Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

133. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Hensel)¹

Washington, April 25, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Department of State Debriefing of General Collins

General Collins was debriefed by Department of State representatives, commencing at 1000 Friday, 22 April. Also present at this debriefing were representatives of Defense, FOA, CIA, USIA, and Treasury.

The problems discussed were primarily political in nature and the objective of the discussion was to arrive at a solution to the current governmental situation in South Viet-Nam. However, two problems of interest to the Department of Defense—financial support of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) and integration of Sect forces into the Vietnamese National Army—were also discussed.

In the political phase of the discussion, the various proposals which have been made during recent weeks were analyzed and the following points are considered to be of interest:

a. General Collins stated that:

(1) In his opinion it would be a major error in judgement to continue to support a man (Diem) who has demonstrated such a marked inability to understand the political, economic and military problems associated with Viet-Nam.

(2) Diem is currently governing by himself, based on the advice of his brothers and a few close friends (Ministers of Justice, Finance, and Information).

(3) Diem simply cannot get along with other capable men.

(4) Diem, in five months, has not had one original constructive suggestion, idea, or plan. Generals Collins and Ely have been responsible for any of these which appeared to originate with Diem.

(5) Doctor Quat and former Foreign Minister Do are the most able men available in South Viet-Nam.

(6) General elections in South Viet-Nam are not possible and the best form of government for this country would be a constitutional monarchy. The Vietnamese are not, and will not be in the immediate future, ready for a republican form of government.

(7) Various plans which have been proposed for interim forms of governments, such as provisional or constituent assemblies, and including the plan of Thoai (Minister for Planning and Reconstruction)² which was considered worthy of further study, are doomed to defeat as Diem will not accept such recommendations.

(8) “Diem has been informed by me that I don’t see how anyone can save his government and that I think that Bao Dai will remove him.”

b. In elaborating further on the situation in South Viet-Nam General Collins stated that the Bao Dai plan (Embtel Paris 4576³) attached as Tab A is worthy of consideration and recommends that the U.S. concur in its implementation. Based on this statement, Mr. Murphy, State, commented that for a time it appeared that Diem was developing successfully according to General Collins’ reports but that General Collins had now reversed his position. In response, General Collins stated that he had never indicated that Diem was indispensable. General Collins further stated that this was the best we could hope to obtain as pertains to a Vietnamese-conceived plan and that practically any plan was going to be saddled, propaganda-wise, with the stigma of French or U.S. conception.

c. In a further discussion between Mr. Murphy and General Collins the problem of the fighting between the Sects and the National Army was developed and General Collins stated:

(1) The U.S. is just now beginning to train the Vietnamese National Army and a senior Vietnamese Army officer stated that they had no desire to fight other Vietnamese (Sects).

(2) Ty (Army Chief of Staff) told General Ely he would not order an attack on the Sects.

(3) The French will not, except to protect their own people, use French troops against the Sects. Their primary mission is one of external security.

(4) The bitter feud between Bay Vien and Diem originated in Diem’s closing of the “Grande Monde”.

(5) Practically all Vietnamese now disagree with Diem.

(6) Some compromise will be necessary on the part of Diem’s replacement.

(7) The Binh Xuyen are not in a strong military position.

(8) Bay Vien and the Sects will accept the concept of Bao Dai’s plan.

(9) Bay Vien will surrender the control of the police if ordered to do so by Bao Dai and if Diem is replaced.

(10) Although an effort must be made to give Bay Vien an opportunity to save face, the Binh Xuyen must be stripped of their power.

(11) Based on the above, General Collins considered that there were only two solutions to this problem—acceptance of the proposal of Bao Dai, or for Bao Dai to return and assume the Premiership. General Collins did not consider the latter as a desirable solution.

d. In response to a question, General Collins stated that the current situation in South Viet-Nam was definitely not engineered by the French. He further stated that General Ely has given Diem unequivocal support. However, he could not speak for French support from Paris. General Collins emphasized that civil war could break out at any moment and that either side could be responsible.

e. General Collins stated that the U.S. has a moral obligation in relation to the 500,000 Vietnamese refugees and that it would be difficult for the U.S. to withdraw from Viet-Nam.

f. In reference to the Sainteny mission, General Collins stated that General Ely has threatened to resign over this issue. He indicated that the French business people have not adjusted to the concept of a Free Viet-Nam. He thought that the French would just as soon see an indefinite partition of Viet-Nam but that the U.S. should force the issue of French support for a legally constituted Vietnamese Government.

With reference to the two problems primarily of military interest, General Collins stated that:

a. We should not provide one nickel more than the 100 million dollars currently available for support of the FEC. They might reduce their forces but would not withdraw.

b. The current dispositions of the FEC are sound.

c. The FEC is a strong, stabilizing influence in South Viet-Nam.

d. Implementation of Article IV of the Manila Pact would require ground forces to stabilize the front and give the U.S. Air and Navy forces something to shoot at.

e. Air and Naval forces will not alone result in a victory in this area in the event of overt aggression.

f. Integration of Sect forces as he has proposed (DA IN 130977) (Tab B)⁴ has now been agreed to by the French.

g. This integration will now cost approximately 40 million dollars rather than the 26 million as previously stated.

h. This plan for integration will eventually provide for a reduction in Sect power.

In summary, General Collins is firmly convinced that it will be to the detriment of U.S. interests to continue to support Diem. However, State is reluctant to face the fact that they must admit a failure in U.S. policy and obviously will attempt to retain Diem in the Government in some capacity.

A.C. Davis
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

1. Source: United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 937–940.
2. Nguyen Van Thoai.
3. See footnote 4, supra.
4. Not printed.