134. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1
VIET-NAM
- a)
- Risks of some outbreak of civil war in South Viet-Nam still great and impose need for very urgent action.
- b)
- Root of trouble is that Diem’s prolonged attempt to run a one-man government has destroyed his chances of ever securing the collaboration of other prominent Vietnamese personalities. There has been a steady build-up of intellectual opinion against him. He has got nowhere with his own efforts to form a government worth anything.
- c)
- Public opinion in Great Britain, as elsewhere, is unlikely to view intervention by Bao Dai with any enthusiasm.
- d)
- But Bao Dai represents the only constitutional method of dealing with the situation (cf. appeals from the Sects, senior army officers and even Do, which show that Vietnamese themselves recognize this).
- e)
- Therefore, given this constitutional position and urgency, there seems no alternative to an intervention by Bao Dai. He is needed as a catalyst.
2. Therefore …2
- a)
- An immediate approach should be made to Bao Dai asking him to take the initiative in bringing about a solution.
- b)
- Bao Dai should not be encouraged to return in person to Viet-Nam (he probably does not wish to at present).
- c)
- In tackling Bao Dai, care must be taken to avoid the imputation of foreign pressure.
3. a) The type of solution which should be sought is the setting up of a temporary government with or without Diem, pending the establishment of a national assembly.
b) Even by using Bao Dai, it might prove impossible to get the other parties and intellectual personalities to accept Diem, even as a temporary measure. This possibility must be faced. Their acceptance might be obtained if solid guarantees were given that the government to be formed would be of strictly limited duration.
c) If Diem fails, this must appear as being due to his political isolation and not represented as a victory for the Sects or French opinion.
d) If it can possibly be achieved, the request for Bao Dai’s intervention should be agreed upon by the Vietnamese in Saigon and put to him by the parties from there. If this cannot be achieved, it might prove necessary for a meeting to take place in France.