Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

126. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 19, 1955—11 p.m.

4662. To the Secretary from Collins.

1. I met with Do, Quat, Minh and Tran Van Van 1500 April 19 to review with them their reactions to modified Thoai proposal. I went over each step carefully, so that there would be no misunderstanding as to my meaning.

2. Minh’s reaction was that situation was now much worse than in period before his resignation and crisis would be much more easily resolved without Diem than with him. Minh said he tended to favor early general elections to set up a constitutional assembly in 3 or 4 months. Meanwhile, a coalition government would be necessary, but it would be difficult to form with Diem as Prime Minister.

3. Quat said he had no specific commentary to make on the proposal but wished to contribute an analysis of crisis. The two main elements, he said, are Diem’s government and sects’ position. A third and less crucial factor is political opinion of opposition other than sects. Diem’s obvious errors and faulty methods have created moat between him and all other elements in the society which is becoming broader and deeper, and contacts between Diem and others are becoming more remote. With regard to sects, these groups know the problem they createmust be resolved. He feels only way to resolve problem is progressively through mobilizing public opinion and creating an atmosphere in which sects can be induced accept peaceful solution. Problem could have been resolved more easily at an earlier time. Quat said he did not think Diem and any team he might gather could resume effective contact with sects.

4. Quat discussed in a generally unfavorable sense Do’s idea of having Bao Dai convoke a congress.² He said the congress would be more quickly set up than a Provisional Assembly and would be more manageable. However, owing to Bao Dai’s absence in France, present political roles of sects and attitude of other political groups, he believed congress not practicable. Quat said he thought the best solution would be provided by a Provisional Assembly, but political groups are fearful of any assembly constituted under Diem as Prime Minister.

5. Do said that in his view means should be found to allow Vietnamese public opinion to be heard. He had suggested congress as a means to that end. If there were an assembly present, crisis could be more easily resolved. A congress, operating under Binh Xuyen menace, might remove Diem and this could be interpreted as victory for sects with unfortunate effects in U.S. Do suggested as possibility that congress berepresentative only of political groups and not of sects. If Provisional Assembly solution were adopted, it would be necessary find interim government to function for period of perhaps six weeks and thus problem remains of creating a new government. Diem is a barrier to solution of this problem. Do referred to fact that during nine years of war no government could obtain popular support for struggle against Communism because they were all French puppet governments. Problem now is to gain popular support to continue resistance to Viet Minh. Diem’s government has not succeeded in convincing people or political groups of necessity to carry on anti-Viet Minh struggle. Only a government fully supported by people can do that, and such a government must come from some kind of popular body, either an assembly or a congress. As a practical test of whether provisional government followed by Provisional Assembly would be acceptable solution, Do suggested asking specific individuals, such as Quat and Minh, whether they would agree to enter such provisional government. Minh said that he would agree to enter a provisional government if political groups represented by Quat and others accepted, but he felt this solution had been overtaken by events. Quat said that if an immediate answer from him was required, it would have to be negative. He added that, in his opinion, Diem cannot now organize an interim government.

6. Van said that he felt Diem might accept the proposal but that proposed members of new team, thinking Diem incapable of change, would not agree to participate. He said that Diem does not have support in the country, and while his group would risk almost anything for a good solution, they would not take the chance of participating in interim Diem Cabinet.

7. I said that if Vietnamese leaders were unable to find solution, and Diem was removed under circumstances which pointed to sect victory, it would be very difficult to obtain popular support in U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid. I therefore urged participants to consider matter further and to find some other solution if that which we discussed seemed impracticable to them.

8. More follows.³

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1955. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information priority to Paris for Dillon. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 915–917.
2. Do made this suggestion, as reported in telegram 4599, April 17, in a discussion with Collins on April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1755)
3. Telegram 4663, infra.