Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

122. Telegram From the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 17, 1955—2 p.m.

4503. Ref Embtel 4498 (Saigon 665).² French called last evening to say they had received Ely’s views on U.S. questions (Deptel 3622³) and that French Government written response would be submitted us this morning. Latter delivered Embassy this morning and we were told that Couve would receive copy prior his meeting with Secretary tomorrow and would probably refer to it. Line taken in French aide-mémoire delivered this morning follows that indicated to us orally yesterday (reftel). Free translation follows (text by pouch⁴):

“FonOff gives below unofficial (a titre officieux) response to questions submitted by Embassy April 13 to French Government:

“Question A (Deptel 3622): French Government stresses once more fact that response to this question ought not be French but Franco-American. It is urgent then that necessary instructions be addressed by American Government to Gen. Collins with view to his preparation with Gen. Ely of joint (communes) suggestions.

“It goes without saying that the personality eventually designated will have to be an indisputable nationalist and not be labelled as a man particularly favorable to French or the Americans.

“Question B: It will not escape U.S. Government that a decision ought be reached urgently. Not only does the disintegration of the country become accentuated each day but still further the tension at Saigon is such that irreparable harm can occur following the least incident. It would be eminently desirable that a conservatory measure be taken before expiration of truce April 20. Bao Dai could for example announce in course of day Monday the commencement of positive realizations and leave hope that crisis will be settled in its entirety before end of month. It could notably be made known that he has decided to convoke to Cannes to confer with him a certain number of political personalities.

“Question C: The chief of this sect (Binh Xuyen) has already promised, in a declaration dated April 12, the resignation of the Chief of the Sûreté and the placement of the police at the disposition of the new government which would be formed.

“At the time of preparation of new solution, the Chief of State would state precisely that the change of government ipso facto involved the departure of the present Chief of the Sûreté, his replacement being at the discretion of the new government.

“French Government considers that the Binh Xuyen problem must be examined at same time as the question of the sects in its entirety and following the principles of:

• “A single nation,
• “A single state,
• “A single army,
• “A single administration.

“Question D: The procedure of which the French Government is thinking can be analyzed in three successive phases:

• “—A Franco-American phase,
• “—A Franco-American-Vietnamese phase,
• “—A Vietnamese phase finally, only this last phase being made public.

“Franco-American phase:

• “a) Four lists would first be prepared at Saigon by common agreement of Generals Ely and Collins, namely:
  • “—Names of possible Prime Minister;
  • “—Names of members of present Cabinet to remain in future government;
  • “—Names of personalities not belonging to present Cabinet and capable of being called to participate in the next or any other organism of the new structure;
  • “—Names of the personalities who should be convoked to Cannes.
• “b) Two governments French and American will then reach agreement on names to be retained (on lists).

“2) Franco-American-Vietnamese phase:

“Bao Dai would be approached secretly and jointly by the French and American authorities who would submit their joint suggestions and would reach agreement with him, on the one hand on the personalities to convoke (to Cannes) and on the other on the principal members of the new government.

“3) Purely Vietnamese phase:

• “a) Within the framework of the agreement thus reached, Bao Dai would endeavor, in course of conference at Cannes, to reach a solution agreeable to parties present.
• “b) It is then that he would make known his decisions to his people by a speech program which would forecast notably:

  “—Creation of a Supreme Council or High Council;

  “—Municipal elections permitting at a date as near as possible the indirect election (l’election a un deuxieme degre) of a National Assembly;

  “—Integration of the sects in the community, in conformity with the principles enunciated above.

“Question E: a) By the participation of the sects in the Supreme Council;

“b) By the creation of a government of national union and not of clan (clan) and which would meet criticisms directed for a long time against the Diem government by the sects and, in a more general fashion, by Vietnamese public opinion.

“c) By a general policy of honors, indemnification and especially integration in the army or regrouping.

“Question F: Since the independence agreements, the French forces in the feeling of the government of the Republic are no longer intended to reinforce (enforcer) any Vietnamese Governmental formation.⁵

“In conclusion French Government believes it ought underline following points:

• “The solution of the crisis can only result from a joint Franco-American action;
• “It ought not be interpreted as a victory for those opposing the legal government;
• “It cannot, in any way, end in the creation of a government which can appear to be under foreign domination.”

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1755. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information niact to Saigon.
2. In this telegram, April 16, the Embassy reported on conversations with French officials Roux and Risterucci who expressed disappointment over what they described as an apparent lack of desire on the part of the United States to seek a solution to the Saigon crisis within the Franco-American context. The French were wary of coming forward with what they believed would be labeled, to use Risterucci’s own words as quoted in telegram 4498, “French proposal for replacement Diem.” (Ibid., 751G.00/4–1655)
3. Document 117.
4. In despatch 2216 from Paris, April 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1855)

5. In telegram 4512 from Paris, April 18, the Embassy sent the following correction:

   “Re question F reference telegram, sentence ending ‘Vietnamese Governmental formation’ should have been immediately followed by sentence: ‘For present and for period impossible fix at this time, their presence (French forces) constitute, in spite rule of non-interference, factor of calm, order and stability from which the Vietnamese Government will be able largely benefit.’” (ibid.)