Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

127. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 19, 1955—11 p.m.

4663. For Secretary from Collins.

1. I called on Diem 1800 April 19 and asked whether he had considered further modified Thoai proposal. Diem handed me following note (in English):

Begin verbatim text.

1) I agree with idea of coalition if it is truly to obtain representation for the great majority of the people;

2) This is in accord with my belief in government which represents the people—and toward which I have been trying hard to bring Vietnam against so many difficulties;

3) I do not feel that the names given to me as suggestions for members of my cabinet—men from small opposition parties who actually represent only a handful of people—are in accord with the principle of having the great majority of the people represented in the Government—which I understand is our mutual desire. Certainly this is the political principle of the United States in its own government;

4) I agree that no one man should manipulate the election of a National Assembly so that he dominates it falsely. This is the very reason why I have proposed that we hold a general election—in a manner which will be most familiar to my people—to elect a National Assembly;

5) With a general election, there is every reason to expect that the people will be represented by people of their own choosing—and not by self-appointed spokesmen for the people;

6) I do not believe any freedom-loving Vietnamese—and we all know that we are facing a clear decision between freedom and Communism here—is fearful of Communists being elected to high position through the means of a general election;

7) I would prefer to let an assembly chosen by all the people in a general election be the deciding factor in the continued life of this government—than to have a complex system of contrived representation do so, no matter how wisely this system was devised by a group of men. The people are the ones whose lives are at stake. They should be given a voice in their own future;

8) On the basis of these principles dear to me, and to free men throughout the world, I am willing to accept coalition.

April 19, 1955. End verbatim text.

2. With reference to last paragraph of note, I asked whom Diem would take into a “coalition”. He said that his Cabinet ministers should be “capable, neutral” men. He made a point which the note does not make clear that the coalition he envisages would be formed after general elections to be held in3 or 4 months. Diem said that his government must fight Communism, feudalism, and colonialism. If it had 5 or 10 years it could use various peaceful measures. However, owing to exigencies of situation, military pressure must be used. He said he believed the people were in accord with that principle.

3. I reminded Diem that there is no election law and no election machinery. I said all those I had consulted agreed that general elections were not now practicable. I added that in my view his government could not continue for three months as it is now. Diem replied that he believed when people knew elections would take place in three months they would change their attitude. I asked what he proposed to do in the meantime. He said he would carry out reforms and programs with which I was familiar, and to do this he proposed to choose only additional Cabinet members having same political concepts as himself. He said the struggle is very hard and there can be no compromise.

4. I asked if he thought Quat was in favor of colonialism, feudalism, and Communism. He said that Quat favors compromise methods. I asked the same about Do. Diem said Do avoids difficulties and has no plan. I asked same about Thoai. Diem said that Thoai is anxious only to return to his chemical laboratory.

5. I told Diem that I did not know what would happen to his government and country if he continued on present course since I believed his solution must lead to civil war. Diem replied that he realized risks were involved, and that he never ceased to reflect on nation’s problems. He said compromise had lost the war against Viet Minh. I said that in my opinion Vietnamese people did not want civil war. Diem replied that neither did he wish civil war, but added that “feudalists” are unscrupulous. I said that I must report to my government that I believed Diem’s course of action must lead to civil war.

6. I told Diem that all Vietnamese with whom I had talked were likewise opposed to colonialism, feudalism, and Communism. However, they differ as to methods of tackling these problems and do not approve of Diem’s way of working. Diem said that on the contrary they did not oppose his methods, but his political concepts. He added that every time a compromise is made the problem returns in more acute form. The people do not like this.

7. I asked what Diem would do if Bao Dai decided to make a change of Prime Minister. Diem said Bao Dai has power to do so and will decide. However, experience in Vietnam during the war had proved compromise to be ineffectual. It will be unfortunate if Bao Dai does not accept his course of action. I told Diem that I believed that if no coalition were effected prior to elections, Bao Dai would make a change. I had tried to assist Vietnamese to avoid drastic solution of this sort, but unless government is effectively broadened, I believe there will be a change. Diem said he was continuing his political conversations to test acceptability of his ideas. I said I hoped he would do everything possible to avoid open conflict during my absence. Diem said that if he had removed Sang as Chief of Police in beginning, he would now have Saigon well in hand.

8. I asked if he had had any reports from Luyen. Diem replied that Bao Dai was absent when Luyen arrived. He said that Luyen had reported that people in Paris had no understanding of what was going on in Vietnam.

9. On taking my departure I said that in my opinion Bao Dai would remove Diem if he continued as at present. I had done my best to help. I admired his accomplishments and his character, but not his method of working and only regretted that I had not been able to do more for him and his country.

10. I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1955. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information priority to Paris for Dillon. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 918–922.