possible.

The Secretary went on to say that we have a somewhat open mind as to what to do with the statement. It may be best not to brandish it quickly in an inflammatory manner. In the tense situation which exists and will exist, there is a real question as to whether such a public announcement, made in the manner in which we had originally conceived it, would be conducive to maintaining the armistice. However, the fact of this Declaration is known to some extent already, and will certainly come out at least at the time of the meeting of the General Assembly. Mr. Robertson talked about it with President Rhee. Since we cannot finalize a Mutual Security Treaty with the Koreans until next year, Mr. Robertson assured President Rhee that the Declaration would cover the gap. If the Declaration is not made, President Rhee will clearly feel defrauded. However, we are prepared to reconsider on the question of the immediate release in sixteen capitals within twelve hours.

Ambassador Spender said that some of the point would be lost if issuance were delayed too long. In addition, governments would be criticized for secret diplomacy if public knowledge of the statement came about through leaks by the Communists or others.

The Secretary then suggested that it might be useful to consider sending the Declaration to the Secretary General as a part of the formal transmission of the armistice by the Unified Command to the United Nations. This would have to go forward as promptly as possible, but it is an important matter and it will take at least a week to prepare, since it must carefully establish the background and perhaps a good deal of the interpretation of the armistice.

All of the Commonwealth representatives expressed their personal opinions that the Secretary’s suggestion might be a useful solution. They promised to communicate with their Governments and let us know as soon as possible what their official Government views might be.

Ambassador Spender then asked whether there could be some arrangement under which they could receive advance notice of the signing of the armistice. Mr. Johnson said that we are satisfied that arrangements of this sort can be made.

1. President Rhee’s attitude toward the armistice raised serious doubts among the British, Canadian, and Australian Governments as to the timing and appropriateness of the Greater Sanctions Statement; these concerns are documented in numerous memoranda of conversation among the three nations’ Embassy staffs and Department of State officials during June and early July (located in the 795.00 decimal file). The change in working terminology to the “Joint Policy Declaration” was a manifestation of this uneasiness.
2. For the portion of the final communiqué relating to the Far East and Korea, Section V, see Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1953, pp. 105–106. For further documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings in Washington, July 10–14, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.
3. A report of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, July 20, 1953, not printed. (795.00/7–2053)
4. The addition read as follows: “Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.”