Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

121. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 16, 1955—3:12 p.m.

4575. Eyes only Collins from Secretary. I greatly doubt that it will be practical to give any effective US commitment to a program for replacing Diem without your going over the program personally with us here in Washington. To make any new plan succeed there will need to be a better understanding than can be arrived at by cable on the part of State, Defense and CIA, and also some Congressional leaders should be consulted as otherwise there will, I fear, be little chance of getting the needed appropriations. Therefore, I suggest with highest concurrence² that as soon as you get French proposals you should as rapidly as possible return with them to Washington for consultation here. We realize the risk of your being absent from Saigon at this critical time but also we realize that in view of the general trend of thinking here in Washington it would be almost impossible to get an effective switchover without personal consultation. I hope you will feel that the situation can be held in status quo during your absence and that your return will not be misinterpreted. Unless you think of some better reason you can say that the Congressional hearings on next year’s Mutual Security Act are about to start and that appropriation for Vietnam is one of the most significant items and that you are required here briefly for that purpose.³

I hope that if you find this program acceptable you will do all you can to see to it that Diem’s authority will be fully upheld in your absence. We feel that it would be a disaster if the French should unilaterally take action which would in effect supplant Diem or so weaken his authority as to require his replacement before in fact it was known whether or not there was a substitute program that could be agreed upon by our two Governments. Ely should realize that the situation is in this respect very delicate and that any attempt by the French to rush us or force our hand in this matter would almost surely have a generally serious effect on US-French relations and in particular a Congressional decision to cut off appropriations and to accept the loss of Vietnam on the theory that the money and effort can better be spent elsewhere. This might also cut off the appropriation for FEC.

In the event you agree to flying here, to permit your rapid transportation, Admiral Stump who is now in Washington advises he can arrange direct Defense transportation from Manila.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1655. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted and signed by Dulles. At midday April 16, Dulles met with Radford, Anderson, Wisner, Stump, and Hoover to discuss sending this cable. Two telephone calls were made and transcribed during the meeting. At 12:48 p.m. Dulles called Hagerty, who was with the President in Augusta, Georgia and asked him to inform Eisenhower that it was the consensus of the meeting that Collins should return to Washington to discuss plans for Diem’s replacement because such a decision could not be made by cable. At 1:09 p.m. Dulles called MacArthur and informed him of the meeting and the decision to ask Collins to return for consultations. Dulles went on to add that participants at the meeting “think the situation is getting so confused between us that we must ask him to come back.” The Secretary then read the proposed cable to MacArthur for his approval. MacArthur concurred but added that in the last paragraph of the text, referring to a potential Congressional decision to cut off appropriations for Vietnam, Dulles might wish to add a reference to the $100 million for the FEC. MacArthur noted that the French were banking on receiving this aid from the United States. Dulles said he might do this. (Both memoranda, April 16; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

2. According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, April 17, Dulles traveled to Augusta for discussions with Eisenhower beginning at 12:30 p.m. which covered a variety of topics. The following extract presents that discussion dealing with Vietnam:

   “I showed the President a copy of my cable to Collins suggesting his return (4575). I had previously cleared this in principle with the President by telephone, and the President indicated his concurrence. We talked over the situation. I indicated that …, particularly General [sic] Lansdale, had much more confidence in Diem than Collins had, and I thought Collins’ feeling that Diem lacked confidence in him was because Diem did not consult with him on certain matters which he felt Collins might feel in honor bound to disclose to Ely.

   “The President agreed that we should not try to shift horses until we had another one to shift to. He also indicated his concern at the Congressional reaction, and said he felt it would almost surely mean cutting off the $100,000,000 for the FEC.

   “(As I was leaving for the airport, I received a message that Collins was leaving for arrival on next Friday morning [April 22]. I arranged to have this information relayed to the President.)” (Ibid., Meetings with the President)

3. Text of the press release to this effect, April 18, is in telegram 3687 to Paris, April 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/4–1855)