Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

131. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, April 22, 1955.

Dear Walter: I refer to the current situation in South Vietnam and the probable necessity for review of the basic policy in that area.

An analysis of the problems has been made by my staff in the attached staff study. I think it is an excellent study and I highly recommend you and your staff read it.

While I realize these problems have no easy solution, to me the basic issues are quite clear. I believe there are three major areas of weakness in South Vietnam as follows:

a. The need for a solution of the problem of how we can achieve our ends in South Vietnam and yet live with the French.

b. The need for a solution of how we can achieve internal order with particular reference to the sects, the lack of internal communications, and the lack of strength in the central government. (During my recent trip I conferred with Diem at which time he stated that if his government could become strong he felt the people would rally to it, and that at present Ho Chi Minh offered the only strong rallying point to the people of South Vietnam.)

c. The need for a solution of how we can achieve a suitable government of South Vietnam, with particular reference to its relationship to Bao Dai, the broadening of its base, and the participation of capable people within the government. (I feel that in the past we have made a mistake in building the government upon one man.)

In view of the probable nature of the problems to be discussed with General Collins during his visit, I consider that this information may be of value to you.

Sincerely yours,

H. Struve Hensel%%²

[Attachment]

PROGRAMS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH VIET-NAM

Problem:

To re-examine current implementation of U.S. policy pertaining to South Viet-Nam in light of current events related to that area.

Discussion:

Tab A.³

Conclusions:

1. Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of the Far East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. The successful accomplishment of U.S. programs for South Viet-Nam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs as the French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as they further French policy in the area.

3. The influence of Bao Dai in his position as Chief of State is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

4. Alternatives to the Diem Government should be given adequate consideration in the event the U.S. cannot longer reasonably support Diem.

5. A strong, stable, viable government cannot be developed in South Viet-Nam until a reasonable solution to the problem of the Sects has been determined.

6. The Viet-Minh are capable, even without resorting to overt aggression, of preventing the total accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.

7. The military defense of Viet-Nam would be extremely difficult if not impossible should: The FEC withdraw from South Viet-Nam and no other forces be immediately available to fill the vacuum; the Viet-Minh then overtly intervene; and no U.S. ground forces be included in “other” forces ultimately used to fill the vacuum.

8. The loss of Viet-Nam and subsequent political developments would render the military defense of the remainder of Southeast Asia extremely difficult, if not impossible.

9. It is questionable that South Viet-Nam could at this time win an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Nam.

Recommendations:

1. Direct U.S. military aid and support programs at the rapid and efficient development of indigenous forces, particularly Thailand and Cambodia. Any U.S. military aid program in the latter should be contingent upon U.S. control of the organization and training of Cambodian forces.

2. Obtain a firm statement of French policy relating to Viet-Nam; inform the French that the U.S. will expect complete French support in the implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

3. Obtain from the Department of State an immediate and practical solution to the problem of Bao Dai. (From a Defense point of view, he should be a figurehead only, with a minimum amount of control over the Viet-Nam Government.)

4. Accept General Collins’ recommendations on alternatives to the current Vietnamese Government but make certain that the problem of the Sects is also considered concurrently.

5. Regardless of whether Diem or alternative government is in power, it should be understood that the Binh Xuyen will immediately be stripped of all power and subjugated to the National Government; that the government will include representation from the other Sects; and that these other Sects will eventually be completely subjugated to the National Government.

6. In re-evaluating current or establishing new U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam insure adequate consideration of Viet-Minh capabilities rather than possible intentions.

7. Determine U.S. military action within the scope of the SEACDT in order to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Viet-Nam.

8. Make every effort to abolish or postpone indefinitely the elections proposed for Viet-Nam, under the Geneva Accords, for July 1956.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2255. Top Secret. This letter and its attachments are also printed in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 923–936.
2. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature and an indication that it was signed.
3. Tab A was a 10-page study. For text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 927–936.