Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

132. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 23, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Report on Vietnamese Political Situation.

I. General Collins’ Report

A. During two long meetings in the Department Friday,² General Collins vigorously reiterated his view that no solution in Viet-Nam is possible as long as Diem remains in office. He tried to convince Diem to accept a compromise solution but he says Diem stubbornly refused to consider it. General Collins emphasized that Diem’s inability to govern successfully was not due to lack of Ely’s support but to Diem’s major incapacities to organize a following, handle men, delegate responsibility, concentrate on essential matters and come up with ideas and suggestions. Gen. Collins believes that Diem has no organized support and very little personal popularity except perhaps in Central Viet-Nam. While he acknowledges the many other factors in this situation, Gen. Collins forcefully repeated his conclusion that some new arrangement is urgently required. He inclines to Dr. Quat as successor which Bao Dai has now formally proposed to us and probably the French (Para II A). The meetings Friday only began to explore various solutions and major procedural problems. No tentative recommendations were made.

While he has not fully agreed with Ely’s estimate that a major military crisis might break out at any time, Gen. Collins feels that the Saigon situation is tense enough that it could ignite quickly at any time. Gen. Collins added two new interesting sidelights on his picture of the situation:

1) He said Diem’s brother, the Bishop, recently admitted to him the disproportionate influence of the other brothers on Diem, and the Bishop’s inability to dissuade Diem from listening to them almost exclusively. Gen. Collins confirmed that there is widespread bitter opposition to Diem because of his reliance on his brothers, other than the Bishop;

2) Gen. Collins said that Gen. Ely and the French have not denied the Vietnamese National Army ammunition or gasoline either on the night of March 28 or 29 when the Binh Xuyen attacked, or since. There has been a standing French offer to turn over additional ammunition depots to the Vietnamese army which it has so far not answered. While the French officers did try to stop the outbreak of fighting that night, it was to prevent the outbreak of civil war which Ely is convinced will occur if the national army drives the Binh Xuyen out of Saigon, which it can do.

B. At lunch with the President Friday noon, Gen. Collins made a general report along the above lines.³ The President reportedly emphasized the difficulties with respect to Congressional and public opinion in making any change in Saigon.

II. Various Suggestions for Meeting Saigon Political Crisis

A. Bao Dai’s Plan: In a telegram from Paris April 21,⁴ Bao Dai has proposed to us through a spokesman that Dr. Quat be asked immediately to form a new government in conjunction with a new “Council of National Union”, both to be under the legal authority of Bao Dai. The sects could be in the new Council but not in the cabinet which would include about twelve “technicians” acceptable to all factions, anti-Communists and competent for their jobs. The Council would have eighteen or twenty members representing all Vietnamese factions and groups except the Communists. Both Cabinet and Council would have real powers. Bao Dai would serve as arbitrator in any disputes between them. However, the Council would serve only until a National Assembly is established. Bao Dai is reported to have “settled on” this plan because he is convinced no solution is possible unless Diem is removed at least temporarily and replaced as Prime Minister. He believes Diem’s plan of a provisional government and national election is “madness”. The U.S. must take no visible role in implementing his plan but he wants U.S. agreement to it in principle. He is prepared to make a formal commitment to us that he can put it into effect quickly. He will stake his personal prestige in assuring that the sects will agree (1) to incorporation of all their forces into the national army, and (2) not to take part in the Cabinet but only in the Council. After securing this agreement from them, Bao Dai assures us he will obtain Binh Xuyen agreement to give up control of the national police force. Bao Dai believes Quat is the best qualified candidate to receive “passive” French-U.S. and “active” Vietnamese support to form a government of national union. He wants general U.S.-French approval for this plan but then both countries must withdraw from active role in forming the new government and influencing its daily activities. If U.S. insists on continuing with Diem and rejects his plan, he will no longer take any responsibility for events in Viet-Nam. He will do nothing further until he receives our reply. He emphasized need for prompt action.

General Collins suggests we use this plan as a basis, although he recommends, among other things, the Council be advisory. Our discussions with him pointed up the danger that this plan would appear to be “made in France”.⁵ In our meetings Friday we had just begun to explore whether any such plan might be made to look more “Saigon-originated”.

B. Diem’s New Proposals: In his radio broadcast of April 23,⁶ Saigon, Diem proposed a national referendum on four major political questions, general elections in three or four months, and immediate negotiations with the sect leaders whom he asked to meet with him. He has offered them financial assistance and integration into the national army. There has been no reaction to this as of Saturday⁷ afternoon.

C. UK Ambassador’s Views: On April 22, Ambassador Stephenson in Saigon told our Chargé Diem must go and that Diem’s intransigent turn-down of compromise proposals makes it impossible to change the government without going to Bao Dai.⁸ His selection of a new Prime Minister would attach to anew man “the Bao Dai stigma” To avoid this Stevenson suggests Bao Dai name a new Premier to head an interim government pending elections of a national assembly which would then choose and submit to Bao Dai the name of a new prime minister.

Comment: This is similar to the suggestion Department has been making and Collins was exploring in Saigon before he returned, except that Diem would remain as interim head, pending a provisional assembly in early June. That arrangement with Diem may have become impracticable.

III. Steps to be taken

We are preparing briefing papers⁹ for discussions with you Monday and Tuesday on the following major questions:

A. What should we say to Diem, if anything, before and if we decide on assenting to some new arrangement? Perhaps it would be the decent thing to do to have the U.S. Government tell Diem of the impasse that has been reached and of the necessity for the U.S. to look for some new arrangement, before we withdraw our support completely from him. This could be done by a message for Kidder to deliver orally, by a personal note from you to Diem, or, if there were time, for Collins to deliver in person on his return.

B. What reply should be made to Bao Dai and when? This is a difficult answer because it involves the entire picture of whether, on what terms and conditions, and when a new political composition should be attempted in Saigon through his auspices.

C. Is Quat the best available replacement for Diem and to what extent should the U.S. engage itself in Quat’s candidacy?

D. To what extent should and can Diem be kept on the scene in some new role, such as chairman of the National Council with some major responsibility such as supervising the Free Vietnamese handling of consultations with the Viet Minh on the election problem, or giving special attention to the refugees, most of whom are Catholics.

E. Will it be possible to solve the possible dilemma that a Bao Dai formula will seem to be foreign-inspired and unacceptable to that extent, while on the other hand the leading personalities in Saigon appear increasingly unable to compose their differences and come up with any formula on their own? This may mean that we will have to do a lot behind the scene to put the pieces together if that is possible. There is increasing mention in our telegrams that the Viet Minh may be playing a more active role as instigator and exploiter of the situation.

F. What role should Bao Dai play?

IV. Gen. Collins’ Appointments

He is scheduled to have lunch with you Monday noon. Mr. Allen Dulles is free to see him Monday morning or later Monday afternoon. Mr. Morton has tentatively set up appointments with Senator Mansfield and Senator Fulbright and others on the Hill for Tuesday.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2355. Top Secret. Drafted by Young.
2. April 22; another account of these meetings is printed infra.

3. In a brief memorandum of April 23 to Secretary Dulles concerning this meeting Hoover reported:

   “The presentation by General Collins closely followed discussions which he was having on the same date with members of the staff of the Department, which are being reported to you separately. I will therefore not outline them in this memorandum.

   “No decisions were made and the entire matter is being held in abeyance pending further consideration by the Department, and your return.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2355)

   A memorandum of the Eisenhower–Collins meeting by Dillon Anderson, dated April 22, is in Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File, Vietnam.

4. Telegram 4576 from Paris, April 21, reported telegraphically the information in Document 129. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2155)
5. This was Kidder’s assessment as reported in telegram 4780 from Saigon, April 24. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–2455)
6. According to telegram 4773 from Saigon, April 24, the text of this broadcast was transmitted to Washington as FBIS B–232346. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–2455)
7. April 23.
8. As reported in telegram 4770 from Saigon, April 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2255)
9. Not found in Department of State files.